# MODERN AGE

### A CONSERVATIVE REVIEW

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The De-Marxification of the SPD

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Eighty Days around the Communist World
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Communist Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics

# **MODERN AGE**

A Conservative Review



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### Eichmann in Israel

As these words are being written, Adolf Eichmann, son of Karl Adolf Eichmann, as the trial record faithfully records every day, has been in the hands of the Israelis for a year. His long deposition—more than 3500 pages—tape recorded and then typed for his corrections, the statements of people who knew him before and during the period of his lethal activities, the testimony of his jailers, leave him as open to observation as does the glass enclosure wherein he sits pale and shrunken in his sober blue suit. He makes many notes,

leafs busily through the pile of documents on his table, looks toward his lawyer, the witnesses and the judges, never at the audience in the courtroom, his eyes blinking, his face twitching now and then, but otherwise tense and expressionless behind his glasses. Even when a man in the gallery rose and shouted incoherent words, among them "Bloodhound!" before the police could lead him from the courtroom, Eichmann did not turn as did everyone else toward the sudden bustle of the disturbance. His persona, as is evident from his statement

as well as from his stiff carriage in the courtroom is that of the "treue Husar," a grotesquerie of the military virtue of obedience unto death, of "Traveller, go tell the Laodiceans that here, obedient to their words, we lie." All his life, he has said, he was brought up to obey orders, to that ideal of Kadaver Gehorsam under which any command whatever is mechanically carried out. He would without hesitation have shot his own father had he known him to be a traitor and had he been ordered to do so, he has said, and it is easy to believe him. But he is also in this persona a man of taste, of sensibility, he cannot bear the sight of a wound, he could not have been a doctor, and when reluctantly, but under orders, he visited in 1941 the first extermination camp where gas was to be used, he was revolted not only by its purpose but also by the man who had it in charge. This person, although a police officer, appeared without his coat, his sleeves rolled up and he gave Eichmann the distasteful impression of having built the camp with his own hands. In addition he used coarse language, spoke a south German dialect and, who can tell?—may even have been drinking-another possibility distressing to Eichmann. Finding himself in 1942 as the chief expert on the Jewish problem, at the Wannsee conference among ministers of state, Eichmann remembers gratefully the gentility of the gathering where cognac was served and the ministers spoke with few words and to the point. That is what he recalls about the meeting convened to arrange for the destruction of all the Jews in Europe. At the scenes of the killings Eichmann, although the most ardent of hunters in his pursuit of Jews for delivery to the extermination camps, has to look away, as he does during the forced marches of exhausted prisoners-men and women-where thousands died or were shot on the roadsides. On the occasion of another visit to check on the killings at Minsk and Lwow, Eichmann while invited to do so cannot bring himself to watch more than a small part of the executions, and he takes his mind off the horror of the scene by admiring the charming railroad station built to celebrate the 60th year of the reign of Franz Josef.

His habits of obedience have remained with him. Soon after being brought to Israel, Eichmann asked for something to eat, and one after the other as they were handed to him he solemnly chewed up seven slices of bread. He then thanked his jailer and said he had a request, would it be possible next time to give him only six slices? He is elaborately polite to his questioner from the Israeli police as he undoubtedly was to Himmler and to Heydrich. "Yes indeed, Herr Hauptmann," he says to his interrogator, "Please do not disturb yourself, Herr Hauptmann, on my account," when the officer suggests he may want to rest. "I am here to tell you everything," he says, "even things that are damaging." And he recounts how he once forced a man out of the SS because he beat two or three Jews for no reason. It is a story, obviously, in which he plays an uncommonly humane role although he wishes to point out, since he's concealing nothing, that he is responsible; the man had served under him. He himself he says with shame, in a moment of anger once boxed the ears of a Jew who stood before him. But he was never an anti-Semite, through his stepmother he was even related to Jews, and helped one of them escape to Switzerland. In short Eichmann, like Himmler, like Hoess the commandant of Auschwitz, and thousands of other murderous operators was able to take his part in organizing the killings and then live more or less in a normal fashion by a fantastic legerdemain of self-idealization. These men who stood in no danger, in well pressed uniforms,

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while defenseless people were slaughtered, became for themselves heroes performing difficult tasks more abhorrent to their inner natures than to others less sensitive, but nevertheless stoically doing their duty to their Leader, to the State and its higher order. One of the witnesses in the trial described this scene: as Jews were gathered in a town for transport to the place of execution, a young baby held in the arms of its mother, began to cry. An SS man went to her and said: "May I take the child, please?" The mother hesitated for a moment before handing over the baby and the SS man took the child and dashed its head against the ground. Men like this told one another they had an assignment beyond the ordinary call of duty but like the soldiers at the front they had to carry it out if the enemies of the race and its future were to be made harmless.

The Eichmann trial will contribute to history in its side-effects, as Nuremberg did, by being the occasion for the accumulation of documents, of eyewitness accounts out of which we may one day be able to explain how in the 20th century such events. on such a vast, efficient and continuous scale could be organized. But just as Nuremberg was the trial of the vanquished by the victors, so is this the trial of the persecutors, of the hangmen by their victims. Eichmann fades into the background as the witnesses tell their stories of murder and heroism, of the manner of dying of millions of people. For the trial is a point of concentration, like a medieval theater where the audience knows the play, knows the characters and the tragic end and nonetheless relives each scene as though seeing it for the first time.

For the government, the prosecution, the trial is another proof of the need for this state of Israel to exist, of the Jews to rely on themselves for justice, or for mere survival-were not the doors of escape, even those in the hands of their friends closed to them? And who else in the course of years ferreted out Eichmann and brought him before a court of law? That the law under which he is being tried is retroactive is conceded, but it is argued that necessity makes law, that the chaos, the nihilism, of the Hitler period have forced the courts at Nuremberg and those of subsequent trials including this one, to deal with the perpetrators of a new crime, genocide, as nations dealt with pirates who could be captured and punished by any power. That this court is prejudiced may be admitted says the Attorney General, what human being would not be? But the judges will be fair which is all any judge, Israeli or not, could be. Even in Nazi Germany he points out, the communist Dimitrov, was freed by a court that could not be convinced of his guilt for the Reichstag fire.

The behavior of the court substantiates his view. The three judges are learned, courteous, patient, although one in the early part of the trial nodded and awakened with a perceptible start when a question was asked. While they hand down the expected decisions confirming their own competence, they check the Attorney General from over-elaborating his case but in the interest of the historical record and of the world television audience, they permit wide latitude to the prosecution in producing witnesses who testify to atrocities they saw but which have no direct connection with the defendant. They listen carefully to Dr. Servatius, Eichmann's lawyer, and in its procedures, its externals this is a true court, weighing objections, the evidence, seeking the truth. And that Eichmann since his kidnapping has been well treated is evident from the tone of his rambling deposition; the conduct and interrogations of his jailers seem to have been impeccable however roughly handled he may have been in the Argentine. While Servatius, here as in Nuremberg, is working under considerable handicaps he will be able to make his case. He has obstacles not shared by the prosecution; insufficient funds, (the \$20,-000 he was paid was furnished by Israel and he says he has already spent it), witnesses who cannot be brought from Germany or wherever they are, either because they are unwilling to come, or would be in danger of arrest if they did. Their testimony however may be taken in a German court and will be admitted as evidence. And on the whole Servatius can probably present as good a defense as can be made for his client; no money and no witnesses are likely to affect the record which is so damaging and which has been so thoroughly preserved.

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The flaw of the trial is not in its forms but in its structure. It is like Nuremberg a trial with political overtones. No one questions Eichmann's guilt; he himself admits it in the context of the post-Nazi world and has even offered, because of his complicity in the mass murders, to hang himself in public. Chancellor Adenauer denies that Eichmann is a German citizen, and Austria, the only other country that might claim his allegiance, has made no request for his deportation. For the representatives of East Germany the trial is solely an opportunity for propaganda. They are present to show that Nazism survives in the Bundesrepublik, in its army and government and Eichmann as such has no interest whatever for them. The representatives of the Bundesrepublik who are here as observors have kept an ostentatious distance from the accused and his counsel; they comport themselves as the representatives of a neutral power whose interest at some point may conceivably be involved. The Russian concern with the trial is limited to the line of the anti-West German press of the Iron Curtain countries. A request on the part of the Israeli government for the delivery of copies of documents kept by the Soviet government in Vilna was not even answered. Such matters come under the jurisdiction of the desk of Middle Eastern Affairs, not under the department of historical research, certainly not of justice.

Despite the outward correctness of the proceedings it is evident that Israel has missed an opportunity to forward the cause of law as well as justice and international comity in a time when all three are inconspicuous in international relations. "We shall neither forgive nor forget," says the Attorney General and this remote thunder of the prophets is heard too in the Israeli press. What then becomes of a distressed humanity, no part of which is wholly without guilt in history? Does it live forever in the massacres, the St. Bartholomew nights, the endless injustices of the past? And of course, in fact, the Israelis like people everywhere do forgive. The mark of Cain is not on all Germans. Ben Gurion and Adenauer, simple Israelis and Germans have pleasant even friendly relations -but the rhetoric, for political purposes no doubt, is unrelenting. Yet Israel herself is surrounded by enemies who can and do point to the thousands of Arab refugees, whose property is held by the Israelis, to the punitive killing of defenseless Arab civilians. For this latter offense it is true, the responsible Israelis were given heavy sentences, but it is also true that the sentences were later commuted and the perpetrators only lightly punished. And if Israel has jurisdiction over crimes committed before its laws were written and can act on behalf of Jews in any country, what is to prevent, as Servatius among others has asked, one of the new African states from claiming the right to kidnap and to try the persecutors of the Negro in South

Africa or Tennessee? But conceding the primary need to try Eichmann, and the fact that no other country took the pains to find him and bring him to trial, what aside from chauvinism kept Israel from asking that an international court be convoked to try the accused who had participated in crimes against the nationals of many countries? If the representatives of these two and a quarter million people had been ready to share their hard won sovereignty

to this extent, the verdict of any court could not conceivably be different from what this one will be. But the cause of manifest justice would have been better served and Israel would have taken a historic step toward a new order of the West, plainly dissociating herself from doctrines that have made so many victims of her people.

—E. D. (Jerusalem, Israel.)

# MODERN AGE

A Conservative Review



The danger of words for our weapons

# Disarmament: Hope or Trap?

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

It is a tragic irony of the present age that, just when the theoretical case for reducing or eliminating armaments seems strongest, the practical obstacles to international agreement in this field are most formidable. Never has war seemed less rational. Never have so many varied and complex difficulties stood in the way of safe, effective arms limitation.

Destruction of civilization is not too strong a term for what could happen as

the consequence of a war, fought with existing weapons of mass destruction, especially in the old European lands of small area and dense population, rich in historic monuments, and treasures of art and culture.

Despite the tremendous effusion of blood, the outer appearance of Europe's cities altered very little as a result of World War I. Enormous patches of grim desolation, irreparable loss of many precious memorials of

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past civilization, followed the bombings of World War II. And means of obliteration have now been multiplied many times.

The familiar old argument that war is a necessary if grim school of personal and national fortitude, the argument that prompted William James to propose his "moral equivalent for war," in the form of nonmilitary national and international service, completely loses validity when war tends more and more to assume the character of indiscriminate carnage. Individual heroism and devotion would count for as little in an exchange of nuclear destruction as in the face of some tremendous natural catastrophe, dwarfing all the earthquakes and volcanic explosions of recorded history.

World War II inflicted many grave injustices, unnatural partitions (Germany, Korea, Vietnam), unjust frontiers. Lvov and Wilno belong in Poland, not in the Soviet Union. Breslau and Koenigsberg are historic German cities, which are on alien soil in Poland and the Soviet Union, Yet, if the choice were posed of enduring these injustices or trying to redress them by means of nuclear warfare, most Europeans, even those adversely affected by the changes, would probably opt for putting up with the present evils. War is always a desperate and uncertain remedy. It has a perverse tendency to create new evils, as bad as or worse than those against which it is waged. It is certainly a safe prediction that a war employing the bigger available nuclear weapons would leave behind staggering difficulties, in all the conditions of human existence.

Indeed the bleak prospect of nuclear devastation has driven some individuals and groups, especially articulate in Great Britain, to the point of advocating unilateral renunciation of atomic weapons,—on the ground that the probable consequence of such action by the Western powers, Soviet conquest of the world, would be less terrible

than nuclear conflict. Both morally and practically, however, this position seems highly fallacious. The old Latin saying: "Propter vitam perdere causas vivendi" would apply with special force to such a surrender of the essential values of Western civilization.

Nor could there be any assurance that surrender to the will of an alien brutal dictatorship would even insure physical survival. It would only make the Western peoples helpless robot pawns in the probable future struggle for world domination between the Soviet Union and Red China.

And, despite prophets of gloom and total destruction, there is a fair probability, if not an absolute certainty, that powerful nuclear armaments in the hands of nations psychologically committed to defense, not aggression, may be the best assurance of maintaining peace and freedom in the part of the world that has not fallen under communist domination. It certainly looks like a better prospect than a reckless plunge into unilateral disarmament.

Ever since the end of World War II the declared objective both of the Western powers and of the Soviet Union has been reduction and eventual limitation of armaments under a system of international control and inspection. But the approaches of the leading military powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, to this problem have been radically different, with the result that, more than fifteen years after the end of the war, there has been no agreed disarmament whatever.

The Soviet Government has favored big declamatory slogans, "Abolish nuclear weapons," "Total disarmament within four years." But its representatives have been quick to shy away from concrete measures of inspection and control, such as President Eisenhower's proposal to permit flights of Soviet-manned planes over America and Western Europe and American-manned

planes over the Soviet Union, for the purpose of seeing that there were no preparations for surprise attack.

The United States, in agreement with other Western powers, has stressed the need for gradual steps toward disarmament, accompanied by the development of an effective, comprehensive system of international inspection and control, designed to detect violations of any arms limitation convention which might be signed.

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It would certanly be highly naive, and extremely dangerous to the security of noncommunist nations, to take at face value Soviet assurances that measures of disarmament were being carried out in the Soviet Union. For the Soviet record in international relations is thickly strewn with the tornup scraps of treaties of non-aggression that were concluded only to be violated at the first convenient opportunity, with pledges of action that were not kept, with assurances of safe conduct that were given only as bait to lure victims to arrest and execution. Poland, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, were among the victims of the violated treaties.

Stalin at Yalta gave his word to Roosevelt and Churchill that "free and unfettered elections should be held in Poland" and that the peoples of eastern and southeastern Europe should be permitted to create "democratic institutions of their own choice." Polish elections have been fraudulent farces and "democratic institutions of their own choice" have turned out to be one-party dictatorships, imposed by small communist minorities.

Sixteen Polish patriot underground leaders, lured out of their hiding places by assurances of safe conduct, the leaders of the Hungarian fight for freedom, Imre Nagy and Pal Maleter, arrested by treachery and never heard of again until their execution was announced, are examples of Soviet respect for obligations.

In the light of this record it would be suicidal folly to sign or ratify any treaty dependent for its implementation on Soviet good faith. Any people weak and foolish enough to walk into this trap would invite the ruthless retribution that would almost certainly follow. The experience with the one field in which we have let ourselves in for an indefinite period of unpoliced disarmament should be an instructive lesson.

Since October 31, 1958, the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain have been negotiating at Geneva for a treaty assuring permanent cessation of nuclear tests by means of international inspection and control. All three countries are supposedly subject to a self-imposed prohibition of such tests during the period of the negotiations. There have certainly been no tests, of any kind, in the United States or in Great Britain and it may be assumed that there have been no big explosions, of the type easily registered by scientific instruments abroad, in the Soviet Union. But there is only the word of the Soviet Government that there have been no underground tests, which cannot easily be distinguished from earthquakes. For all that is definitely known, the Soviet Union may have utilized this moratorium to forge ahead significantly in the development of small tactical nuclear weapons. The danger of this situation has been clearly stated by the late Thomas E. Murray, former member of the United States Atomic Energy Commission and an engineer with an excellent technical knowledge of the subject:

I fear that the Soviets may be making progress in their weapons technology much more rapidly than we are making progress towards a test ban. . . .

The United States should never have suspended underground tests when it did. It should never have placed itself in the militarily dangerous and politically absurd position of having to obtain Soviet permission to carry out needed testing and research programs. We are in this position because the Administration made a grave blunder in October, 1958, when it put our present suspension policy into effect. . . .

... We have already allowed the Soviets to accomplish an important strategic objective-that of forestalling the further improvement of the American weapons establishment without a formal agreement of any kind. Yet a formal agreement, under the premises now governing the Geneva negotiations, is precisely the thing most to be feared. We are drifting toward signing a treaty which will legally freeze our weapons development system before we have met our weapons needs and before an adequate inspection system can be constructed and placed in operation. The trap is set and ready to be sprung. (Italics supplied.)

There has been a curious and sinister ambivalence in the Soviet attitude during the Geneva negotiations, already some two and a half years old. (The negotiations were resumed on March 21 to the rather characteristic accompaniment of the United States offering seven concessions and the Soviet Union raising two more serious objections.) Khrushchev, in his speech at the United Nations General Assembly in September, 1959, called for "general and complete disarmament" for all nations within a time limit of four years.

Yet, while professing, in words, willingness to swallow the camel of total disarmament, Khrushchev has balked at the gnat of accepting verification of the proposed ban on nuclear tests. This is why the talks at Geneva have dragged on so long. Soviet negotiators have maintained that control posts on Soviet territory should be manned

largely by Soviet citizens, that on-site inspections of undetermined underground explosions should be limited to three a year far below the figure which Western experts regard as the minimum for safety. Especially if one recalls how the Communist Chinese and North Koreans violated every arms limitation clause of the armistice agreement concluded when hostilities in Korea were suspended, there seems to be strong reason to suspect that, if the Soviet Government will ever accept any system of inspection and control, this system will be so weak, formal and superficial that it will lend itself to easy evasion.

The Soviet Government has no reason to be in a hurry to reach any agreement at all. For it has achieved its fondest diplomatic hope: a suspension of nuclear tests unverified by any impartial investigating authority. No wonder it has not been anxious to change this advantageous situation.

It is not always realized that in all disarmament discussions the Soviet Union enjoys two great advantages over America and its allies:

First, the Soviet dictatorship is completely free from a variety of pressures that push Western governments to more and more concessions for agreement and insure that these governments will keep any agreement they may sign. This is because there is no semblance of an independent public opinion in Russia.

Consequently there is no Soviet equivalent for the American Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy or for the still more extreme unilateral disarmament groups in Great Britain. While Western governments are under constant prodding from assorted critics, pacifists, fellow-travelers, appeasers, scientists whose knowledge of nuclear physics is not matched by their knowledge of the nature and historical record of communism, one never hears from Soviet citizens the slightest protest against their government's elaborate war preparations.

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It would be fantastic to imagine a group of Russians gathering in protest demonstrations around a Soviet nuclear installation and then marching into Moscow and holding a "Ban the Bomb" demonstration in front of the Kremlin. No Soviet citizen, so far as is known, ever sailed a boat into a forbidden zone of nuclear experimentation or tried to climb in protest on a Soviet submarine. Nor do Soviet books and magazines and movies show the end of human life on this planet as a result of nuclear warfare. Because pacifist pressure on Western governments, especially in Great Britain, is strong and such pressure is nonexistent in Russia, it is not surprising that almost all the concessions in disarmament discussion come from the Western side.

The existence of an independent, articulate public opinion is the surest guaranty that Western governments would not try to evade any arms limitation convention which they might sign. No government would try to cheat when some of its own citizens, thanks to freedom of press and public expression of opinion, would be quick to expose any such attempt. No such guaranty exists in the Soviet Union. For under the communist system there is no independent voice, no opposition newspaper that could be counted on to expose treaty violations.

Second, geography makes concealment much easier in the Soviet Union than it is in the United States. To hide away a key laboratory, even a sizable nuclear plant, in some unexplored corner of Asiatic Russia would present much less difficulty than an attempt to conceal a similar installation in the much more accessible United States. Forbidden nuclear tests could conceivably be carried out in regions altogether outside the range of inspection, in western China or Tibet, for instance.

Apart from the special difficulties posed for effective verification of disarmament by the nature of communism and the facts of Soviet geography, the increasing significance of new complex weapons raises other obstacles that may well be insurmountable. This aspect of the situation is put very forcefully by the eminent nuclear scientist, Dr. Edward Teller, in the following excerpts from an article in "Foreign Affairs," for January, 1958:

Modern warmaking potential depends to an increasing extent on highly specialized weapons. Some of the most essential of these weapons can be hidden with relative ease. Nuclear explosives and long range rockets are two outstanding examples. Thus surveillance becomes more and more difficult. In addition, scientific and technical developments have produced and will produce unexpected types of weapons. How shall one check whether such weapons exist when the person who does the checking does not even know what he is looking for? (Italics supplied.)

Dr. Teller possesses a rare combination: mastery of nuclear science and a first rate appreciation of the nature of communist dictatorship. His remark about the inspector not knowing what to look for has a prophetic ring, in view of Khrushchev's boast, in January, 1960, of a "fantastic" Soviet weapon, still in the drawing-board stage.

The enforcement of an arms limitation agreement is made enormously more difficult by the fact that wars are no longer fought with comparatively simple and easily identified weapons. It would not have been difficult for an international inspection system, before World War I, even before World War II, to work out a reasonably accurate census of men under arms, cannon, machine-guns, rifles, airplanes, and so on. But the war of the future may be

won or lost in scientific institutes and research laboratories.

Is it conceivable that the Soviet Union, given its record of obsession with secrecy, would accept close international surveillance over all its scientific research projects? For that matter, would American public opinion welcome a host of international snoopers, including some from the Soviet Union, prying into everything our big industries and universities are doing in physics, chemistry, electronics and related fields? Yet, without some such inspection, where is the assurance that some new miracle weapon, capable of upsetting the existing balance of power, is not approaching completion?

The hopeful road toward a more stable and secure international situation does not lie through arms limitation schemes which are sterilized in advance by mutual distrust. Armaments are a consequence, not a cause, of such distrust. If and when international communism ceases to stir up trouble from Laos to Cuba, if and when Germany is reunited in freedom and the present Soviet satellite states are as free in relation to Russia as the European members of NATO are in relation to the United States, then some voluntary arms reduction all around may be expected as a natural consequence of a generally enhanced sense of security. Where certain verification of observance is possible, there may be mutual reductions without these pre-conditions,

But to conclude far-reaching arms limitation agreements with the Soviet Government that depend for their implementation on an assumption of Soviet good faith is to invite disaster. If Western statesmen by this time cannot appraise at zero the worth of a Soviet promise, the West is probably doomed, and deservedly so.

The arguments in support of the proposition that any agreement with Moscow on disarmament is better than no agreement

are pathetically flimsy. It is suggested that here will be a test of Soviet goodwill. As if there had not been all too many proofs of Soviet bad will and bad faith! A familiar contention is that the United States and the Soviet Union have a common interest in preventing the expansion to the "nuclear club." It is indeed very probable that Khrushchev does not wish to see nuclear weapons in the hands of his restive Chinese partner, or of the satellite states in Eastern Europe. There is too much uncertainty as to the direction in which these weapons might ultimately be directed.

But it is very unlikely that Khrushchev or anyone else can prevent Red China, in time, from acquiring nuclear power capacity. The United States might more profitably apply its energies to putting nuclear weapons in the hands of its allies than to attempt to do what is probably impossible, keeping them out of the hands of its enemies. We should favor and promote the development by all the NATO powers of an effective nuclear deterrent. It can be taken for granted that no European power would use such weapons, except in defense of its national existence; the liability to reprisals is too terrible and crushing.

The greatest risk of war does not lie in a balance of terror, in which each side is admonished to caution by the prospect of receiving formidable damage from the other. The real danger lies in a onesided preponderance of terror, such as might become a reality if the Soviet Government should succeed in luring the Western powers into the trap of a disarmament agreement which it could break with impunity while its trusting partners, abided by its provisions.

So much emotional sentimentalism has been worked up over nuclear weapons, bomb tests, fallout and similar issues that the forces of appeasement possess considerable psychological advantages in advocating unsound, unreliable, inadequate arms limitation agreements, full of loopholes as regards essential controls and safeguards. In no field is there more need for coolheaded, realistic thinking, by the men charged with carrying out our national policies and by the citizens who ultimately form what is called public opinion. And this thinking leads to one inescapable conclusion.

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We may well bitterly regret that the awesome secret of atomic power was ever discovered. Perhaps its destructive possibilities are too great to be entrusted to fallible man. But there is no way of putting this formidable genie back in the bot-

tle. There is no safe and sure means of eliminating nuclear weapons throughout the world. Even if such weapons could be destroyed, the means to recreate them would always be present.

From this bedrock fact one conclusion may be drawn. The United States and its allies can never afford to dispense with the ultimate safeguard of ability to maintain their freedom: possession and development of the most modern and effective weapons, nuclear and conventional. In dealing with a power like the Soviet Union or Red China, a power impelled by insatiable ambition, restrained by no moral considerations, paper pacts on disarmament are not a hope. Such pacts are a trap—and a dangerous trap.

### New Order

They do not want my songs. They do not wish to hear the bamboo rustle: of what significance, they say, is that? And I have no answer.

I say I am growing old. It does not matter, they remind me, and hasten to add: the new order demands vigorous youth.

The wise man will bow to his fate and be silent. Unfortunately, I am too proud. One day soon they may enter here, disturbing me for the last time.

Meanwhile, I listen to the morning singing of birds beyond the bamboo. The bamboo moves to a breath of wind, making a brocade sound.

WILLIS EBERMAN

# The Levels of Consensus

FRANCIS CANAVAN

Russian tanks crashed through Budapest in 1956. The Russian tanks are still there, lurking in the background. In the foreground are the police of the Hungarian Communist state, guns once more securely in their hands. Hungary today is perhaps the world's outstanding example of the reign of naked force over an unwilling people.

We are accustomed to contrast the Communist police state with the free democracies on our side of the Iron Curtain. Our governments, we say, rule by the consent of the governed. And, in a meaningful sense, so they do.

The difference, however, between the Hungarian Communist régime and the government of, say, Great Britain or the United States is not found essentially in free elections, important though these undoubtedly are. There is a deeper meaning to "the consent of the governed."

As Edmund Burke said, all government "stands upon opinion," by which he meant that "the only firm seat of all authority is in the minds, affections, and interests of the people." Traditional, and even absolute, monarchies have been known to enjoy a degree of popular consent that many a democracy may envy. Louis XIV no doubt sat more firmly on his throne than Charles de Gaulle on his presidential chair.

Burke's statement implicitly asserts the need of what today we call consensus. Any government depends to some extent upon the support of its people. If the government is to function smoothly, this support must be found not only in the people's external actions but also in their sentiments and beliefs. The less a government can rely upon its subjects' minds and hearts, the more nearly it becomes a régime of brute force, as at present in Hungary. Conversely, the more truly government rules by the consent of the governed, the more it depends upon a popular consensus in its favor.

Democracy, being par excellence government by consent, would therefore seem to have the greatest need for consensus. On the other hand, democracy as we know it is liberal democracy. The bias of a liberal constitution is in favor of individual freedom, especially freedom of thought and expression. But the intellectual individualism that a liberal constitution fosters runs counter in many ways to the formation and continuance of that deep and strong consensus on which the democratic system rests.

The liberal mind cherishes democracy precisely because it is a régime of freedom. The tendency of liberal thinkers therefore is to require as little agreement among citizens as possible. Many liberals look upon intellectual dissent as a positive good, on the principle that the more kinds of heretics there are, the less chance there is of an orthodoxy establishing itself. Yet consensus is by definition a kind of political orthodoxy.

The problem of consensus is thus peculiarly acute in modern democratic societies. Both the need for and the revulsion against consensus are inherent in liberal democracy. The question of the kind of consensus which democracy requires consequently is one that must be faced. What is the "opinion" on which democratic government stands? The question is large and complex, nor is it subject to a simple answer. But the initial step toward any answer must be, it would seem, a delineation of the

several levels on which a consensus can exist.

In discussing the levels on which a democratic consensus can or should be built, we must keep clearly in mind what we are talking about. Our subject is only that consensus that is needed to enable democracy to function successfully. Democracy is a form of government and government is essentially a practical matter. It exists to organize common action for the achievement of common goals, secular and temporal goals at that. The consensus which democracy requires is only that degree of agreement among citizens which is necessary or desirable so that the government can get on with its mundane tasks.

Those of us who are not secularists would hope for a much broader and higher union in truth and love among men. But such a consensus is not required by democracy except insofar as the practical operation of this kind of government somehow depends on it. Religious and philosophical truth are infinitely superior to political belief. But they enter the democratic consensus only to the extent that they are politically relevant.

Politically relevant consensus is the agreement that underlies political disagreement and furnishes the common premises of the disagreeing parties. In this sense it can be said that consensus is always basic or fundamental. If, for example, there is a dispute about where to locate an airport, there must be a consensus, at least among the disputants, that there is to be an airport. This consensus is basic to, because prior to and presupposed by, the dispute over the location of the airport. Did it not exist, then the subject of controversy might be whether there should be an airport. But that would be a different dispute and one which this dispute presumes to be already settled.

Because it is basic, if only in this perhaps purely formal sense, consensus is largely unquestioned. The matter about which there is now general agreement may have been the subject of dispute in the past and perhaps will be again in the future. But at present this matter is the underlying and agreed premise, not the subject, of controversy. The most important characteristic of consensus is not the precise percentage of people in agreement that is required to constitute it, but the fact that the agreement is, at least for the time being, generally unquestioned. The more the subject of the agreement is taken for granted as something established and not disputed, the more complete the consensus.

Democratic government always presupposes consensus in some sense and on some level or other. The function of the democratic process is, without resort to force, to resolve differences of opinion sufficiently for the purpose of public action. But the very statement of the differences and their eventual resolution presuppose a deeper consensus. This consensus may be considered on four levels, which I shall call the levels of existence, action, sentiment and belief.

By consensus on the level of existence, I mean merely the common agreement of a people to exist as a political society under a democratic constitution. A people's consciousness of itself as a single political society or nation is, of course, not one and the same thing as its will to be a democracy. Frenchmen are unhesitatingly determined to be French, even, as in Algeria, at the cost of fighting the French government. But the lack of a consensus on the form of government in France since 1789 is a commonplace of the literature of political science.

If nationalism is sufficiently strong, a political society can weather storms of fratricidal political strife. The consciousness of nationhood, where it truly exists, is an elemental consensus. So deep that it is taken, so to speak, as a constituent of men's blood, nationalism can preserve a political society through successive changes of government for centuries. It can also make a democratic government viable even when there is no true consensus in its favor but only a dominant democratic party or faction within the nation, as seems to be the case in Italy today.

Yet it is obvious that the lack of a common agreement to be not only a nation but a democratic state is a disease of the body politic. If the malady reaches a crisis -the recurrent crise de régime of Latin politics-it can lead to the death of the political system. So it happened in Spain in the 1930's. We must admit that even on the level of existence a democratic consensus is not strictly necessary for democratic government, inasmuch as this kind of government can exist and function without it. Yet there is a valid sense in which we can speak of the need of a democratic consensus on this level. It is the same sense in which health is a need of the physical body.

Above this most elementary level of consensus is the level of action. Since the purpose of government is to produce common action for common goals, consensus is desirable if not absolutely necessary on this level too. At least, this would seem to be true in a democratic state, in which the efficacy of government depends so largely on the support of public opinion. Consensus here means that the bulk of the citizens agree on at least the following: the main lines of what is to be done by government, and the procedures by which decisions about what is to be done are arrived at.

The question, what is to be done, is of course the question of public policy. Public policy is the stuff of politics. It would therefore seem to be, and is, the subject of intense and protracted disagreement rather than of consensus. The institution

of majority rule certainly does not guarantee that most or virtually all citizens support prevailing public policies. Of itself majority rule achieves no more than that more people support the prevailing policy than oppose it. Yet there is always some consensus underlying the conflicts of democratic policy.

Robert Dahl has put it very well in his Preface to Democratic Theory:

In a sense, what we ordinarily describe as democratic "politics" is merely the chaff. It is the surface manifestation, representing superficial conflicts. Prior to politics, beneath it, enveloping it, restricting it, conditioning it, is the underlying consensus on policy that usually exists in the society among a predominant portion of the politically active members. Without such a consensus no democratic system would long survive the endless irritations and frustrations of elections and party competition. With such a consensus the disputes over policy alternatives are nearly always disputes over a set of alternatives that have already been winnowed down to those within the broad areas of basic agreement.2

Some have contended that no agreement on the substance of policy is necessary, so long as there is agreement on the procedures to be used in determining policy. That might be true on some other planet where dwells an ideal democratic race untainted by original sin. But in this vale of tears we are forced to agree with A. Lawrence Lowell when he said:

Even in the most firmly established democracies there are questions touching a chord of feeling so deep that the minority would not voluntarily submit to the decision of the majority. To such matters a genuine public opinion cannot apply, and they lie, therefore, beyond the province of popular government. What these matters are cannot be determined by any universal formula, because they vary from place to place and from time to time; but it is the part of wise statemanship to recognize them and avoid them if possible.<sup>3</sup>

In a healthy democracy the avoidance of the deeper chords of feeling is not left to statesmen alone. Almost unconsciously there grows up what we may call a negative consensus among the people themselves. This is an agreement, often a tacit one, that certain issues must be kept out of politics: the disagreement on them is so deep and strong that the principle of majority rule would break down if these issues were submitted to the political process. The United States successfully weathered the "religious issue" in both 1928 and 1960 because religion was only superficially an issue. Had the voters' freedom to practice their several religions really been at stake, the political campaigns would have much more nearly resembled the Thirty Years' War.

In addition to public policy, the question of consensus on the level of action arises also in regard to the procedures by which policy is to be formulated. In a democratic state these are in essence the procedures of majority rule as qualified by those guarantees which make it possible for the minority to submit to the majority's decisions even while dissenting from its views.

It will be generally admitted that the greater part of the citizens must be willing to abide by democratic procedures if democracy is to work. But the proposition that the citizens must believe in the procedural principles of democracy in sufficient numbers to constitute a consensus has been questioned. Professors Prothro and Grigg, in an empirical study of consensus in two American cities, maintain that "consensus on democratic principles is restricted to a few general and vague formulations." Consensus, they say, is not

found "on more concrete questions involving the application of those principles." It must be noted that they demand a high percentage of agreement to constitute a consensus, since they "interpret the vague usage of the term to suggest agreement approaching unanimity." 5

In the two American communities in which they conducted their questionnaire (Ann Arbor, Michigan, and Tallahassee, Florida), they found a high degree of consensus (more than ninety-four per cent) on the general principles of democracy. But when questions were put on specific applications of those principles, consensus broke down completely. Virtually everyone questioned agreed, for example, that "every citizen should have an equal chance to influence government policy." But only fortynine per cent agreed that the uninformed should be allowed to vote, and as many as seventy-nine per cent felt that non-taxpayers should not be allowed to vote in a city referendum on projects to be supported by public taxes. In like manner it was almost universally agreed that "people in the minority should be free to win majority support for their opinions." But only seventy-five and one half per cent felt that a Negro should not be barred from candidacy for the mayoralty of the city, and only eighty and six tenths per cent that he should be permitted to take office if elected. Still lower percentages by far of those questioned had the same views regarding a Communist candidate for the mayoralty. Even among the best educated, who achieved the highest percentage of "democratic" answers to the questionnaire, consensus was almost entirely lacking on the specific applications of the general principles of democracy.6

Prothro and Grigg conclude from their findings that although possibly "consensus on fundamental principles in a highly abstract form is a necessary condition for the existence of democracy... the implication of political theory that consensus includes more specific principles is empirically invalid."<sup>7</sup> But little more seems to follow from their findings than that there is not a consensus, in the strict sense of the term, among the American people on all the implications of an ideal type of democracy.

Prothro and Grigg, in my opinion, are open to the criticism that they misunderstand the nature of the abstract principles which make up their statement of the ideal type. The rules of conduct by which men live can be stated as universal principles, valid in most instances but with exceptions that are understood, at least implicitly, in the very acceptance of the principles. This is certainly true of some of our basic moral principles. "Thou shalt not kill" has traditionally been understood as not forbidding capital punishment.

The proposition that "every citizen should have an equal chance to influence government policy" is an acceptable statement of a democratic principle. But it has never been understood in this country to admit of no exception, for children, criminals, and the insane are included in the term "every citizen." The term, therefore, is understood from the first to be subject to qualification. In determining what is the democratic response to a proposed denial of voting rights, for example, we must distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate qualifications. It cannot be assumed that to assert any qualification of the term "every citizen" is a priori undemocratic. If that assumption were correct, we should have a democracy in this country but precious few democrats.

The true consensus would seem to be on the proposition that most, or virtually all, adult citizens, depending on their possession of certain minimal qualifications, should have a right to take part in the political process. There will be disagree-

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ment about the precise exceptions which are implicit in this statement. (I for one am willing to argue that Negroes should not be excluded, but that professed revolutionaries, e.g., Communists, should.) But since the exceptions exclude relatively few people (apart from the exclusion of Negroes, which means that democracy exists in certain states only in a highly qualified sense), what we have is agreement on a rule of thumb adequate to the practical purposes of a more or less democratic political system.

This agreement will extend to most, though not all, specific applications of the rule. To a certain type of mind, it may reveal a significant lack of faith in democracy that flfty-eight and three tenths per cent of those questioned in this study would not admit a Communist to candidacy for a public office. But it is also significant that, as I assume to be the case, ninety-five per cent or more Democrats would admit Republicans to candidacy and that the Republicans would return the courtesy, albeit with misgivings. That consensus breaks down on some specific applications of general principles does not mean that it breaks down on all. And the areas where the consensus is maintained are quite as meaningful as those where it collapses.

It seems probable—this is admittedly mere theorizing—that we do not have in this country a simple dichotomy between general principles of democratic procedure, on which there is consensus, and specific applications of the principles, on which there is not consensus. The consensus no doubt includes not only the principles but their most obvious and acceptable applications. Agreement drops away from consensus and shades off into disagreement in areas where either prejudice is strong or many people do not feel that a particular application was implicit in the general principle as they accepted it.

The above is not meant to indicate radical disagreement with Prothro and Grigg, They are doubtless quite right in two of their central affirmations. One is that political theorists, when treating of the need for consensus in a democracy, tend to assert as fact what is really only their view of the logical requirements of democratic government.8 The other is that we "tend to overlook the functional nature of apathy for the democratic system."9 Very likely, many people hold undemocratic views but do not act on them. What counts is what they do, and in a democratic society they are likely to act in accordance with democratic practices simply because they are prevailing ones.

One still wonders, however, why the democratic system has expanded so steadily in the United States and is still expanding on what is perhaps its last great frontier, the civil rights of the Negro. Surely it is because democratic ideas, and not only practices, are the prevailing ideas. Those who, when asked, say that they do not think Negroes should be permitted to hold public office (or to vote) may be a relatively high proportion of the community, as the figures given by Prothro and Grigg indicate. Nonetheless they are everywhere on the defensive. One reason is that the commonly accepted premises in terms of which they are obliged to argue are hostile to their conclusion. The movement of events, of sentiments and of ideas is in the direction of drawing from the general democratic principle of equality the particular conclusion of equality for the Negro. Those who oppose the extension of civil rights to the Negro are swimming against a tide of opinion.

We can perhaps generalize and say that a successful democracy does not in a strict sense require a consensus in favor of democratic principles, not at any rate if we define a consensus as a high degree of affirmative agreement. What the democratic system does need is a prevailing and dominant opinion in favor of democracy, such that apathy and force of habit work for democracy and not against it. Ideas are political factors insofar as they are springs of action. In a situation in which undemocratic ideas are ineffective because those who hold them for the most part do not seriously think of acting on them, the practical result is not dissimilar to that of a true democratic consensus. At any rate, it will take the place of consensus for the practical purposes of democratic government.

That perhaps is all that the writers who have asserted the necessity of consensus in a democracy have had in mind. The logical requirements of democracy must be accepted by enough people to make them operative. It may well be true that a democratic state can get along without ninety per cent agreement on anything. But it is highly doubtful that it can carry on successfully with only fifty-one per cent agreement in favor of the elementary principles of democratic procedure. Because democracy aims at substituting free cooperation for force, it must have a base of agreement on which to operate. This base no doubt is definable only in vague terms such as "the great bulk of the citizens" or "the greater part of the people." But even vague statements may still be true statements. We can agree with Prothro and Grigg that there should be less loose talk about consensus. But it is unlikely that we can get along without consensus at least in a loose sense.

The ultimate conclusion drawn by Prothro and Grigg is that democracy requires habitual modes of behavior rather than quasi-unanimity of belief in fundamental principles. Since they refer to their conclusion as one already stated by Carl Friedrich in *The New Belief in the Common* 

Man, we may turn to that book for a fuller exposition of this position.

Friedrich rejects the notion that a democracy requires "agreement on fundamentals." Rather, he says, "The steadfast adherence to communally established and traditional modes of conduct and the simple, straight-forward judgment as to what is in keeping with them—these are the elements of consent and order in a democratic community. They are something very different from fundamentals in a rational or philosophic sense." 10

If you look at existing democratic societies, Friedrich says, you will frequently find in them the "three fundamental cleavages which divide men: religious, national-cultural, and social-economic issues. . . ."

Yet these divisions in belief and sentiment are preserved rather than eliminated by the democratic system. "To discover . . . specific agreements for action from among common men who disagree about fundamentals—such is precisely the task and achievement of constitutional democracy."

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Friedrich therefore prefers to talk of common objectives instead of agreement on fundamentals. "There must, of course, be common objectives," he says, "but such common objectives are, in a democratic society, pragmatic or, to use a less controversial term, ever-changing. Democratic behavior is pragmatic in that it tends to concentrate upon practical tasks. . . ."13

One can hardly dissent from Friedrich's position. Government is essentially a practical matter, as I said above, and its successful functioning in a pluralistic democracy depends far more on common habits of action than on unity of belief "in a rational or philosophic sense." But there still remains the question of what is required to sustain democratic habits of conduct. It hardly seems credible that a community will continue to act democratically unless

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a large part of its members in some sense believe in democracy.

Habit, of course, is not completely distinct from belief. Belief itself can be and frequently is a habit. If the habit is passed on from generation to generation, we call it a tradition. But traditional belief, while it is not the same as individually reasoned conviction, is not mechanical and mindless. It may be very strongly and deeply held. Indeed, most of the beliefs that mold a society and give it its shape and direction are traditions. At its deeper levels, the consensus on which any society is founded is a continuing thing, inherited from the past and preserved for the future, as it must be if the society is to endure without radical alteration.

What I am suggesting here, then, is that a democratic state needs from its citizensthough to some extent it can do withoutnot only the habit of acting democratically but also the habit of believing in democracv. The citizens will differ from each other to some extent in their understanding of the meaning and scope of democracy. Those who reflect on the reasons why they believe in democracy, or on the more remote premises of their belief, may vary widely from each other. But the "steadfast adherence to communally established and traditional modes of conduct" of which Friedrich speaks includes an habitual belief in the rightness of those patterns of behavior.

Does a successful democratic government require any consensus deeper than a general belief in democracy and a willingness to abide by its procedures? Some liberal democrats are inclined to answer no. Democracy, in their view, is a self-sufficient system, independent of any set of values and beliefs outside itself. Yet there are reasons for thinking that the citizens of a democracy not only can but should reach a consensus on more profound levels of thought and feeling.

One of these is the level of sentiment, which includes both love and fear. Men are united in a will to form a state by a common love of certain objects and by a common fear of certain dangers. Presumably their will to form a democratic state will include common desires and fears related not only to the existence of the state itself, but also to its democratic character. In other words, democracy presupposes "shared values" which render it desirable and possible.

The radical difference in ultimate objects of love which St. Augustine posited between Christians and pagans in The City of God indicates that he thought of the Roman state as a mere arrangement of mutual convenience between them. Yet even he recognized a "harmony between them in regard to what belongs to this mortal life."14 By this Augustine meant a sharing of certain values, chiefly those of peace, security, and that highly imperfect justice which the state could administer. These purely secular values were enough to engender a sentiment of unity among men who were deeply opposed in their ultimate values. Augustine shared this patriotic sense of unity himself. He was a Roman who gloried in the Roman name and he did not despise the harmony among citizens which was the bond of the Roman Empire, even though he refused to idolize it.

All modern states, but especially those existing in pluralistic societies, are well aware how much they depend on common purposes and objectives to unify their citizens. The need is perhaps greatest in democracies where the minority must not only submit to the majority but is expected to do it voluntarily.

Fellow citizens are bound together by the feeling that, for all their differences, they share a common good which is preserved and fostered by the political system. If men come to diverge too radically in even their secular values—in their attachment to or hatred of certain social and economic institutions—the strain on their political loyalty may be too great to bear. Underlying the conflict of interests which is the substance of democratic politics, there must be found a common allegiance and sense of mutual devotion strong enough to keep the conflict from tearing society apart.

This is to state the role of emotion in common life too coldly and rationalistically. Men's loyalties are something more than a calculus of interest, and the bonds of society are ultimately bonds of love. But however one expresses it, there is a consensus in sentiment deeper and stronger than the dissensions of democratic political strife.

So much will perhaps be admitted by most students of politics without demur. Disagreement will arise in regard to the necessity of a consensus in belief supporting the consensus in sentiment.

One need not admire the Ideal State of Plato's Republic to recognize the rightness of his thesis that the ultimate political concept is the Idea of the Good. Politics is the organization of common action, and men act always in terms of what they think good. In subtle but sure ways their ultimate beliefs about human good influence the course of their political action. These beliefs in turn depend upon and are part of their conception of the world and of man's place in it.

We are faced therefore with the question of belief and of the necessity of consensus on this level for the functioning of a democratic state. The answer is in large part obvious. Successful democracies exist among people who are significantly divided in religion, culture and social beliefs. Switzerland and Canada are prime examples. Moreover the political developments of the past five centuries have shown that formal

unity of religious faith is not requisite for political unity, as earlier centuries thought. Yet these facts, significant though they are, do not obviate the question whether there is still not a need for some unity of belief underlying the diversity of religious, cultural and other commitments.

Those who assert the need of such a unity argue in effect that a common moral code is essential to the proper functioning of democratic, or of any constitutional, government. The heart of the argument is the proposition that without a generallyaccepted moral standard there is no true public opinion. As Francis Wilson has put it, "Ever since the moral wisdom of man made its appearance in the great philosophical and religious literature of the world, and ever since there has been some agreement on the moral code under which men live, there has been in elemental form some kind of public opinion. For it was possible with a moral code to approve or disapprove of the actions of rulers."15

Walter Lippmann has popularized the idea of a basic code of social morality under the name of the public philosophy, in his Essays in the Public Philosophy. More recently, in We Hold These Truths, John Courtney Murray, S.J., has presented the case for "a consensus that will set our purposes, furnish a standard of judgment on policies, and establish the proper conditions for political dialogue." 16

Both men argue that the fundamental democratic principle of consent is inadequate of itself to assure the rational and good administration of public affairs. In a democracy, public opinion in the long run controls public policy. Such, at least, is the theory of democracy. But if public opinion is to perform its function, it must have some commonly-held standard by which to criticize and judge policy. That standard can only be a set of convictions about what is truly good for human beings,

both in general and in the historical circumstances of our times.

Fr. Murray explains:

Facing the massive fact of world disorder, the United States faces the question: What kind of order in the world do you want? What are its premises and principles? What is to be the form of its institutions-political, legal, economic? How do you propose to help organize this disorganized world? Or do you propose not to help? Or do you perhaps think an order of peace, freedom, justice, and prosperity will come about in the world simply by accident, or by sheer undirected technological progress, or by the power of prayer, or by what? Order is, by definition, the work of the wise man: sapientis est ordinare. It is the work of men and peoples who are able to say: There are truths and we hold them. Hence the disordered state of the world itself puts to America the question: What are your truths? With a decent respect to the opinions of a mankind that is groping for a civilized order, speak these truths.17

Now, a nation's truths are its public philosophy. As the public philosophy exists in the popular mind, it will of course be a moral heritage and a tradition rather than a fully-reasoned theory of human and national good. But in itself the public philosophy is a philosophy and not merely a congeries of traditional beliefs. According to Lippmann and Murray, it is the philosophy that has been carefully elaborated through the centuries by the best minds in Western society under the name of natural law. The principles of natural law, in Lippmann's words, are "the terms of the widest consensus of rational men in a plural society. They are the propositions to which all men concerned, if they are sincerely and lucidly rational, can be expected to converge."18 The public philosophy, in short, is the product of our common reason addressing itself to the needs of our common human nature.

On a still higher level are the metaphysical and theological beliefs which are the basic elements of a society's culture. As a distinguished anthropologist has said:

Underlying every culture is a body of basic postulates implicit in the world view of the members of the society in question. These are broadly generalized propositions as to the nature of things and what is qualitatively desirable and what is not. Such postulates . . . set major goals for action, and as guides to selection of permissible lines of behavior, pattern the forms of political authority in those societies in which political behavior is an outgrowth of the indigenous social system and not a power structure imposed by outsiders. 19

I am fully in accord with the statement made in the 1945 Harvard Report on General Education in a Free Society, that the modern democratic state's unity is purely political and consists in "agreement on the good of man at the level of performance without the necessity of agreement on ultimates." I further agree that ultimate beliefs, whether metaphysical or theological, are relevant to politics only insofar as they affect and support the moral standards asserted by Lippmann, Murray and others to be an indispensable part of our political tradition.

The question, however, is whether some kind of consensus on ultimate beliefs, in the broad terms of a general religious tradition, is not in fact necessary for the maintenance of a sound public philosophy. Political unity and viable democratic government can certainly go on without formal unity in religious faith. On the other hand, there is little doubt that, historically, Judaeo-Christian faith was the crucible in which were formed those moral attitudes

on which democracy, and indeed any humane system of government, depends.

We cannot be certain that these moral attitudes will persist without that faith. To be sure, secularists assure us that our moral foundations can and will endure without religious belief. But then, the Irish say that there are leprechauns. That democracy—or at any rate, a democracy worth having—could maintain itself if our religious tradition should wane yet further than it has, is more than we can say with any confidence. Some have wondered, with Renan, if we are not already living on the perfume of an empty vase.

These, then are the levels of the consensus which, arguably at least, can or should exist in a democratic state. There should be comparatively little dispute that the successful functioning of democracy requires general acceptance, first, of its existence, then of its fundamental procedures and of the broad substance of public policies. The major ground of dispute in a religiously and intellectually fragmented society will be the need of consensus on levels deeper than the strictly political.

One's belief in the necessity of a consensus on certain great overarching moral principles or concepts of human good will vary, I should think, with the concept of community which one holds. As a cliché in the literature of local government has it, there is no Democratic or Republican way to pave a street. A fortiori, there is no Christian, Hebrew or secularist way to do it. To the extent, therefore, that one views the political community as an organization for performing such prosaic tasks, one will pitch the level of consensus required by that community at a fairly low level.

But even if we accept the limitation of the state to mundane and "practical" functions, we must still ask whether the democratic state can perform these duties without some degree of "like-mindedness" or consensus on moral principles among its citizens. The modern democratic state, under anyone's definition, decides questions of war and peace and determines policies affecting such major social interests as levels of production and price, the volume of credit and employment, labor relations and, in some countries, race relations. What is perhaps most significant, the state today is the largest of all educational institutions. A state performing these and similar functions is likely to find that its decisions arouse deeper passions and more heated controversies than the question of the right way to pave a street. It is probable that such a state, if it is to determine its policies on the principle of consent instead of imposing them by force, must find among its citizens a pre-existing agreement on, let us say, some norms of justice.

It appears to me that the liberal philosophy faces something of a dilemma in the modern democratic state for this reason. Liberalism is committed to individualism (and so is much of what today is called conservatism, but in fact is old-fashioned liberalism). This commitment is probably the deepest motive that leads liberals and their conservative allies in this consensus to prefer democracy as a form of government and to set the consensus requisite for democracy at a low level. The tendency of the liberal mind is to push the requirement of consensus as far as possible downwards to the level of action. For a state which demands of its members only that they come to some workable agreement on what they want the state to do for them has no claim to invade the sanctuary of the individual mind.

But on the other hand, it is likely that liberal individualism achieved its full flowering in the laissez-faire state of the nineteenth century. The citizens then had little need to agree among themselves because there was so little that they wanted the state to do for them. Today we have moved far from laissez-faire and, whether we like it or not, we shall move farther yet. In an era of increasing state responsibility for order and welfare, the old agreement to disagree peaceably may no longer be enough. The time, one suspects, has come when, for the preservation of liberty as well as of order, we shall have to address ourselves to the formation of a rational consensus and a public philosophy.

<sup>1</sup> Edmund Burke, Works (Rivington ed.), vol. X, p. 93 and vol. IX, p. 178.

<sup>2</sup> Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 132. 3 A. L. Lowell, Public Opinion and Popular Government (Longmans, Green, 1921), p. 44.

<sup>4</sup> Prothro and Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," Journal of Politics, vol. XXII (1960), p. 281.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 276, n. 1.

6 Ibid., pp. 284-291.

7 Ibid., p. 293.

8 Ibid., p. 281. <sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 293.

10 C. Friedrich, The New Belief in the Common Man (Little, Brown, 1942), p. 153.

11 Ibid., p. 159.

12 Ibid., p. 171. <sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 180.

14 Bk. XIX, ch. 17.

15 Francis Wilson, "Public Opinion and the Intellectuals," American Political Science Review, vol. XLVIII (1954), p. 323.

16 J. C. Murray, S.J., We Hold These Truths (Sheed & Ward, 1960), p. 86.

17 Ibid., p. 88.

18 W. Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philoso-

phy (Little, Brown, 1955), p. 123.

19 E. Adamson Hoebel, "Authority in Primitive Societies," Authority (ed. by Friedrich, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1958),

20 Quoted by Murray, We Hold These Truths, p. 54.

### Social engineers of Utopia

### The American Intellectual

#### THOMAS MOLNAR

"It is for America," wrote Hegel in The Philosophy of History, "to abandon the ground on which hitherto the History of the World has developed itself." The new ground was to represent a break in the historical continuity of the ages, a community as close to a utopian state of affairs as it was feasible for men to establish. The anarchistic-democratic ideas of seventeenthcentury England could not flourish in their country of origin and were carried across the ocean in the messianic imagination of the non-conformist sects. "If there was ever a people," wrote Daniel J. Boorstin of this migration, "whose intellectual baggage equipped them for a journey into Utopia, it was the New England Puritans.

In their Bible they had a blueprint for a Good Society; their costly expedition to America gave them a vested interest in believing it possible to build Zion on this earth."

Note in this judicious phrase the juxtaposition of Zion and Utopia. The intellectualideological history of modern times may
be written as a search for a substitute for
the Christiana Respublica, for the Zion
that David and Solomon, blessed by God,
so gloriously ruled. On the soil of the old
continent, labored by the steel-plow of history, such a utopia could not be erected;
but the virgin lands of America offered
an opportunity to do just that: "The history
of the New England pulpit," Mr. Boorstin

continues, "is an unbroken chronicle of the leaders' attempt to bring their community steadily closer to the Christian model."

From the beginning, the American intellectual\* was convinced that the material as well as spiritual pre-conditions for a harmonious society were given, and that success or failure would ensue depending on the correct application of the blueprint, of the formula. As Mr. Boorstin further remarks, "the New England meeting-house, like the synagogue on which it was consciously modeled, was primarily a place of instruction"; not of debate, but of instruction: the New England elders excluded from government the subversive elements since life in the wilderness favored not the discussion of subtleties but the unity of efforts in combatting a hostile environment.

The overcoming of external obstacles and, to achieve this goal, the guaranteeing of internal cohesion became the double task and everyday experience of all Americans. This attitude was stamped on the minds of America's intellectuals as well: "In the United States," Karl Mannheim noted, "the elite have been absorbed in problems of organization, and this has determined, to a large extent, the intellectual outlook of the whole nation."2 Intellectual or member of other categories, the American thought of himself as possessing a formula by which his tasks, individual or collective, may best be carried out. In fact, this belief in formulas is the most important single feature of American mentality; it explains American efficiency and optimism, but also intellectual insecurity and poverty of imagination.

It is the heritage of Calvinism which sees in a certain behavior not the cause but the sign of salvation, of being among the elect. The Zion of the early immigrant and the Calvinistic conception of life of his puritan mentality developed in Americans a conviction that they live in the

land of the elect-God's own country-and that adjustment to this ideal community is the expression of being worthy of it. Although the religious content has been drained off from American life, the basic conviction has remained unaltered: the contours of the belief and the behavioral conformity to it have survived. Even radical movements, cultural, artistic, intellectual and educational trends, carry in themselves the fear of originality and the secret, unconfessed preference for the comfort of formulas. The so-called "progressives" are no exception: they try to prescribe the attitude of progressivism, to formulate-not conceptually which is an indispensable way for an idea and its partisans to identify themselves—in terms of behavior what is expected of members, joiners, followersand leaders. . . .

The intellectual in America is looked upon, and accepts himself as, essentially the organizer, the formulator of the consensus, the specialist, the expert. The goals and tasks to be organized are given, considered data of nature, data of the ideal community of human beings. While the European intellectual's historical memory speaks to him of regimes whose foundation and principles contradicted one another, his American counterpart is able to look back upon one continuous regime, with one fundamental philosophy and one basic document, the constitution. Again Mr. Boorstin may be quoted: "American history could be described as 'closed' at both ends: both origin and destination appear fixed."3

What does American history recount? First of all that "the settlement of America was a selective process. . . . It appealed not necessarily to the ablest or the strongest, but usually to the most enterprising. In a sense it may be said that America was from the beginning a state of mind and not merely a place." The American nation has no history fading into a mythical past,

American political parties and institutions cannot have a mystique; the entire "American experiment" has been conducted in broad daylight, and the forces which shaped the country were either subjected to rational control or identified in terms of some human group: immigrants, founding fathers, industrial barons, New Deal brain trusters, and so on.

In the second place, the history of America is one of fast population growth through the immigration of foreign elements. But, resigned as the immigrants were never to return to their native countries, to them "America seemed unstable; it lacked the orderly elements of existence. Without security of status or the recognition of rank, no man, no family had a proper place in the social order. Only money talked." "Family, dignity counted for nothing here. He merited consideration who had acquired a secure existence and had shown thereby his capacity to deal with the New World."

This initial rootlessness was responsible for the fact that Americans never knew exactly where they "fitted" in, and that they had to rely on external signs of wealth, success, and adjustment to indicate their status. This was not only the immigrant's experience: with every wave moving westward to fill the continent, a new immigration took place, and when this was finished, a just as intensive and aggressive upward movement started to climb the ladder of wealth and respectability. The newly arrived, and even his children were thus rootless in the new environment; they were obliged to imitate the people they saw around themselves, to accept, without criticism, their standards and behavior, and to hold on to the acquired status, knowing that without a tradition-sanctioned name or title the accumulation of material success was their best social carte de visite.7

Thus, thirdly, Henry B. Parkes is right when he says that "to a much greater degree than elsewhere, society in America was based on the natural man rather than on man molded by social rituals and restraints."8 This is true of the immigrants in the seventeenth as well as the nineteenth century who deliberately left their homes and traditions, ready to start again with their natural capabilities only; it is true in the eighteenth-century sense of the word, according to the Encyclopedists' vision of man as a being endowed by the natural light of reason, and only hampered by environmental restraints, traditional mores, religion and superstition; and it is true in yet another sense, the American dream of an unfettered existence, not receiving law from anybody, an outlaw, cowboy, pioneer. From the tales of Leatherstocking to those of Superman, a considerable trend in American imagination (and fiction) speaks of the will and belief that there is always an escape from civilization toward the frontier where one may build a utopia of anarchism and outlawry.

"No facts are to me sacred," wrote Emerson, "none are profane; I simply experiment, an endless seeker with no Past at my back." The American writer has adopted, by and large, this attitude, or, when he felt the need for an artistic tradition, he became an expatriate. With Emerson (and Melville and Mark Twain) began that strange line of writers who no longer had the specific New World-optimism of Franklin or Jefferson, but, knowing that there was no return (to Europe) either, set up their tents in the no man's land of loneliness, cynicism, and masochistic acceptance of defeat.

But the American intellectual has little in common with the writer, as opposed to the European intellectual's literary-philosophical bent, his style and esthetic dimension. While the American writer—Melville, Thoreau, Dreiser, Henry James, Scott Fitzgerald, Nathanael West, Steinbeck, Upton Sinclair, Sinclair Lewis, Arthur Miller, J. D. Salinger-is critical, dissatisfied, despairing, the American intellectual has accepted his society, the role he plays in it, and the tasks assigned by it. The reason is that the writer, in any society, probes the human condition, and thus in America, he becomes conscious of the absence of roots -in history, environment, nature and society-of the plight of the "natural man," the insecure, the lonely man. He describes the contradictions of the "American dream" and reality, denounces the false situations created by an aggressive and ubiquitous business civilization, and satirizes the sugarcoating which, instead of veiling, shows up the harshness of life in cruder colors. The intellectual, on the contrary, has dreams of power and influence, and considers the manipulation of society his legitimate reserve. Not without partners, of course; unlike the European intellectual, he does not seek power for the sake of prestige, exalted position, and charismatic leadership; he is aware that the nation was built by a different type of human being, the rugged pioneer, the crafty, but equally rugged businessman, and lately, the bureaucrat, the pioneer of the welfare state. But precisely: he thinks that with the last-mentioned, his own hour has also struck, and he claims now to occupy a respectable position among the builders of society.

The intellectual in America has, thus, no major quarrel with the powers that be; he adopts and admires the techniques of the dominant mentality because he too wants to achieve the success he sees firmly established in other camps. The result is a wholesale commercialization and industrialization of most intellectual endeavors, education, entertainment, art, press, cultural institutions, etc. What are the immediate consequences? The adoption of business-slogans and attitudes creates among Ameri-

can intellectuals a basic service-mentality. Since qua intellectuals: professors, ideamen, entertainers, journalists, critics, publishers, foundation staff-members, etc. do not expect profit in the business sense, nor is their contribution to the nation's wellbeing measurable in concrete terms as is that of the business world (and of which the latter never ceases reminding the public), they try to compensate society for the apparently "useless" activity in which they indulge. They constantly seek to justify themselves by proclaiming their sincere efforts to work for the common good at whatever, very often hypothetical, level the common good chooses to make its claims. Thus it is interesting to watch (here I may speak from a long experience of personal observation) the utter humility with which the teacher and professor submit to the student (the youth of America is, of course, considered the most precious part of the common good!), the servile attitude they adopt regarding the youngsters' wishes and whims, real or imagined interests.

Thus the American intellectual becomes a kind of glorified public-utilities man. The democratic distrust of excellence and the narrow interpretation of the common good accumulate obstacles in the path of talent. The man who furnishes proof of his exceptional qualities is soon absorbed by administrative duties, assigned to him in the belief that his talents as an individual may be put to what seems to be an even better use in the direct service of the collectivity. From business operations to schools, from the entertainment world to political life, committee work is not only an essential part of everybody's active hours, but one which leads more surely to rewards, remuneration and prestige than does genuine creation. This is not only the game connatural to democracy; it is also a version of the Calvinistic distrust of spontaneity and independence of thought, since the committee is the living formula which helps domesticate (more often extirpate) originality.

Finally, the service-mentality leads to the rather unfortunate situation in which groups and minorities conceive of themselves as by definition handicapped because they are "divisive," eventually even "un-American." A Catholic sociologist, Thomas O'Dea, calls attention to the phenomenon that Catholic intellectuals by desperately trying to adjust to both Society and the Church, became passive, timid, un-original, un-productive. More important than creation is then the "dialogue" by which opposition, or mere differences of views, might be bridged. In many instances, however, this is impossible as when differences of dogma or ideology stand in the way of agreement. What happens then is that the core of the debate is carefully avoided and only surface discord is mentioned; in this way a formula of reconciliation may, indeed, be worked out, but at the expense of leaving the essential problem untouched.

THE AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL feels himself on more secure grounds—and may expect a greater recognition and remuneration—when he absorbs himself in organizational tasks. Two main causes should be mentioned:

1. American society was not built organically but by successive additions. There was, for example, no continuity of classes, the industrial workers did not grow out of a pre-existing peasant class, and the new capitalists of the nineteenth and twentieth century did not originate from an earlier aristocracy, nor did they intermarry with one. The indentured peasant or semi-peasant immigrants were free, after years of service, to set out on their own and become independent farmers or artisans; later immigrants, saving enough as construction team workers, were also free to try their fortune without the hindrance

of the past; and fortunes were amassed outside the traditionally well-to-do classes, often indeed overshadowing the latter.

The ensuing chaos and economic jungle soon created problems to which, in the European societies, solutions would have been either indefinitely postponed or found through revolutions. America could neither postpone their solution, nor wait for violent outbreaks: the American ideal was one of equality of opportunity, and no class thought of itself as entitled to keep others out of prosperity for long; and the lessons of European history showed the un-wisdom of letting grievances accumulate until outbursts can no longer be checked.

At the beginning of this century Theodore Roosevelt understood this when he warned the capitalist class that a reform of the abuses was the price to pay in order to be saved from a socialist revolution. The reform-minded intellectuals thus considered it a patriotic as well as philosophical task to devote their energies to the transformation of society where concrete, ad hoc problems were waiting for them, arising from the pluralistic nature of that society. Unlike the European intellectuals, they did not have a quasi-mythical, national history, studded with heroes and saints and fabulous battles, the image of which they could have set against new social movements; on the contrary, they had to point to the totality of the institutional and socio-economic achievements, a kind of argument of which there could never be enough and which had value only insofar as such achievements continued to multiply. This is how, with men like Beard, Dewey, Veblen, Holmes, and such, "American history and philosophy became concerned with the Negro problem, imperialism, trusts, the labor movement. To these problems the band of new scholars hoped to apply scientific methods."10

What the historical and philosophical

argument was for the European intellectual, the scientific and social argument became for the American. Every institution which in Europe was destined to be a depository of past wisdom and a brake on new trends, became in America a laboratory of social service for the present and of further experimentation for the future. This is true of the law courts, schools, political parties, and other institutions. The reverse of the medal is that the American intellectual is so absorbed in his direct organizational tasks that he does not possess the detachment and the broad vision necessary for true achievements. As an organizer and social engineer he has the nostalgia of the real man of action that he cannot be, and remains with a sense of inferiority when he compares his own impact on the environment with that of the pioneer, the businessman, and the specialist, the labor leader and the politician.

The result is that he denigrates the intellectual values he is supposed to represent. He even casts suspicion on the individual and extolls the communal mentality and methods as if this were a solved dilemma between good and evil. "The mere absorption of facts and truths," wrote Dewey, "is so exclusively individual an affair that it tends very naturally to pass into selfishness. There is no obvious social motive for the acquisition of the learning, there is no clear social gain in success thereat."

The obsession with "social motivation," with the need to justify individual action and attitude by a close-at-hand communal benefit, characterizes the American intellectual; it is stamped on political and economic issues, but also on philosophy, theology and art; instead of stressing the authority of geniuses, society as such is trusted to generate progress, measured, in turn, in terms of benefit to society.

2. The second reason why the American intellectual feels at home in his role as an

organizer, coordinator and engineer of society is that he thus conforms to the American genius of building the society of the future, utopia. For Americans, and not for intellectuals alone, organizations and institutions are destined to be mirrors of society, small replicas of the community. The American who distrusts individual theory and tends to weaken its influence on society by subjecting it to various screening processes (committees serve this purpose, among other things), favors the setting up of miniature communities wherein theories and ideas will be diluted and juggled away. Thus little remains of tradition and continuity to fill the historical consciousness; rather, the latter is replaced by the successive layers of an evolving society, the latest always judged better than the one before it and thus alone deserving recognition. The past is forgotten because its being "dated" shows it up as a failure. On the contrary, the present state, and the always just-emerging future deserve all the attention and glamorizing effort: those who busy themselves around it, who are in the spotight, have the power to turn towards themselves the admiration of their fellow-citizens.

But the "present" and the "future" are not the only time-categories with weight and meaning; "utopia" is a third category which captures American imagination even more powerfully, since while the former are organizable and manipulable, "utopia" is always just a little "beyond." In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that utopianism is the idealism of the American whose practical-mindedness would not allow him to indulge in making images wthout some social connotation and apparent concreteness.

But, let us not forget, utopia is not a form of individual salvation or contentment: it is a collective goal to be reached by an ever-higher degree of cohesion. In America, however, it is also a release of pent-up longings and secret satisfactions that the puritanic modes of feeling have restrained. Thus utopia, in America, means at once a higher form of social organization and a dream of lawlessness; insistence on adjustment and hope of anarchy. Many observers of the American scene have called attention to the fact that in the American mind the Calvinist and the anarchist are forever fighting it cut. While the European revolts against a known order which he senses both in the universe and within his soul, an order whose existence he acknowledges and whose dogmas and restrictions he admires, the American does not know against what he revolts, since he considers norms and standards man-made conventions, unjust and stupid, to be overpowered by will and action. But since evil-as his Enlightenment-inspired ideology tells him-is not a permanent feature of things, he persuades himself that it is merely a passing problem, subject to some solution.

THE AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL is, thus, a "progressive" and a "utopian" who likes to believe that wrongs can be righted by human action, and that accumulated constructive actions lead in a straight line to organized well-being and freedom.

But this belief and the premises on which it rests pose the characteristic intellectual dilemma of this century: the faster and more complete the progress, the greater the general indifference, the more numerous the "dead souls," the more acute the social disintegration. Yet, the American intellectual can no more abandon his optimism than the other ideologues. This society has been forged by the successful solution of tremendous problems, and its ideology emerged stronger from each test. The solutions were always "liberal": the absorption of immigrants, vote and education extended to all, abolition of slavery, the asso-

ciation of workers to the class of consumers, and many such. The American intellectual has no other model—historical, political or social—before him to imitate. He is enclosed in a trend and in a role from which he neither can nor wants to free himself.

In a recent study Seymour Lipset has stated that the American intellectuals are, in an overwhelming number of cases, "leftists," affiliated to the Democratic rather than the Republican party, and rather to the left-wing (A.D.A.) than to the right wing of the former. "The relatively small leftist third parties, both Socialist and Communist, seem to have secured more support from intellectuals than from any other stratum of the population."11 The author points out that the essential feature of leftist ideology, egalitarianism, is stamped on the American intellectual's consciousness by the Declaration of Independence and by the American creed. Among other things this explains that any foreign leftist import, European radicalism in the nineteenth and Russian communism in the twentieth century, elicits an immediate echo in his heart.

Is there an alternative for him? In the last decade or so, conservatism or neoliberalism has tried to acquire respectability both as a philosophical position and an encouragement for practical politicians to oppose the Welfare State. It is no coincidence that the vogue of conservatism has run parallel to the appearance of a deadly enemy at the gate, Soviet communism and imperialism, which attracts the nation's attention, for the first time in a protracted manner, to the world outside. The first real threat to American security and well-being, the first alarm that utopia is vulnerable has brought a shock to American consciousness. The very duration of the cold war creates an atmosphere intolerable to this consciousness which likes to believe that all problems have a solution-furthered by reasonable talk, underlying fellowship and common interests, contractual agreement—and which is unable to envisage that an evil situation should be lasting. If Soviet communism is evil, the American (conservative and liberal) seems to ask, why is it that God does not strike it off the surface of the earth?<sup>12</sup>

On the domestic scene proper, the conservatives have a hard problem to face. Let us repeat: the nature of American society and government is progressive, and the progressive forces, from the age of Jackson to that of the Supreme Court decision on desegregation, have won every single issue. Thus the conservative has no solid historical ground to stand on and easily incurs the accusation of being in the pay of "reactionary capital" or of being slow and indolent, reluctant to go along with betterment at the required speed. (A damning indictment in America!) It is obvious that the dépaysement of the conservative has been made even more acute since the "age of Roosevelt" which has institutionalized much of the progressive blueprint and has injected a considerable amount of utopianism into the conduct of foreign affairs.

Faced with this situation, the American intellectual is reluctant to call himself a conservative because the elements which constitute his intimate conviction simply do not make sense in the context of American history, society and expectations. Thus he is forced to use the terminology of European conservatism (or classical liberalism) by which he then definitely bars any chance of a fruitful conversation with fellow-Americans. When he looks at the two political parties, at the policies and statements of American institutions-welfare agencies, higher courts, schools, art institutes-nowhere does he find words and programs other than such as are informed by the spirit of progessivist ideology and utopianism. Thus the scope for debate and controversy is singularly narrowed, unlike in European countries where progressive forces, even when victorious, must come to terms with ideologies and terminologies clearly opposed to theirs, and where these progressive movements themselves have a historical tradition—and therefore a dimension—of their own.

THE RELIGION OF PROGRESS and utopia, however, has consequences beyond the political attitude and outlook. "The dream of millenial existence," writes Henry B. Parkes, ". . . from the times of the Puritans who hoped to achieve 'a new heaven and a new earth' in Massachusetts, down to the present day . . . has been particularly associated with the American continent. The belief that America has a peculiar mission to establish a new and higher way of life has become a part of the American character, even though few Americans have interpreted it in any radical fashion."13 The higher way of life meant not only more prosperity, but also wider educational opportunities. John Dewey, in 1927, saw the problem of progress as the "intellectualization of the public at large"; Seymour Lipset shows that there are proportionately more "intellectuals" in the United States than in any other western country, and that, contrary to the American intellectual's "self-image as one of low status . . . academic and other intellectual occupations in the United States are high in social prestige."

Thus parallel to general commercialization of life, there is also in the U. S. a general intellectualization of the public. The culture-critics usually remain on a superficial level when they indict the antivalues, the artificiality, the phoney sentimentalism of the business climate and the businessman; hence the cry that the American people and its leaders are "anti-intellec-

tualist" is misleading; the heart of the matter is just the opposite: the excessive intellectualization of American society. Any observer of the American scene will testify that in no other country are there so many committees, panels, journals and broadcasts of popular culture, adult education courses, lecture bureaus, "intellectualized" advertisements, "artistic" posters, and the rest as in the United States. Practically any man or woman with a college degree may call himself an intellectual, not because of his culture or competence which are most often amazingly low, but because of some urbane contact with the world of sophistication: art, science, education, philanthropic support of general intellectual improvement or cultural institution. The workleisure-culture continuum is a fact in American society where the democratic ideology cannot tolerate the exclusion of anybody from material, social or cultural benefits.

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The result is the absence of selective processes; the irresistible attraction of and drive toward mediocrity; and the confusion of authentic and artificial, of superior and well-packaged, of depth and popularity. Thus the American intellectual is practically anybody, Joe and Jane College. They serve the "dream of millenial existence" as well as their own interest when they militate for the diffusion rather than the concentration of intellectual activity and cultural values. The structure of society facilitates their endeavor: decentralization of churches and school boards, the cultural and educational work of associations, groups, women's clubs, local committees, etc. require an intellectualized personnel which, however, is not supposed to be out of touch with the limited ambition of these varied employers and think beyond the average level of the membership. The quality and nature of this intellectual-cultural activity expresses an ideologically desirable common denominator.

In addition to mediating between the groups of the pluralistic society, the American intellectuals feel obliged to justify the existing or emerging mass-values. The latter are not truly welcome; in fact, each time these intellectuals congregate-in committees or cocktail parties—the main topic is the denunciation of mass-values, massculture and mass-mentality in terms which would put to shame any group of European aristocrats. But they are never denounced ultimately and irrevocably since they are signs and symbols of social cohesion, of the efficacy of the democratic machinery of education, press, and mass communication.

The justification (not necessarily the defense) of mass values is, in a sense, the protection of a social class, the fluid but ubiquitous and permanent mass-middle class so characteristic of the United States and practically coinciding with the nation. Its credo, reinforced by the business mentality, sets the pace of public thinking, its taste is dominant, its endless thirst for illusion and entertainment sets into motion myriad of illusion-fabricating mechanisms.

Participating in a symposium of Partisan Review, C. Wright Mills wrote in 1952: "I would impute the leveling and the frenzy effects of mass culture in this country not to 'democracy' but to capitalist commercialism which manipulates people into standardized tastes and then exploits these tastes 'personal touches' as marketable brands." These views are held, generally, by most of Mills' fellow-intellectuals and also by artists and writers. In other words, it is not democracy qua ideology they denounce, but an evil manipulation of it by the capitalist profiteer, vulgar because he shares the public's bad taste, and evil because he perpetuates it. This is one reason why the intellectuals' revolt in America starts on the Left, why socialism is extolled as capable of substituting profiteering by disinterestedness, a listless, anonymous public by a purposeful community of cultured individuals.

But, although Marxism in the 1930's and 1940's was very successful among the American intelligentsia, it remained a definitely alien doctrine. By the 1950's, when Senator Joseph McCarthy made his memorable charges, it was truly a cast-off garb, and these charges affected mostly ex-communists who since their youth had turned "respectable." As Leon Samson writes, "the principal cause for the failure of the socialist movement in America has been the fact that the symbolic goals of socialism are so closely identical with those of Americanism that Americans feel no need to adopt a 'foreign' version of Americanism." In other words, the New Deal rather than Russianstyle socialism; the native rather than the foreign utopia.

Social engineering as an ideology is the pursuit of an idea to its logical end: the idea of utopia on earth. But attachment to utopia, utopian thinking, is also an American mode of thinking, an outgrowth of the American Experiment. In this sense it cannot be called utopia since as part of the nation's mental baggage, it has roots, it is a tradition. More than that, utopianism is the ultimate form of the American search for identity, a search which can have no ideally happy conclusion except with the good society, the Zion, the final justification for the immigrant, for the government by, for and of the people, for the definitive-that is American-way of life. This impatient and nervous need for justification of the very existence of American society is, perhaps, the most powerful driving force propelling this country forward-to good and to evil.

For these reasons, the American intellectual's commitment to utopia is extremely strong. The organization-mindedness, the social engineering implied in the balancing of views and interests among the groups of a pluralistic society, the belief in magic formulas which at once harness the "evil" in nature and make the latter productive. the continued effort to justify American society in terms of success-are the main elements which show up the intellectual as a social engineer. It must be added, however, that, as we have seen, two distinctly American factors modulate this definition. The first is that the country itself was built on a utopistic view of nature, history, society and the individual (a vincible nature, an a-historic idea of history, the good society, the perfectible individual); the second is that from the beginning the intellectuals were either integrated in the pursuit of social goals, or else ignored and excluded. In other words, they did not make the Danean gift of ideology to their nation, they found that ideology imbedded in the nation's fabric. As Richard Hofstadter expresses it, "it has been our fate as a nation not to have ideologies but to be one."

The significant thing is that the American intellectuals have accepted these tasks and this role. Thus it happened that from simple "organizers" they became, when the need was felt, "social reconstructionists" at the turn of the century, and, fifty years later, caterers to mass society and formulators of the new civic morality of the socialized man. In this sense, their condition, their goals and conceptual world foreshadows the general condition of tomorrow's intellectual. It is in the light of this American experience that intellectuals in many other parts of the world are beginning to study their societies and their own position within them.

\*The Decline of the Intellectual—which will be published this fall and from which a chapter has been adapted to form the present article makes it clear at the outset that the term "intellectual" is used in the sense of "ideologue." And ideologue means, in my interpretation, a proponent of social and political blueprints, that is plans for the preferably total reshaping of social intercourse and political activity. Hence writers, philosophers, politicians, artists may not be called "intellectuals" unless, in addition to their proper function, they are inspired by the desire to intervene radically into the affairs of the community.

For further clarification: I argue in my book that the period of emergence of the intellectual is the pre-Renaissance centuries when Marsilius of Padua and Machiavelli (to mention the main figures) investigate the failure of the Christiana Respublica and construct the theory of a secular commonwealth on new moral and political foundations. And I conclude that the intellectual has reached his decline in our time when the scientific ideological concepts elaborated from Machiavelli to the present make the social engineer the dominant type of society.

- <sup>1</sup> "The Puritan Tradition," Commentary, August 1958.
- <sup>2</sup> Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, p. 84.
- <sup>3</sup> America and the Image of Europe, Meridian Books, 1960, p. 174.
- <sup>4</sup> Henry B. Parkes, *The American Experience*, p. 7.
  - Oscar Handlin, The Uprooted, p. 115.
  - 6 Idem, p. 191.

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r d <sup>7</sup> This attitude is, of course, changing. According to E. Digby Baltzell, the United States is developing an upper class like that of the European aristocracy. The signs of membership in it are the high social status, wealth, Anglo-Saxon

origin, Episcopalian church-affiliation, ivy-league education, club membership. This class, according to Mr. Baltzell, emphasizes Protestant ethics and is suspicious of leisure; it is hard-working and responsible in its exercise of power.

- <sup>8</sup> Op. cit., p. 10. <sup>9</sup> Essays, I/297.
- <sup>10</sup> Morton White, Social Thought in America: The Revolt against Formalism, p. 46.
- 11 "American Intellectuals: Their Politics and status," Daedalus, Summer 1959.
- 12 The American myth, writes Professor Hans J. Morgenthau, speaks of a golden age of past foreign policy in which no power, cruelty and will to dominate was used, and of a golden future in which the world will happily coexist in a federation modelled acording to the United States. In the meantime the present is evil because Russia thwarts the American-sponsored organization of world harmony. This character description by Professor Morgenthau is confirmed by General de Gaulle who, in his wartime conversations with Roosevelt understood the President as believing, and working for, a world system of peaceful American hegemony, after the evils of British, French, Dutch, etc. colonialism, world wide misery, etc. would be replaced by a peaceful cooperation of democratic peoples, including Soviet Russia.
- 13 The American Experience, pp. 81-82. The eighteenth-century view of man and society is obvious in such statements as Jefferson's referring to the United States as a "universal nation, pursuing universally valid ideas" and John Adams's: "Our pure, virtuous, public spirited federative republic will . . . govern the globe and introduce the perfection of man."

### The Sound of Blossoms

When night hung like succulent from the summer bough and like a somber bell the swaying earth was rung in the eastern fall of the summer sea, where a moth-winged fog lay white and pulsing over the cadenced lamps of seven hills strung free through the ink wash tide; beneath the white ringing were we sung in that ceaseless litany; under the deep cowled sea the utterances of tide and tree and eye dissolve and the weeping wood and burdened leaf resolve last syllables of wind to ring the bell of the blossom.

## Keepers of the Veil

When we close night from the light places of us, and valleys fall from the moon like morning blossoms after the noon rains; when we fold high constellations to the sceptered sleep, old songs seep out of the young earth of recurrent dreams into bright silences like sudden seed on the wind; When we chose night from the bright places of us, and light fell from the wanderers like a thrust of fresh pain; when we cry out on the waking new names for the cup and the wand

and sort from the early blossoms their early light,

then out of that night come new kings lost from some ancient court.

MARY SHUMWAY

# The Basis of Burke's Political Conservatism

PETER J. STANLIS

My principles enable me to form my judgment upon men and actions in history, just as they do in common life, and are not formed out of events and characters, either present or past. History is a preceptor of prudence, not of principles. The principles of true politics are those of morality enlarged; and I neither now do, nor ever will, admit of any other.

-Burke, Correspondence, (1960), 282.

It is a commonplace of scholarship on Burke that his political genius consisted of an extraordinary ability to understand the complex relationships between the constantly changing empirical and historical conditions of practical politics, and the basic principles of common morality. Yet during the century and a half since his death, and until very recently, studies of Burke's political philosophy have been concerned almost exclusively with what has been called the "empirical," "utilitarian" and "pragmatic" elements in his thought, or with those conservative principles which have an historical rather than an ethical foundation. Burke's own explicit words, that "the principles of true politics are those of morality enlarged," have generally been ignored.

Ever since Henry Buckle published The History of Civilization in England (1857-61), it has been universally assumed by Utilitarian and positivist writers, and even by some Christian humanists, that Burke's political philosophy rests upon a purely empirical, utilitarian and pragmatic foundation. John Morley, the outstanding Victorian disciple of Bentham and Mill, and the recognized authority on Burke during the late nineteenth century, wrote two books on Burke, in which he emphasized "Burke's utilitarian liberalism," and praised Burke for having overthrown "the baneful superstitution that politics . . . is a province of morals." According to Morley, Burke refused "to reason downwards from high sounding ideas of Right, Sovereignty, Property, and so forth," because such ideas "have no invariable conformity to facts, and . . . are only treated with reverence because they are absurdly supposed to be ultimate, eternal entities."1 Thus Morley claimed Burke as a fellow political liberal, whose strict regard for "circumstances," "expediency" and "prudence" made "the standard of convenience," rather than appeals to absolute ethical principles, the ultimate foundation of politics.

The path charted by Morley's interpretation of Burke was followed, with some slight variations, by William Lecky, Sir Leslie Stephen, and a whole host of Victorian and twentieth century writers in the liberal tradition of politics. Charles E. Vaughan, a learned political scientist and recognized authority on Burke, applied the usual Benthamite antithesis between "natural rights" and "expediency," and concluded that in Burke's politics "the last appeal is not to Rights but to expediency."2 Vaughan noted that Burke's "expediency" differed from that of Hume and Bentham, because it was qualified by "higher principles" and "a tissue of moral and religious ideals," but like Morley, he never doubted that Burke made "expediency the ultimate principle of politics." In 1913, John Mac-Cunn, an excellent Burke scholar, also assumed Burke was a utilitarian, and concluded: "To Burke, as to Bentham, all rights . . . are not ultimate but derivative."3 Elie Halévy supplied a variation on this theme in 1928: "From a utilitarian philosophy Burke deduced an anti-democratic political theory. . . . The utilitarian morality led Burke to social views which were profoundly different from those to which it led Bentham."4 In 1934, Lois Whitney, a noted eighteenth century literary scholar, contended: "Priestley, Burke, and Bentham are in harmony in their utilitarianism, Burke developing the doctrine in the form of a philosophy of expediency."5 Two years later, Henry V. S. Ogden extended this common conviction concerning Burke: "The repudiation of natural rights was implicit not only in his utilitarian conviction that the end of government is the happiness and welfare of the people governed, but also in his reliance on experience and in his rejection of all abstract doctrines of political theory . . . Burke's opposition to the theory of natural rights and to the use of nature as the norm in political theory was . . . a conviction unshaken during his whole career." In 1940, John H. Randall repeated this point, and during the 1940's two other writers on Burke, Annie M. Osborn and John A. Lester, added their voices to this chorus of scholars who supposed Burke was a utilitarian and pragmatist in his political philosophy.

Thus, for the past century liberals have always interpreted Burke's political philosophy by resorting to formulas based on "utility" versus "natural rights," and they have interpreted Burke's frequent attacks on metaphysical abstract rights as a rejection of belief in absolute moral principles. They have made much of Burke's strict regard for "circumstances," and have praised his "expediency" and "prudence," and his appeals to consider the practical consequences of following a given political policy to its logical but fatal conclusion. All these elements in Burke's thought have been praised as the ultimate in political wisdom.

Accepting the utilitarian frame of reference, a conservative writer, Richard M. Weaver, denies that Burke has any real claim to be considered a conservative political philosopher:

Burke is widely respected as a conservative who was intelligent enough to provide solid philosophical foundations for his conservatism. It is perfectly true that many of his observations upon society have a conservative basis; but if one studies the kind of argument which Burke regularly employed when at grips with concrete policies, one discovers a strong addiction to the argument from circumstance. Now . . . the argument from circumstance is the argument philosophically appropriate to the liberal. Indeed, one can go much further and say that it is the argument fatal to conservatism.8

Since Burke always argued from circumstances, rather than from "the nature of

things," Professor Weaver concludes that "Burke should not be taken as prophet by the political conservatives." The basic error in this argument, as we shall see, lies in the assumption that Burke's strict regard for circumstances is merely a matter of empirical observation and rational analysis, and wholly disconnected from any ethical principles. Weaver's basic error involves as complete a misinterpretation of Burke's principle of prudence as that held by Morley or Lord Acton, both of whom identified Burke's "prudence" with the calculated expediency of utilitarianism, and failed to understand its vital connection with the absolute ethics of the Natural Law in Burke's political philosophy.

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Quite apart from the utilitarian tradition of Morley, many recent writers who have claimed Burke as a conservative have laid great stress upon the historical elements in his political philosophy. They have emphasized the importance of Burke's appeals to social traditions and manners, to legal prescription and laws, to his passion for liberty connected with civil order and legal justice, to his veneration of "the wisdom of our ancestors," as embodied in Church and State, to his defense of the constitutional safeguards to life, liberty and property, to his praise of "prejudice" and duty as against abstract reason and "rights," and to his conception of man as a civil or political animal, who finds his selffulfillment in the gradually unfolding corporate life of his nation.9 This conception of Burke as an historical conservative has the merit of avoiding the over-simplified errors of doctrinaire liberalism. Also, on the positive side, by taking into account many of the most important aspects of civil society, as these are discussed by Burke, this view of his political philosophy has illuminated many of the most vital principles in Burke's complex thought. Yet the ultimate basis of Burke's political conservatism is not to be found in history, but in his moral principles.

All the elements perceived by utilitarian liberals and historical conservatives are to be found in Burke's political thought, but none of them, in themselves alone, or in any combination, constitute the ultimate principles of Burke's political philosophy. Writers who have converted these elements in Burke's thought into his supposed ultimate political principles have invariably reduced the scope and complexity of Burke's political philosophy to the measure of their own thought and temperament. Thus, both liberals and conservatives have praised or condemned Burke for insufficient reasons, on a consideration of those parts of his political philosophy which fitted or failed to fit into their own thought.

Since history is descriptive, not normative; since, as Burke said, "history is a preceptor of prudence, not of principles," to fully understand the basis of Burke's political philosophy it is necessary to look beyond history to his religious and ethical principles. But before doing this it is necessary to understand in what sense "history is a preceptor of prudence," and why it was that Burke considered prudence to be "in all things a virtue, in politics the first of virtues." For the past century, the most common single error of writers on Burke has been the failure to understand the nature and function of "prudence" in his political philosophy.

For Burke, political philosophy was the practical art of governing man as a moral agent in civil society. It was not and could not be a speculative science dealing with abstract truth. The politician, by Burke's definition, was "the philosopher in action," and he could never assume a priori knowledge that would enable him to attain exact mathematical certainty in the consequences of his decisions. Politics was a part of practical reason, not theoretical reason; it was concerned with the good, not the true. The

nature and actions of men are under general laws of moral necessity, but because the will of man is free to obey or defy the moral law, and because his social circumstances are infinitely varied, in contingent matters and details there can be no general laws. Although justice must always be observed, the determination of what is just in each particular instance, under the different institutions and conditions of mankind, must always vary in its means, according to the infinite variations of men's temporal circumstances. The common nature of man is infinitely modified by climate, geography, history, religion, nationality and race, by institutions, customs, manners and habits, by all the civil circumstances of time, place and occasions, which cut across and qualify, but do not impair the different means by which the moral ends of society are fulfilled. "The progressive sagacity that keeps company with times and occasions," Burke wrote, "and decides upon things in their existing position, is that alone which can give true propriety, grace, and effect to a man's conduct. It is very hard to anticipate the occasion, and to live by a rule more general." To Burke, "no moral questions are ever abstract questions." Prudence was for Burke not an intellectual, but a moral virtue, and as such it was a corrective and the best positive alternative to the errors of metaphysical abstraction:

Nothing universal can be rationally affirmed on any moral or political subject. Pure metaphysical abstraction does not belong to these matters. The lines of morality are not like ideal lines of mathematics. They are broad and deep as well as long. They admit of exceptions; they demand modifications. These exceptions and modifications are not made by the process of logic, but by the rules of prudence. Prudence is not only the first in rank of the virtues

political and moral, but she is the director, the regulator, the standard of them all.

Burke always maintained that "the exercise of competent jurisdiction is a matter of moral prudence," because "moral necessity is not like metaphysical, or even physical." Tyranny was a more common abuse in government than usurpation, Burke believed, because even under legitimate legislatures, "if the rules of benignity and prudence are not observed" oppressive actions may result. Prudence, or a strict regard for circumstances, is not merely a matter of empirical observation and intellectual calculation; it is morally imperative to regard circumstances, because otherwise political action could mortally injure those whom the statesman wishes to serve.

In Burke's attempted economical reform of 1780, he distinguished between his principle of prudence and moral weakness or equivocation:

It is much more easy to reconcile this measure to humanity, than to bring it to any agreement with prudence. I do not mean that little, selfish, pitiful, bastard thing, which sometimes goes by the name of a family in which it is not legitimate, and to which it is a disgrace—I mean that public and enlarged prudence, which, apprehensive of being disabled from rendering acceptable service to the world, withholds itself from those that are invidious.

Burke's remark, "If I cannot reform with equity I will not reform at all," and his statement, "I am not possessed of an exact measure between real service and its reward," provoked from Jeremy Bentham the reply: "Except Edmund Burke, no man is thus ignorant." Bentham's willingness to compute the ratio between public service and reward illustrates one of the great differences between Burke's principle of prudence and the utilitarian idea of "ex-

pediency." To Burke, prudence is the general regulator of social changes, including the reforms of abuses in society, according to the legal norms of the constitution and the moral principles of Natural Law. As such, prudence is the cardinal political virtue because it supplies the practical means by which Natural Law principles are fulfilled in the various concrete circumstances of man's social life. Burke's prudence is not the utilitarian computation of circumstances, a calculation of how far political power might be utilized before provoking opposition. Nor is prudence merely the social virtue of tact. To Burke, prudence is part of God's "divine tactic" fulfilled in man's moral temperance and political tact. Understood in this profoundly Aristotelian sense, Burke's principle of prudence is nothing less than the universal, eternal, and unchangeable Natural Law applied in practice through politics to each particular man, at every moment and in all circumstances, under the constitutional sovereignty of various nations. Since "the situation of man is the preceptor of his duty," prudence tells us when we should "abate our demands in favor of moderation and justice, and tenderness to individuals." Prudence is not intellectual calculation, but the moral discretion which enables men to live by the spirit of the moral law.

The claim of utilitarian writers that Burke belongs to their camp has obscured the absolute difference between his principle of prudence and their conception of expediency. Burke had a principle of utility, but he was no utilitarian. In the "Tracts on the Popery Laws" Burke indicated that he derived utility from Cicero's principle of moral equity, which was based upon "original justice." It was a utility "connected with and derived directly from our rational nature; for any other utility may be the utility of a robber." In his attack on Warren Hastings' "system of corrup-

tion" Burke noted the governor's "attempts to justify it on the score of utility," and added, "God forbid that prudence, which is the supreme guide, and indeed stands first of all virtues, should ever be the guide of vices." Burke distinguished carefully between a true and false adherent of moral prudence: "Our love to the occasionalist, but not server of occasions." In any conflict between merely utilitarian convenience and law, his stand was clear: "What the law respects shall be sacred to me. If the barriers of law should be broken down upon ideas of convenience, even of public convenience, we shall have no longer any thing certain among us." When rulers follow true moral prudence they are perfectly in accord with Natural and constitutional law, from which men's true natural and civil rights are derived. Burke believed that when claims to individual "rights" conflicted with moral expediency or prudence they were not really "rights," and not, as Morley said, that they were rights but had to yield to public expediency.

Lord Acton interpreted Burke late in life as a utilitarian, and charged that "Burke loved to evade the arbitration of principle." Apart from the failure to distinguish between political policy, which is subject to arbitration, and moral principles, which are beyond arbitration, Burke's whole practical political career is the best answer to such a misrepresentation. Burke's loyalty to the Rockingham Whigs, and his moral and intellectual guidance of Whig policies for almost three decades, is but one sustained instance of his high personal integrity. He gave up his seat for Bristol, rather than support an iniquitous economic and religious policy against Ireland. For years after most of his colleagues would have liked to have quietly dropped Hastings' trial, Burke made himself unpopular because of the moral zeal with which he pursued a just decision. He broke lifelong

friendships and stood alone for several years, rather than give approval of the French Revolution. Goldsmith's line is literally true; Burke was "too fond of the right to pursue the expedient." Because of his refusal to be corrupted by the Crown, Burke spent most of his political life with the loyal opposition. Neither in practice nor in theory did Burke's principle of prudence include the calculated expediency of utilitarian self-interest.

Burke once described prudence as "the god of this lower world." Professor Leo Strauss has wisely seen fit to note that "prudence and 'this lower world' cannot be seen properly without some knowledge of 'the higher world'-without genuine theorie." Through the Natural Law and political prudence, Burke combined his eloquent religious mysticism and stark concrete practicality. As a normative code of ethics, the Natural Law was the basis of Burke's political conservatism in "the higher world" of principle. As a practical means of applying the Natural Law in "this lower world" of civil society, prudence underlies Burke's sensitive regard for men's differences, his reverence for local loyalties and prejudices, his intense dislike for a priori abstract absolutes in doctrinaire theory, and his skepticism of ideal, simple plans of government. Burke's ability to combine the Natural Law and prudence made his political philosophy thoroughly consistent, yet almost wholly unsystematic. Natural Law and prudence enabled Burke to fuse to the limit of their valence the most sublime moral precepts and the most concrete empirical facts, details and circumstances, so that political theory and practice were one: "A statesman, never losing sight of principles, is to be guided by circumstances; and judging contrary to the exigencies of the moment he may ruin his country for ever." This is the key statement behind Burke's definition of the politician as "a philosopher

in action." As a philosopher, Burke drew his absolute ethical principles from the natural law; as a politician, he applied his principles in the concrete, with a full regard to historical circumstances, through his principle of moral prudence.

For Burke, history is "the preceptor of prudence" because it reveals "the known march of the ordinary providence of God." History was for Burke a secondary form of divine revelation, supplementing Scripture. History taught practical ethics, not directly through moral principles, but indirectly, by inculcating the spirit of morality through temperance and moderation: "Our physical well-being, our moral worth, our social happiness, our political tranquillity, all depend on that control of our appetites and passions, which the ancients designated by the cardinal virtue of Temperance." Burke believed that "the restraints on men are to be reckoned among their rights." In civil society, the moral law alone was insufficient to restrain the passions of men. The most immediate restraints on men came from the established institutions and legal processes of society, regardless of its political structure. In every just social order, sound ethical norms are embodied in its established institutions, so that in ordinary cases, within "the ordinary providence of God" which constitutes the historical process, society provided the practical means of solving its political problems by political and legal norms, in harmony with the moral law. Since for Burke "the actual and the present is the rational," prudence was a sufficient guide in the ordinary political problems of man. It was not necessary to appeal to transcendental moral standards in every political conflict; such appeals were reserved for extraordinary violations of the moral law, as in the cases of British misrule in Ireland and India, and the Jacobin tyranny in France.

It was the cardinal error of Morley and

the utilitarians (and even of Christian moralists such as Lord Acton and Professor Weaver), that they interpreted Burke's prudence as identical with the utilitarian conception of "expediency," which was based upon empirical philosophy and analytical reason. Morley and his disciples saw nothing of the ethical norms of the Natural Law in Burke's principle of prudence. In fact, they were totally unaware that the Natural Law was the ultimate foundation of Burke's political philosophy. Morley admired the blooming flowers of Burke's politics, without noting the philosophical ground in which they were rooted. He enjoyed the taste of the stream without going back to its source. Consequently, Morley made a tabula rasa of the moral principles in Burke's political philosophy, expunging the Natural Law in favor of history. Thus, Morley praised and Acton condemned Burke as a shrewd political activist who had no ultimate philosophical principles to guide his actions. Burke's definition, "a philosopher in action," was split in half, with Morley insisting on the self-sufficiency of ad hoc pragmatic action, and Acton insisting that the politician be a moral philosopher. Both Morley and Acton fully appreciated Burke's practical genius in politics, but neither man understood the philosophical basis of his political philosophy.

II

The two most important questions to be answered concerning Burke's political philosophy are (1) What, to Burke, were the basic principles of sound morality? and (2) How could moral principles be man's guide in practical politics? The second question has already been answered in our discussion of Burke's principle of moral prudence. For purposes of convenience, these questions can be stated separately. But in the close fusion of theory and prac-

tice in politics, they are ideally one and the same question, although man as a finite and fallible creature can approximate this ideal fusion only according to the purity of his understanding, the determination of his will, and the means at his disposal. Burke's actions as a practicing statesman, and the dialectical means by which he defended his actions or advocated political policy, are much more evident than his basic ethical principles. There are several good reasons for this. We have already noted that for Burke, in ordinary political issues, the practical instruments for realizing moral ends in civil society are not found in an abstract ethical code, but in the constitutional means and institutional arrangements inherited from the past. It is a common error to construe Burke's refusal to appeal to universal and eternal absolute moral principles at every point as a denial of belief in such principles. Burke's basic moral principles are not always evident, because as a practicing politician his basic political principles were never presented in a systematic treatise. His essential ethical and political beliefs, more or less explicit or assumed, are to be found scattered throughout his voluminous writings and recorded speeches. They are never found in any abstracted form, but are imbedded in Burke's various responses to the particular circumstances and political situations which confronted him during his twentynine years in Parliament.

Nothing is more evident than that Burke never approached the immediate contingencies of particular political problems in an ad hoc, arbitrary or unprincipled way. Quite the contrary, he always raised each political issue above its empirical circumstances, to the level of constitutional principles, and when necessary, to the level of moral principles. Matthew Arnold's remark that "Burke saturated politics with thought" can be refined into the higher claim that

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he saturated politics with historical, legal and ethical principles. In so doing, he continuously achieved a close reciprocal fusion of the particular and the universal. If Burke did not reason downward from high-sounding metaphysical abstractions, as Morley said, it was not because he had rejected moral absolutes, as Morley assumed, but because for Burke, as for Aristotle, transcendental moral truths possess reality only in so far as they are immanent in human affairs, and self-evident to right reason. The empirical actions of men are judged according to their conformity to or violation of basic ethical norms, as these are embodied in man's civil institutions, or in the revelations of religion and right reason.

Burke's politics involves much more than his initial response and subsequent method of reasoning on concrete political situations. Without his faith in the Natural Law, his responses and reasoning in politics would have had no order or cohesion, since there is no ultimate principle of organic unity in empirical, utilitarian and historical political appeals. The much belabored question of Burke's consistency can never be resolved on the political level alone, within history, without recourse to the moral principles which underlie Burke's politics. Burke changed his political front, but he never changed his moral ground.

It would take us too far afield to analyze in detail why the utilitarians so completely and persistently misunderstood Burke's appeals to the Natural Law. But a few general points should be noted. During much of the nineteenth century, utilitarian and positivist writers on political science never regarded the Natural Law as anything but a dead relic of the superstitions of prescientific Christian ages. Natural Law was generally held in contempt, and ignorance of what it had meant to previous periods resulted in a complete failure to distinguish between the traditional meaning of Classical

and Scholastic Natural Law, and eighteenth century aberrations from "Nature" put forth by revolutionaries under the "natural rights of man." As Jacques Maritain has said: "The idea of natural law . . . does not go back to the philosophy of the eighteenth century, which more or less deformed it."10 To the utilitarians, all appeals to "nature" as an ethical norm were anathema. Since it was well known that Burke was an enemy of the revolutionary "rights of man" doctrines, utilitarian writers assumed that Burke rejected the whole tradition of Natural Law in favor of expediency, social utility and an appeal to history. Morley wrote two books on Burke and never even mentioned the Natural Law. Leslie Stephen noted Burke's appeals to "natural rights," but dismissed all such passages as mere rhetoric. Vaughan and MacCunn also noted Burke's "natural rights," but insisted that what he really meant was "civil rights," based upon conventions rather than absolute ethical norms. Following his secondary sources, George Sabine, an outstanding authority in the history of political theory, refined upon these long prevailing convictions concerning Burke:

Burke made an important contribution to the nineteenth century proposal to replace the system of natural law. . . . In a sense Burke showed precisely . . . the reaction that was to follow upon Hume's destruction of the eternal verities of reason and natural law. . . . It is true that he never denied the reality of natural rights. . . . However, like Hume, he believed that they were purely conventional . . . They arise not from anything belonging to nature or to the human species at large, but solely from civil society. . . . Accordingly, Burke not only cleared away, as Hume had done, the pretence that social institutions depend on reason or nature, but far more than Hume he reversed the scheme of values implied by the system of natural law.11

With such a universal chorus of learned authorities proclaiming Burke an apostle of expediency and a deadly enemy of Natural Law, it is not surprising that in many contemporary reference and text books Burke is commonly enlisted as the foremost British political thinker opposed to belief in the Natural Law. "The reaction of the nineteenth century against natural law formulae," wrote Georges Gurvitch in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, "is traceable ultimately to Edmund Burke." Reliance on the high and reverend authorities in the tradition of Morley has caused many eminent writers of textbooks in history and politics to be overwhelmed in "the great Serbonian bog" of positivist scholarship on Burke. Thus, Oscar Handlin, Professor of History at Harvard, recently wrote: "Intellectually, the weightiest attacks upon the conception of a natural and universal law took their points of departure in the writings of Burke and Montesquieu." The enormous ignorance of Burke's works revealed in such statements is clearly evident to anyone familiar with recent scholarship on Burke.

Recent studies in Burke's political philosophy have established beyond any reasonable doubt that far from being an empiricist, utilitarian and pragmatist, and therefore an enemy of Natural Law, Burke was in principle and practice one of the most eloquent and profound defenders of Natural Law morality and politics in Western civilization. In 1949, in the preface to his Burke's Politics, Ross Hoffman took conscious issue with all previous scholarship on Burke in the Morley tradition:

Burke's politics . . . were grounded on recognition of the universal natural law of reason and justice ordained by God as the foundation of a good community. In this recognition the Machiavellian schism between politics and morality is closed, and it is exactly in this respect that Burke stands apart from the modern positivists and pragmatists, who in claiming him have diminished him. His thought, to be sure, worked mostly on concrete and practical questions and he was not fond of adverting to first principles of public morality; but affirmation of the natural law is implicit in all his works, and when he criticized radically -when he attacked at the roots such heinous systems as the anti-Catholic penal code of Ireland and the tyrannical rule of Hastings in Bengal-it became explicit.12

Professor Hoffman was among the first scholars to realize, and the first to say in print, that the foundations of Burke's political philosophy rested upon the Natural Law. Since 1949, at least a half dozen major publications have proved Hoffman's thesis to the hilt.

In "Burke and Natural Rights," The Review of Politics (Oct., 1951), Russell Kirk argued that Burke's "theory of natural law and natural rights made Burke the founder of philosophical conservatism" in politics. In 1953, in a brilliantly condensed analysis of Burke's basic principles, Professor Leo Strauss extended further the evidence of Burke's adherence to the absolute ethics of traditional Natural Law.13 Strauss avoided the common pitfall of the positivists by distinguishing sharply between Burke's Ciceronean "premodern conception of natural right," and the "imaginary rights of men" theories of the eighteenth century revolutionaries, who based their doctrines on Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. Lord Percy of Newcastle, in The Heresy of Democracy (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1955), noted in general certain aspects of Burke's natural law principles which were the basis of his conception of political sovereignty.

In 1956, Charles Parkin published The Moral Basis of Burke's Political Thought (Cambridge University Press), in which he demonstrated the close relationship in Burke's political philosophy between Natural Law and Burke's conception of the social contract. Burke's contract theory reveals the vital place of God and the Natural Law in his political thought. In a famous passage in the Reflections, Burke put forth a view of civil society totally at variance with Locke's theory of a voluntary and revocable social contract between rulers and subjects, based on a hypothetical precivil state of nature. Burke's contract theory was not centered in the means of limiting political power, nor in the share of power between rulers and ruled. Such matters were the concern of constitutional arrangements that depended upon civil conventions, not upon the social contract, and to confuse them broke down the distinction between society and the state, and the ultimate sovereignty of God in all uses of political power. "Society is indeed a contract," Burke wrote, but it is not to be "dissolved at pleasure" by anyone, but should be held in "reverence" as "a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection." This partnership is not merely between the living, as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Hume assumed, in their respective theories of the social contract. Burke's social compact is between the dead, the living, those to be born and ultimately, between all the generations of man and God, and even between God and Himself. In an "inviolable oath" God has bound Himself to maintain the wisdom and justice of His original creation:

Each contract of each particular state is but a clause in the great primaeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible world, according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and moral natures, each in their appointed place.

Burke believed in a transcendental moral duty beyond all human will or power, a duty imposed by the "primaeval contract" of God, binding man through obedience to the Natural Law to his civil obligations. To Burke, the Natural Law was a divinely ordained imperative ethical norm which fixed forever his basic moral duties in civil society. Parkin's book clearly showed that the moral order in Burke's political philosophy does not derive from history, but rather from a religious and Natural Law basis.

To enumerate the extent and variety of Burke's appeals to the Natural Law during his twenty-nine years in Parliament is far beyond the scope of this essay. A fulllength study of the Natural Law in Burke's political philosophy is available in this author's Edmund Burke and the Natural Law (University of Michigan Press, 1958). In this book, all the evidence of Natural Law contained in Burke's complete works was presented to show that Burke consistently appealed to the Natural Law in resolving Irish, Indian and domestic problems in politics, and in the great crisis of the French Revolution. The ultimate basis of Burke's political philosophy, and therefore of his conservatism, is not to be found in his appeals to history, or to prescription, or tradition, and such, but rather in the absolute ethical principles of Christianity and the Natural Law. In Burke's politics, prescription is to law what tradition and custom are to manners, what revelation is to religion and right reason is to morality. The Natural Law is the foundation for Burke's conception of international and constitutional law, of human nature, of Church and State, and of his principles of moral prudence, legal prescription and political sovereignty. As the ethical standard in all human contracts, the Natural Law of God supplied Burke with his conviction that the greatest and best gift of God to man was government: "He who gave our nature to be perfected by our virtue, willed also the necessary means of its perfection.—He willed therefore the state.-He willed its connection with the source and original archetype of all perfection." Church and State have for Burke a Divine origin, and are but two aspects of the same thing-, God-given instruments by which man can bring himself to his highest spiritual and social perfection: "Every sort of moral, every sort of civil, every sort of politic institution, aiding the rational and natural ties that connect the human understanding and affections to the divine, are not more than necessary, in order to build up that wonderful structure, Man." Apart from its spiritual function, the civil function of the Church in England was to consecrate the state, "that all who administer in the government of men, in which they stand in the person of God himself, should have high and worthy notions of their function and destination." Burke's conception of society as based upon a divine contract implies that all power is a divine trust: "All persons possessing any portion of power ought to be strongly and awfully impressed with an idea that they act in trust: and that they are to account for their conduct in that trust to the one great Master, Author, and Founder of society. . . . Power to be legitimate must be according to that eternal, immutable law, in which will and reason are the same." Burke's belief in the Natural Law made him a champion of man's natural rights-, those "self-evident" rights to life, liberty and property which it was the chief purpose of society to preserve: "Everybody is satisfied," Burke wrote, "that a conservation and secure enjoyment of our natural

rights is the great and ultimate purpose of civil society; and that therefore all forms whatsoever of government are only good as they are subservient to that purpose, to which they are entirely subordinate." As these basic natural rights belonged to man, by virtue of his humanity, and were not the civil rights granted to him by the state, by virtue of his citizenship, they transcended the state and took precedence over its power as norms by which the actions or claims of rulers were to be judged: "The rights of men-that is to say, the natural rights of mankind," Burke said, concerning Fox's East India Bill, "-are indeed sacred things; and if any public measure is proved mischievously to affect them, the objection ought to be fatal to that measure." In any conflict between expediency and true natural rights, based on Natural Law, the last appeal for Burke was not to expediency but to Rights.

The most recent book on Burke's political philosophy, Francis Canavan's The Political Reason of Edmund Burke (Duke University Press, 1960), states: "There is not to be found in Burke's writing a formal treatise on the natural law... but the doctrine is alluded to throughout his works and furnishes the premises of his most profound arguments." In opposition to those who have contended that Burke's method of handling political problems proves he was a pragmatist, Canavan's book shows that Burke's characteristic use of political reason conforms with the self-evident norms of the Natural Law.

Thus, the counter-revolution on traditional grounds which has characterized scholarship on Burke since 1949 has completely reversed the utilitarian-positivist-liberal interpretation of his political philosophy. It is now evident to all the outstanding Burke scholars that in the final analysis of Burke's complex thought, the revelations of Christianity and the ethical norms

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of Classical and Scholastic Natural Law form jointly the foundation of Burke's conservative Christian-humanist political philosophy. As Burke so beautifully summarized his position: "The principles of true politics are those of morality enlarged."

<sup>1</sup> John Morley, Edmund Burke: A Historical Study (London, 1867), p. 152. In 1917 Morley recorded that he once had defended himself against Lord Acton's charge that he had no "large principles" by claiming adherence to Burke's "higher expediency." Recollections (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1917), I, 232-233. Acton accepted Morley's interpretation of Burke, and condemned Burke on the very grounds that Morley praised him.

<sup>2</sup> Charles E. Vaughan, Studies in the History of Political Philosophy Before and After Rousseau

(New York, 1925), II, 5.

<sup>3</sup> John MacCunn, The Political Philosophy of Burke (London: Edward Arnold, 1913), p. 193. <sup>4</sup>Elie Halévy. The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism (New York: 1928), pp. 158 and 161. See also, pp. 153-157, 159-161, 181 and 223.

<sup>5</sup> Lois Whitney, Primitivism and the Idea of Progress (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,

1934), pp. 196-197.

<sup>6</sup> Henry V. S. Ogden, "The Rejection of the Antithesis of Nature and Art in English Political Writings, 1760-1800," Ph. D. Thesis, University of Chicago, 1936, p. 85. See also, pp. 83, 86, 113, 116, 137-138, 146 and 155.

<sup>7</sup> See John H. Randall, *The Making of the Modern Mind* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1940), p. 432; Annie M. Osborn, *Rousseau and Burke* (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), pp. 133-145; John A. Lester, "An Analysis of the Conservative Thought of Edmund Burke," Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University, 1943, pp. 64 and 201.

<sup>8</sup> Richard M. Weaver, *The Ethics of Rhetoric* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953), p. 58. See

also, p. 83.

<sup>9</sup> For examples of Burke as an historical conservative, see A. A. Baumann, Edmund Burke, the Founder of Modern Conservatism (London, 1929); John A. Lester, "An Analysis of the Conservative Thought of Edmund Burke"; Russell Kirk, "Burke and the Principle of Order," The Sewanee Review (April, 1952), pp. 1-15; "Burke and the Philosophy of Prescription," Journal of the History of Ideas (June, 1953), pp. 365-380. Kirk was aware that Burke's conservatism had a religious and moral basis, but in these articles he stressed the historical elements in Burke's thought.

<sup>10</sup> Jacques Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law, tr. Doris C. Anson (New York:

Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943), p. 59.

<sup>11</sup> George Sabine, A History of Political Theory (New York: Henry Holt, 1937), pp. 607-614.

<sup>12</sup> Ross Hoffman, Burke's Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), preface, xv. This preface contains one of the best brief expositions of Burke's basic political principles.

<sup>13</sup> Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 294-323.

# Seeds for Greatness

#### DAVID MCCORD WRIGHT

FEW REALLY FAMILIAR with the currents of modern thought can doubt that, whatever the momentary state of American policies, the intellectual initiative has clearly passed to the right. The "Keynesian Revolution" has been absorbed and replied to, and the inadequacies of the comprehensive welfare state as a social goal have become more and more glaringly apparent. The "stale orthodoxy" of our campuses now is in the left! The new "radicalism" is right wing and conservative. Under these circumstances it is worthwhile inquiring into the roots of the new movement. Noneconomic readers are likely to be bewildered by references to the "Austrian School," the "Chicago School," the "New Manchesterians," and so on. What do these terms mean? And again, on a more practical level, where does the modern movement come from? Who has held the tradition during the lean years of socialist intellectual domination? The present essay may be considered as a first guide to some landmarks of right wing thought.

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But, first of all, what is a Modern Conservative? The writer asked that question years ago in an article in Fortune, confusingly re-bapitized (by the editor) "When you call me Conservative—Smile." The truth of the matter is that words like conservatism, socialism, capitalism, radicalism, and so on are constantly shifting in meaning. The only way for an author really to be sure he is conveying his

thought is not to use any of these ambiguous, loaded terms without defining them for himself. Better still, let us follow Dr. Hayek's example and go back to an earlier unvulgarized term and say "Whig."

Better not only semantically but historically! For it is from the Whig synthesisthe "glorious" revolution of 1688, direct ancestor of our revolution of 1776, that modern American conservatism traces its pedigree. "The task of civilization," writes Alfred North Whitehead "is to preserve order amidst change and change amidst order." The Whigs were confronted with a similar problem of balance: how to preserve authority amidst popular government-and popular government amidst authority. The task has its political and its economic side. For the feudal solution to the problem of prerogative is to confine the lord by a frame of static rights, to set up a society, fragmented, to be sure, and governed by law, but undeveloping. The Whigs were beyond that. Their concept of limited government also called for a framework of values and a structure of law, but with the passage of time this increasingly took on the character of values and law designed to permit change! This search for a via media between "community" and development, between prerogative and law, between personal rule and popular government has given to "whig" thought and its descendants a virility and tension unknown to more monolithic outlooks.

The search for a compromise is also shown in the problem of equality. The Whigs did not wish to abolish all inherited institutions. What they did do was to shift emphasis to opportunity. Inequality of income and wealth were permitted, but in a framework of opportunity and "equality before the law." Popular elections were relied upon generally but the franchise was viewed as an earned privilege rather than an automatic right. In short, wherever one looks one finds alike a distrust of the mob and of the dictator, the same search for a balance between opportunity and security, the same attempt to resolve the conflict of what has been called "democracy of status" with "democracy of aspiration." Such are the foundations of the "whig" outlook.

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BUT NEXT let us see where our modern terms come from. The relative political sophistication of late 17th century Whiggism is not matched by an economics of equivalent rank. It took the better part of a century before Hume and Smith, greatly influenced by French thought, had produced a "classical" foundation for economics worthy to rank in brilliance with Hobbes and Locke. But with Smith, and later Ricardo, economics was securely started on its way.

Once, however, a firm base was provided, it was easy for the "utilitarians" to embroider the logic of the market and to apply it to practical politics. Well before the mid-nineteenth century this movement had culminated in what has been called the "Manchester" school—so named because the agitation for equal rights, electoral reform, and free trade was particularly centered in, and supported by the great commercial city of Manchester. The Manchester school enlarged upon the iniquity of making the food of the poor expensive, while the Tories used military argu-

ments for protection. Manchester won and England became a nation of free trade.

Yet it is typical of the semantic confusion with which we have to deal that one of the greatest of the later Manchesterians-John Bright-should be called a "radical." He was radical in his hatred of "vested interests" and inherited privilege, but it would be difficult to conceive of any people further apart than John Bright and the modern communist or state-minded reformers. Bright wanted maximum popular government and individual liberty, but it was a freedom for a man to find his own level. The quality of Bright's economics is shown by the fact that he fought Feilden's factory legislation. Moreover, it was often the conservatives, more concrete in their thought, and less blinded by a priori theory, who appreciated the suffering and degradation often resulting from the new "freedom." Southey's Colloquies, the work of a Tory poet laureate, so devastatingly reviewed by Macaulay, may be a sentimental and at times a silly book, but it got in some home thrusts which the arm-chair theorists of the period entirely failed to grasp.

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LET US, however, now shift the scene to continental Europe. English "liberalism" -the further development of whig thought in the direction of the free market, limited government and equal rights-rapidly spread in Europe. The great apologist of the mid-nineteenth century is the Frenchman Bastiat, whose biting irony and sarcasm have never been surpassed. Even today the "Petition of the Candlemakers" and others of his essays can be read with great profit. But as the century wore on the most formidable intellectual rivals to English predominance in economic thought developed in Sweden and Austria, both groups initially "liberal," that is laissez faire, in their thought. Since by the vicissitudes of fate English and American conservatism have been influenced more directly by the Austrian than the Swedish school, we may concentrate upon the Austrians.

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Americans are likely to be most attentive in their thought to the countries from which they or their ancestors spring. As, until recently, central Europe was not a great source of immigration to the United States, that great complex of intellectual and commercial development which centered in Vienna, before its disastrous destruction at the end of World War I, has never been fully appreciated here. A thrust at Athens, Rome, Paris, London-even Berlin-is felt instantly to be a thrust at the heart. Vienna, a center of European culture nearly as old and important as Paris (like Paris and London a Roman city), has been "felt" unfortunately never America to the same degree until quite recently. Hence much unhappiness-for us and for them.

But let us turn back to happier days. In the 1890's the great, if "ramshackle," Austro-Hungarian Empire was one of the leading centers of wealth and culture for Europe. In the University of Vienna was gathered one of the outstanding concentrations of the brain power of the West. And if the nominal power remained to some extent in the hands of the nobility, the actual power was increasingly exercised by the intellectuals. Circumstances made them increasingly "liberal" in outlook. The empire was an extraordinary conglomeration of conflicting nationalities. The central monarchy was far from strong. A tolerant federalism was the only viable means of government, and only the extreme agitator was curbed. Economically, a free trade policy had more and more appeal. Prussia had first maneuvered Austria out of Germany by free trade and then turned to protection. In the works of great Professor Bohm-Baweck and his disciples, "liberal" thought was stated with a force, depth and sophistication never surpassed. Yet, as frantic nationalism inflicted disaster after disaster upon the old imperial city, men trained at Vienna carried their ideas all over the world, to reinforce the traditions of English classical thought, greatly under fire at home.

It must not be supposed, however, that English and American neo-classical thought was standing still all this time. Even leaving aside John Stuart Mill and Alfred Marshall, capitalism, democracy and the free market were alike analyzed and defended with dignity and moderation by such men, to pick at random over a long period of years, as Professor Sir Dennis Robertson, John Bates and John Maurice Clark, Fred M. Taylor at Michigan, John R. Commons of Wisconsin, Irving Fisher and (earlier) William Graham Summer at Yale, Professor now Lord Robbins of the London School of Economics, John H. Williams and Joseph Schumpeter at Harvard, Frank Knight and Henry Simons of Chicago and many others. To attempt a full catalogue is impossible.

The desire to make a militant re-statement of what he now calls the "whig" case, must however be attributed above all to Professor Hayek, originally of Vienna, next of London, now of Chicago. Hayek did not feel that the rather cynical "liberalism" of Knight, the ambiguous despair of Schumpeter, the gentle sarcasm of Robertson were enough. In his Road to Serfdom he sounded an alarm which many at the time thought quixotic, but which has increasingly echoed down the years. And in his recent book The Constitution of Liberty, he gives a much deeper and more scholarly re-statement. The frustrating stalemates of the New Deal, the disillusioning experience of World War II, and post world war controls and socialism gave point to his words, and a number of younger men all over the world rallied to the cause. One of the outgrowths of this movement was the foundation of the Mont Pèlerin Society which remains to this day a spearhead of the new whiggism.

#### IV

One of the basic tenets of The Federalist Papers is the "Propensity of Men to Disagree." Modern Conservatism is no exception to this rule. To catalogue all the organizations and individuals working today to promote conservative thought would be an intolerable burden on the reader, and, even so, some deserving persons or groups would almost surely be omitted. What we will try to do, instead, is to indicate a few of the principle varieties of opinion. For it must be realized that we are dealing here with a spectrum of thought, not a single beam.

The basic point of view which links together all the various "conservative" groups is a distrust of individual direction of others, and of unlimited power. The hope is to establish a "rule of law." But what rule? That is where discussion begins. Again emphasis is on opportunity rather than equality. But how much opportunity and how provided? Many if not most modern conservatives emphasize continuity, the need for a supporting framework of values, the preservation of useful institutions, and the avoidance of damaging changes. But what is useful? What is damaging? What gives continuity? These questions will serve to introduce a more basic discussion.

Professor von Mises, of the Austrian group, is the outstanding example of almost completely uncontaminated neo-utilitarianism. He pushes the logic of the automatic free market about as far as it can be made to go, and restricts state-supplied opportunity to education of those under nine

years of age. In all this he is in the straight line of John Bright's "radicalism." A special concern is shown for monetary orthodoxy and for a money system that works "automatically." In practice this means the full gold standard and no deficit finance under any circumstances.

Less dogmatic is the "Chicago school" of Henry Simons (now deceased), Hayek, Milton Friedman, all, of course, of the University of Chicago, and others. The Chicago school has devoted many pages to the working out of non-discretionary, automatic, standards of monetary policy. Today this line of inquiry appears somewhat abated. Professor Hayek, unlike Dr. von Mises, is also willing to allow discretionary increases in the money supply to keep constant not just its quantity, but quantity times "velocity" or rate of turnover. Under some circumstances such a policy would cover quite ambitious fiscal intervention. Some others of the Chicago school seem resigned to a condition of "freely fluctuating" exchange rates as being better at least than the arbitrariness, discriminations, and circumlocation of exchange controls. Professor Hayek is also willing to accept social security legislation since he recognizes the extremely vulnerable position of the modern industrial worker toward depression and change.

Probably the greatest line of cleavage, however, between von Mises and the Chicago school, is in the question of monopoly—Professor Hayek and others of Chicago recognize the need for planning "to avoid the necessity of planning." This means reliance on the free market, and, in practice, ranges (according to the individuals concerned) from very moderate to quite drastic anti-trust action. Professor von Mises as I understand him would do nothing against monopoly—feeling that the automatic price system would "solve the problem." All the "Austrians" and their

Chicago sympathizers seem to be free traders.

But the questions we have been discussing are primarily economic. When we move over to politics and philosophy other ideas intrude. First of all as to supporting values. Many of the old line Europeanstyle "liberal", i.e. laissez-faire economists, are not merely non-, but even anti-religious. On the other hand a great body of American neo-conservatives see in religion a key factor of the situation. They do not believe that either democracy or the pricing system can run on mere "reason," and they view the pressure for state action and "national purpose" as attempts to find in the state an ersatz religion.

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The same problems come up when we deal with the questions of continuity and security. Thinkers like Russell Kirk carry their love of continuity and organic development almost to the point of opposing the industrial revolution, whereas other conservatives wish to foster rather than hinder competitive development. In the same way some conservatives are believers in unions as means of mitigating suffering and limiting the power of the state, while a few oppose them entirely. The majority of the conservative movement, however, while prepared to admit that unions can be useful, see in them today the greatest and most potentially dangerous aggregation of unrestrained power in modern society.

There are other lines of distinction. Some conservatives are isolationists. The majority are not. Some think the "cold war" scare exaggerated, the majority probably feel it not sufficiently emphasized. Some are protectionists. Most are not. Some favor large scale foreign aid. Some moderate aid. Most are decidedly skeptical of how much it can accomplish.

When we turn to other countries besides the United States, the same cleavages of thought appear. In England the values of the market, competition, opportunity, and fluidity are being increasingly stressed. Professor John Jewkes, once of the University of Manchester, now of Oxford and a member of the Mt. Pèlerin society has been outstanding in the movement, especially through his book Ordeal by Planning. Other of the "new Manchesterians" are for example, Colin Clark and Thomas Wilson. And of course on the Continent there is the towering figure of Dr. Ludwig Erhard.

But in Europe even more than in America the farm problem is a poser. The new Manchesterian, like the old, condemns the taxing of the people's food and the exploitation of the poor which it implies. But the "organic" conservative, stresses continuity and so on, and takes a different view.

#### V

My IDEA in summarizing some of the different points of view within the modern American Conservative movement has not been at all to give the impression of a quarrelsome movement. Far from it. The Conservative today is confronted by such drastic opposition, is linked to his fellows by such considerable points of agreement that the movement today is cohesive rather than divided.

It is up to conservatives now to show the dangers that lie in uncritical altruism, the long run efficiency that lurks in short run competitive "waste," the value of the individual and the danger of the mob—and the imitation messiah. He must call attention to the human cost and long run sterility of totalitarian "development." He must try to convince the people that labor, no less than any other enterprise, can "price itself out of the market." His job in short is the insistence upon justice, moderation, and good sense in a world that has been increasingly off-beat.

## Coming Home from Work, Autumn Twilight

Their heads rose out of their necks like waving goldenrod Their laughter shook the streets with music! Men and women negroes swaying Deeply, tenderly in the twilight.

They stopped to embrace in the middle of the street And a Studebaker watched with interest.

Right in front of the parking lot they made love Dancing a square dance in the middle of the ripe, bright street To a tune of Gershwin's, high, colloquial and sad Blowing trumpet blues nostalgically Down the quiet street.

They were a couple of negroes coming home from work, The men's arms looped around the girls, gay ribbons binding their waists. Imperiously they held them close, Letting them go with a grin and a swagger!

An industrial street, narrow, factory and drab Came to life at closing time When strong, gay feet broke the cobblestones into splints of laughter.

Arm-linked, in the pouring Autumn twilight
A couple of negroes, quitting a factory at dusk
Laughingly threw their weight around, and made love.

FLORENCE UNGAR

# The German Bundeswehr

HUBERTUS ZU LÖWENSTEIN

THERE WAS one conviction in 1945 common to victors and vanquished alike: Nazism must disappear forever, and there must never again be a German army. Perhaps there was more unanimous agreement on the army than on the party. Even the few Nazis remaining after the collapse of the Hitler regime agreed that the days of German armed forces were over although

their motives were different from those of the majority of the German people.

Accordingly the Allied laws against Nazism always contained clauses against "Militarism," or "Remilitarization." In the Potsdam Agreement of August 1945 demilitarization or what was called the "elimination of Germany's war potential" plays an important role. Under the euphemistic heading "economic principles," the produc-

tion not only of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, but also of all types of air-craft and sea-going ships was prohibited. The same applied to "metals, chemicals, machinery, and other items directly necessary to a war economy." These clauses provided the basis for an almost complete control of Germany's economic life and of its entire industrial production and such control was indeed embodied in the Directive JCS 1076 of April 26, 1945. It contained a paragraph called "De-militarization" in line with the basic tenets of the Potsdam Agreement. A further directive, released on April 1, 1946, enumerated the prohibited industries and those to be eliminated, among them synthetic gasoline and oil, synthetic rubber, ball and taper rolling bearings, heavy machinery tools, heavy tractors, primary aluminum, and so on. The allowable production of steel in Germany was not to exceed 5,800,000 ingot tons, in any future year; the annual consumption of non-ferrous metals was drastically curtailed. Similar limitations applied to the chemical industries and, in short, to all other branches of modern economic and industrial life.

The three "D"s, as General Lucius Clay later on called them, dominated the occupation for a number of years: Denazification, Decartellization, and Demilitarization. They were supplemented by another important "D"—Dismantling. This, too, was carried out under the general policy of eliminating German militarism or its "war potential." Dismantling in fact went on until April 1951, at a time when the Marshall Plan had replaced the Morgenthau Plan and when a German military contribution toward the common defense was being widely discussed.

The "D" program was supplemented by the program of "Re-education." It aimed not only at denazification but most particularly at eliminating any vestiges of "militarism" in the public mind, most specially among the young.

Even since the days of World War I propaganda there had existed the legend of the German "military clique" and of an inbred desire in the German mind for world conquest. The late Gustav Stolper in his courageous book German Realities, published in 1947, has summarized the motives for the post-war treatment of Germany as follows:

Once the nursery fable, bold and preposterous, was generally accepted that the world consists of "peace-loving nations" and two aggressors, Germany and Japan, it was beyond dispute that after victory Germany and Japan had to be so thoroughly disarmed that never again would they conceivably dream of starting another war. We had lived through the story once before, in 1918, but there were a few differences. In 1918 Japan, being one of the "Allied and Associated Powers," was still a "peace-loving nation" and Germany's disarmament was approached with political misgivings and moral inhibitions.

Now in a convenient equation the misdeeds of Nazism were placed at the doorstep of the Army—regardless of certain historic facts.

"The General Staff has opposed re-armament, the occupation of the Rhineland, the occupation of Austria and of Czecho-Slovakia and finally the war against Poland. The General Staff has tried to dissuade me from taking the offensive against France and to wage war on Russia." These are Hitler's own words after the abortive coup of July 20, 1944, in which many leading officers had been involved.

In line with this general policy the German administration in the Western Zones of Occupation was completely decentralized. In the first few years only local police units were permitted, again, of course, under

strict Allied Military Government Control. Any centralization of the police on the Länder level was already considered a dangerous step towards the revival of militarism. To this day the German police in the Federal Republic is decentralized to a degree hardly compatible with the needs of an emergency situation should it ever arise. Only the border police—Bundesgrenzschutz—guarding the approaches to the Iron Curtain are under federal control.

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In the Soviet Zone of occupation no such pacifist chastity ever existed. Neither had Lenin, his collaborators, or successors ever been pacifists. They understood only too well the importance of armed forces as an instrument of power in the hands of the revolution.

We know today from a book by a certain Max Opitz, State Secretary to the "president" of the so-called German Democratic Republic, published in 1959, that as early as October 31, 1945, the Soviet Military Administration ordered the arming of the East German Volkspolizei. Soon afterwards centralized police units were created under the leadership of loyal Communists. Early in 1946, border and transport police units were formed. By 1948, the militarily trained police in the Zone numbered 15,000 men.

The process of Communist re-militarization, in spite of Potsdam, proceeded rapidly. By 1952 there was an army of 110,000 men. The latest figures show that the Soviet Zone disposes of about 1.1 million fully trained men out of a population of 17 million. 110,000 belong to the so-called National People's Army. A further 350,000 belong to the Socialist Factory Units. They have the same internal organization as the Armed Forces, with the same training and equipment. There are 200,000 reservists, almost 100,000 members of the Volkspolizei, about 50,000 men in the Communist border police and 400,000 young people organ-

ized in the pre-military "Society for Sport and Technical Education," following the pattern set by the Nazi pre-military youth organizations.

These formidable forces are in addition to the twenty Soviet Russian divisions posted in the Central Germany, *i.e.*, the Soviet Zone of Occupation, the so-called "German Democratic Republic." There are 7,000 tanks and artillery units with over 8,000 guns. The ground forces are supported by Red Air Force units numbering close to 1,000 frontline fighter planes and bombers.

The German Communist Navy, closely integrated with the powerful Soviet Baltic Fleet, consists at the present time of seven squadrons, destroyers and escort destroyers, submarine chasers, mine sweepers, speedboats and other craft.

The creation, the development and the tasks of the German Bundeswehr, the armed forces of the Federal Republic, must be viewed against the historic and political background. Like the Japanese post-war Constitution, the Basic Law of the German Federal Republic, promulgated on May 23, 1949, manifests a strong pacifist tendency. One of its first articles states that no one can be forced against his conscience to serve in the armed forces. The first Federal Cabinet had no Minister for Foreign Affairs—the conduct of German foreign affairs was reserved by the Western Powersnor was there, of course, a Minister of Defense.

The German Basic Law was promulgated directly after the Berlin Blockade had come to an end and five weeks after the United States, Canada and ten Western European countries had signed the Nato Agreement in Washington. The Western Zones of Occupation shortly afterward united into the Federal Republic of Germany, were indirectly protected by the Pact, its Article 5 stating that an attack against the Occupation Forces of any partner in Europe would

bring about the casus foederis. This clause is still important for the safety of West Berlin which in a strictly legal sense does not form a part of the Federal Republic and therefore is protected only by the presence of British, French, and American troops.

The Communist attack on South Korea in June, 1950, demonstrated to the free world the urgency of the Soviet threat. The North Atlantic Council, supreme organ of Nato, meeting in New York on September 15, 1950, was confronted by the decisive question of how to defend the Nato area against an attack similar to the one which had taken place in the Far East. The meeting of the Council agreed unanimously on a forward strategy for Europe-aggression had to be resisted as far east as possible. The defense of Europe on German soilthe logical consequence of the forward strategy-could not possibly be carried out without the military and political participation of the Federal Republic. When the Council met again in Brussels on December 18, 1950 it stated that "German participation would strengthen the defense of Europe without altering in any way the purely defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." With this step the principle of German participation in the common defense was established and approved. From this day on negotiations between the Western governments and the Federal Republic began to take concrete shape.

However, owing to Allied post-war policy and the national and moral problems posed by the division of the country, many obstacles had to be overcome in the public mind before a German defense contribution could be brought about. The first to attack the old taboo against a military contribution was Chancellor Adenauer himself. In an interview with the *Cleveland Plain Dealer* of December 3, 1949, he

stated flatly that Germany would have to make a contribution toward the defense of Europe. He suggested that it be made within the framework of a European army under a common supreme command. Once the Soviets, he said, stood at the Rhine, the entire continent would be in their power.

The reaction to this clearsighted statement was violent in Paris, in London, in Germany itself, among the re-educators and the re-educated alike. However, the end of the illusion which had depicted the Soviet Union as a "great democracy," akin to the United States and as having renounced the Marxist-Leninist program of world conquest through world revolution, had finally come.

Nevertheless, several years were wasted over negotiations on the formation of an integrated European army of EDC (the European Defense Community) which would have provided for German battlegroups not exceeding 6,000 men fully integrated into the European command. This was the so-called "Pleven-Plan" formulated by Henri Pleven, then Prime Minister of France, on October 26, 1950. It would have been an army of interpreters rather than of effective military units. At that time the witticism was current in Europe that "France desires a German Army stronger than the Russian but weaker than the French." In addition the EDC Army was to be incorporated into the more embracing system of Nato-of which the Federal Republic was not yet a member.

The arguments for and against a German defense contribution rocked the young Federal Republic. The Social-Democratic opposition would have none of it, and only after the new Parliamentary elections of 1953, the government parties having won a two-thirds majority, was it possible to pass the necessary amendment to the Federal Constitution making the draft laws possible.

The end of this post-war chapter was written when on the night of August 30-31, 1954 the French National Assembly did not even bother to turn down EDC and the Pleven-Plan. It merely voted 319 against 164 to remove it from the agenda. It was Sir Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, who in this dark hour of post-war history found the solution. Owing to his energy and clearsightedness the Paris Conference convened a few weeks after the downfall of EDC-the United States, France, Great Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany for the first time as an equal partner. The package of agreements called "The Paris Treaties" ended the Occupation regime in Germany and provided for the Federal Republic's becoming a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. After the German Bundestag had ratified the treaties on February 27, 1954, they became effective on May 5, 1955. On May 9, precisely six years after its creation, the Federal Republic became a full member of the North Atlantic Defense Community.

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Though many obstacles still had to be overcome the build-up of the Bundeswehr could now begin. The first volunteers were accepted in November 1955 and practical work began in January 1956 in a training camp at Andernach on the Rhine. A wire fence around a camp of 1500 square feet enclosed the entire new German Army -1,000 men. Their commander was given four months time to prove that a progressive spirit was compatible with military life in Germany and that in order to train the new soldiers one did not have to fall back on the outmoded patterns of the past. From these humble beginnings the strength of the German Bundeswehr has grown within six years to a present total of about 300,000 men, Army, Air Force, Navy, and Territorial Defense.

The total strength to be reached by the Army by the end of 1961, by the Navy and Air Force in 1963, will be 350,000. 200,000—or twelve divisions—will be Army troops, 100,000 will be Air Force personnel, 30,000 will be in the Navy and 20,000 to 30,000 in the Territorial Defense.

The problems confronting the Bundeswehr were, and still are, very great. For twelve years there had been no training of officers and non-commissioned officers. The adoption of appropriate legislation by the Bundestag despite the large majorities enjoyed by the Government parties by no means eliminated the strong opposition and resentment among broad masses of the people. For the tiny group of Communist sympathizers opposition to the Bundeswehr was a matter of course. They realized that a German defense contribution would make a "European Korea" -- a conquest by proxy —impossible. Should the Soviet Union decide on war, it would now be forced to enter the conflict and could no longer leave the job to its satellites. Moscow would have to take the full risk involved in an all-out war-and this might provide the safety margin for the maintenance of peace.

But small numbers of "unreconstructed Nazis" have also been opposed to the Bundeswehr. For them its very existence is the daily proof that Hitlerism failed. These elements have joined hands with the left-wingers, united if not by a common ideology then certainly by a common hatred of Western Christian civilization.

For the overwhelming majority of the German people, however, the Bundeswehr has become more and more acceptable as time has gone by. At first its creation was regarded as an unavoidable necessity. The left wing slogan: "Ohne mich!" or "Count me out" had been countered by the obvious answer "Without me' means 'For Moscow.'"

What has made the Bundeswehr become truly accepted, however, was precisely what makes it unacceptable to the Nationalists of the old school: the fact that in the strictest sense of the word the Bundeswehr units are not national armed forces. The genuine longing for a wider community which led the Federal Republic into the Strassburg Council of Europe, the European Common Market and into other European organizations like Euratom, has now found its expression in Nato, the Atlantic Community, and in the integration of the German Armed Forces into this defense system. All Army divisions, Air Force and Navy units as soon as they are combatready are assigned to Nato commands. The Bundeswehr has no national command above corps level, the corps for their part being assigned to Nato. Furthermore no General Staff exists in the traditional sense.

The following German units have been assigned to the Nato command: Army-3 corps headquarters with support troops, 4 armored infantry divisions, 2 armored divisions, 1 mountain division, 1 air borne division. The Army has now been fully regrouped in brigades as is the case with the American Army. The new armored infantry division comprises: division headquarters with divisional support troops, 2 armored infantry brigades, 1 armored brigade. The Navy has 1 Headquarters Commander Naval Forces North Sea, 1 Headquarters Commander Naval Forces Baltic, 5 minesweeper squadrons, 3 motor torpedo boat squadrons, I landing craft squadron, 1 destroyer squadron, 1 Fleet Air Arm squadron. The Air Force has 4 fighter bomber wings, 1 fighter wing, 1 transport wing.

Over and beyond the annual budget approximately 16 Billion D Marks (\$3,809,-600,000) intended for long-term orders for weapons and equipment have been granted by the Bundestag.

The main bulk of the German Armed Forces is under the Nato command of Europe Center with headquarters in Fontainebleau. The Commander-in-Chief of Europe Center is a French General. The German Sixth Division in Schleswig-Holstein, the territory between the Elbe river and the Danish border, is under the Nato command of Europe North in Kolsas near Oslo: there the Commander-in-Chief is a British General. The commands Europe North and Europe Center in turn are under the over-all command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, called SACEUR, at present the American Air Force General Lauris Norstad. Under the Commander-in-Chief of Europe Center in Fontainebleau a British Air Force General commands the Allied Tactical Air Forces Europe ("AIRCENT") which includes the German Air Force, assigned to the Second and the Fourth Allied Tactical Air Forces. A Dutch Admiral commands the Naval Forces in Europe Center, including the German Navy. Other units are assigned to Europe North. The Commander of the Allied Land Forces Europe Center, General Hans Speidel, is in charge of the ground forces in Europe Center, which include American, British, French, Benelux, Canadian and German divisions. This is one of the most astounding developments in postwar European history. That the former Inspector General of the German Armed Forces, General Adolf Heusinger, one of the creators of the Bundeswehr, has just been unanimously elected Chairman of the Nato Military Committee in Washington, thereby becoming the highest ranking officer in the entire North Atlantic Alliance, is another indication of the profound changes in the relationship between victors and vanguished.

The necessity of starting from scratch has had certain advantages. It opened the way to an entirely new military and social concept, a new philosophy of life with regard to the position of the soldier within the community. The focal point of this new orientation is called "innere Führung" —inner leadership. This concept is linked with the name of General Count Wolf von Baudissin who back in the days of the defunct EDC laid the foundation for the new human relationship between officers and men. Innere Führung means, he explained, nothing but the leadership of men; leadership, however, in the sense of education, directed primarily towards greater combat readiness. Today, the world is faced by a new kind of enemy who wages a permanent war-on the economic, the political, the social, and the psychological planes. Therefore modern soldiers must be trained and educated in a far wider sense than in the past. The slogan of "citizen-soldiers" is more than an empty postulate. The soldier today must know what he is fighting for. The aims of the state which he has to defend must correspond to his own aims of human dignity and freedom as a moral principle. Furthermore, in view of the danger of an atomic attack with its predictable effect upon communications, the individual soldier must learn to decide for himself in an emergency and must be prepared and willing to assume responsibility. In other words, he must be conscious of the fact that the Bundeswehr is his own army, the instrument of defense of his State, and he must know that the order of liberty which the army is called upon to defend is his own human order.

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Special courses have been instituted to convey to the simplest farmer boys in the army a certain amount of knowledge and understanding of the basic values of life outside the purely military field. There are courses in philosophy of government, social science, history, ethics. A special "Council for Questions of the Inner Leader-

ship of the Bundeswehr" made up of leading public figures serves as a consultative organ.

In a state where authority has been shaken because in the past it has been so misused and discredited, the mere fact that a man wears an officer's uniform is no longer enough to maintain discipline. Something else must be added: a respect for his personality, his knowledge and his achievements. Only then does the younger generation accept its superiors not only because they are officers, but because they are men whom one can trust.

Nato has coined the phrase of Sword and Shield forces. The Sword—the strategic nuclear weapons—is held by the United States and by Great Britain. The other forces, army, tactical air forces, and naval units, specially those stationed in Europe, are the Shield.

The German Minister of Defense, Franz-Josef Strauss, has repeatedly pointed out that the Bundeswehr cannot be part of the Sword forces. Its sole mission consists in strengthening the Shield and thereby contributing to the deterrent power exerted by the West.

There have been many discussions on equipping the Shield forces with tactical atomic weapons. The question has been raised by the German opposition as to whether "the German Army" should be armed with such weapons. It is a matter of simple military calculation that all troops, regardless of nationality, deployed before the Iron Curtain—a front of over a thousand miles—must be equally equipped with atomic weapons. If a section of that front, the one held by German units, were not in possession of the most modern arms, the Soviet strategists would be foolish if they did not try to push through that softest part of the front, thereby outflanking the neighboring Allied divisions.

The integration of the German Bundes-

wehr into the Western defense system applies also to logistics and to arms. The mainstay of the German armored division is the American M-48 tank. A lighter tank will soon be produced by a British-French-Italian-German armament pool. The majority of the German Air Force is equipped with American made planes; the F-84, the T-33 trainer jet, and most recently the Starfighter F-104-G. In addition British-, French-, and Italian-made planes are in use. For air-defense the Federal Republic has now installed Nike-batteries, Ajax, and the more modern Hercules. Pilots are American-trained. The official language of the German Air Force is English. The main German Air Force bases, like Fürstenfeldbruck near Munich, have been for years under American control. At some there are still small American liaison teams. Other bases have been taken over from the British.

Perhaps the most startling feature among the armed forces of the North Atlantic Alliance is the new kind of relationship between the nationals of these diverse countries. A supra-national integration has been achieved to an encouraging degree. Thus, for instance, there is the headquarters II Allied Tactical Air Force in Mönchen-Gladbach near Cologne. Its commander, a British General, has under him Benelux, British, and German squadrons just as American, French, Canadian and German units are under the American commander of IV ATAF in Wiesbaden. There is excellent comradeship and understanding between the Germans and their fellow soldiers. They call each other by their first names and the uniforms are no longer signs of national differences. The same applies to the other headquarters, be they in Fontainebleau, or at SHAPE, General Norstad's headquarters. I have noticed precisely the same thing in Europe North where owing to the Nazi occupation of Norway feelings during the first few years were sensitive. Now there are German officers on the staff and not a trace of resentment apparently remains. The very fact that German units can be trained in the Champagne in France and that now there is talk of training German tank units in Great Britain demonstrates that the Atlantic-European community has gone a long way toward political as well as military integration.

Of course many problems remain, owing to the internal German situation, particularly that of the division of the country. The Communist troops on the other side of the Iron Curtain are German, too, though serving under a Soviet master, and there is nothing more terrible than the prospect of a civil war-which is precisely what any international conflict would mean for Germany. Yet nationalism has been overcome to the extent that the majority of the people feel that more than a common language is required to make a man a compatriot. A soldier fighting under the Soviet's banner, for the subjugation of Germany under the Communist yoke, may talk German, but he would be regarded as a stooge of Sovietism and of Russian imperialism using the German language.

How strong would the German Communist army prove to be in case of war? One indication of its attitude may be found in the fact that in the last two years over 30,000 men belonging to the People's Police or to the armed forces of the Soviet Zone have crossed the line and sought refuge in the Federal Republic. Yet it would be foolish to underestimate the fighting-value of some of these fanatically Communist units. Many are dedicated men with a fervor of belief in their creed which one would like to see paralleled in the West.

Since the abortive Paris Conference of May 1960 and Khrushchev's behavior in New York at the UN meeting the Social-Democratic Opposition has accepted the Bundeswehr as vital for the defense of German liberty and of the West in general. Its illogical opposition to equipping all Nato units in Europe with modern weapons including the tactical atomic ones has dwindled to a paper protest.

According to reliable figures the Soviets have over 200 divisions under arms. To counter them the minimum requirement in Europe Center, as pointed out repeatedly by General Norstad, is 30 divisions. At the present time there are about 20. Any hope of holding the front rests upon the better equipment of these troops. This means appropriate nuclear defenses to prevent the massing of the numerically superior Soviet forces.

In view of the continued French difficulties in Algiers and the very small number of French troops therefore available in Europe Center, the defense of the West is shifting more and more to the new German armed forces. At the present time they already constitute the largest single ground force in Europe Center.

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Just as there are no "German units" stationed along the Iron Curtain but solely Nato units, there is no "American Army" stationed in Germany; there are only American Nato divisions serving in Germany for the protection not only of that country but of the West as well. America and Germany and the other Allies are making common sacrifices for a common cause. The German defense budget amounts to over ten billion Marks. Considering the higher purchasing power of the Mark this corresponds to very nearly the same amount in dollars. In addition, the German Federal Budget has to provide billions of Marks annually for the resettlement of the millions of refugees from the German provinces east of the Oder-Neisse. Anything which might endanger the social structure of the Federal Republic or its economic stability, would play directly into the hands of Communist subversion. Over one billion Marks annually goes to Berlin to support its budget and its economy.

Though the Bundeswehr does not and cannot take part in party politics, its members have of course the right to vote and they may turn whenever they feel unjustly treated directly to a Defense Commissioner appointed by the Bundestag. Between 350 and 400 complaints monthly come from the troops but they have to do mainly with housing, family, or school problems caused by administrative difficulties during the first years of the buildup of the Bundeswehr. Only a small fraction of the complaints are based upon real or alleged violations of the basic civil rights guaranteed to every soldier. To pass on all applications of officers above the rank of Colonel a special board was appointed in 1955. Its function was to investigate thoroughly the political and personal background of every applicant.

I should like to affirm categorically my belief that the Bundeswehr would unquestionably be loyal to the state as an institution in an hour of danger and to the democratic principles of Germany, and of the Atlantic Community as a whole. And perhaps it is what Hegel has called the "ruse of the idea" that out of the military necessity caused by Soviet aggression the armed forces of the Alliance have laid the groundwork not only for the military but also for a wider political and economic community of the Atlantic-European people, conscious once more of their common heritage and their common destiny.

# The De-Marxification of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany

LUDWIG FREUND

Socialism as a political movement started later in Germany than in the rest of Western Europe. This historic fact is partly a natural consequence of the tardiness of German industrial development as compared with that of Great Britain and France. In other respects, it is a result of the policies of suppression as they were carried out by most of the German princes during the period of reaction between 1815-1848, the so-called "Vormarz." The leaders of German socialist thought during that time resided mostly in England and France. Following the revolutionary risings of 1848 there was another period of reaction which lasted for about 13 years. During this time it was all but impossible for German workers to organize and become a genuine factor in politics.

The great leaders of revolutionary socialist thought, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, were both German-born but lived in exile, the former in London, the latter in Manchester. In their Communist Manifesto of 1848 these two had drawn their conclusions from the philosophy of the French Enlightenment and the slogans of the French Revolution of 1789. The humanistic ideals of France as embodied in "Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité," they thought, could not be realized in a democratic-capitalistic

form of society. A society based on true equality was only possible where the principle of the freedom of private enterprise was abandoned in favor of common property and proletarian class solidarity. In this manner alone, they argued, could the third slogan of the French Revolution—fraternity—be brought to life.

This, then, in a nutshell, is the dramatic deadlock of modern socialist thought. As children of the French Enlightenment the early 19th century European socialists were imbued with a sense of humane mission mixed with a revolutionary zeal and a belief that the "right kind" of re-distribution of wealth would bring about a state of equality and fraternity. But where would liberty be in this scheme—the very first of the demands of the French Revolution? "For more than one and one-half centuries socialism has searched for ways to reconcile all three demands. The problem has not been solved to this day."

Prior to Marx, the "utopian socialists" of France and Great Britain, Count Henri de Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, Etienne Cabet, and Robert Owen, had applied their humanistic impulses to non-violent cures of what they considered the ills of a system characterized by class privilege and private property. But it was Marx's revo-

lutionary formula of what he himself labeled "scientific socialism" which swept aside the moralizings of his forerunners.

Marxian socialism took its optimism and its faith in human reason and in eternal progress from the liberal Enlightenment. It wanted to think liberalism and the democratic revolution through to its final conclusions, and—following Hegel's lead—it literally anticipated the end phase of history. But unlike Hegel it identified cosmic reason and its perfection with a materialistic interpretation of the progression of the historical process and, above all, with the final victory and "dictatorship of the working class."

We cannot here delve into a detailed description of the various facets and features of Marxian philosophy, its orthodox and its revisionist sects, its internal disputes and consequent adjustments and re-adjustments. Suffice it to state that in recent times the ideological aspects of all the socialistic parties of Europe, not only that of Germany, have undergone a decisive change. This change derives from an increasing concern, as a result of the experience with communist practices, with the fate of freedom when any attempt is made to realize Marx's revolutionary principles of action. Everywhere, responsible leaders of socialist parties have become prepared to sacrifice more and more of "Marx" in the interest of freedom. In this connection it must be said that Marxian socialism was never an accepted "scientific theory" among serious German scholars of politics.2 It was rather a political stratagem for party ideologues, some of them convinced, even fanatical adherents of the creed, others prepared to make the necessary concessions to reality, none of them true scholars. Some prominent scholars nevertheless were to be found in a certain non-Marxian brand of "academic socialism," among the so-called "Kathedersozialisten."

Extremely instructive in this connection is the historic juxtaposition and subsequent rift between Ferdinand Lassalle on the one hand, and Marx and Engels on the other. Marx and Engels from their exile had sounded the call to the workers of the world to united action to smash the power of the industrial "bourgeoisie." They rejected any idea of cooperating with the state as long as it was controlled by "the capitalist class"; their manifesto was for the "liberation of the working class" everywhere and for worldwide revolution. To them, not nations and states manifested the real differences and struggles of history; class distinctions were back of all of these. Lassalle, on the other hand, was the realistic founder of the German socialist movement. Originally, he had been a liberal, but observing how the liberal progressive party ("Fortschrittspartei") of Prussia used the unjust Prussian system of election<sup>3</sup> in behalf of its commercial interests, because it abhorred the idea of sharing power with any other class, let alone the working class, Lassalle eventually tried an alliance with even Prussian conservatives and Bismarck against the liberals.

Lassalle affirmed the idea of gradual reform and rejected a program of violent revolution. He upheld the ideals of justice, freedom, and reason and sought to secure them within the framework of a given national order. While those ideals for Marx were nothing but an "ideological superstructure" on what was really a materialistic base, Lassalle was an idealist who believed in defending a just and moral claim.

Lassalle founded the first "Association of German Workingmen" ("Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein") in 1863. The workers followed him rather than Marx and Engels who were abroad and out of touch with the moods and sentiments of the German working class. For the workers

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at this time still were inclined toward liberalism and patriotism, and Lassalle was their appropriate mouthpiece. But a year after the founding of the "Association" the still youthful Lassalle was killed in a duel over a love affair. After that, Marx and Engels tried to bring the "Workingmen's Association" under their wing.

They were aided by two men, August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht. August Bebel, at first a liberal, then a disciple of Lassalle, under the influence of Liebknecht turned into an active supporter of Marx and Engels. Strangely, Marx and Engels, who tried to direct the German workers' associations from abroad, never trusted Bebel completely. In fact, Bebel remained at heart a pupil of Lassalle, though he talked like a Marxian.4 This was evidenced through many acts and hesitations which continued to demonstrate his patriotic scruples.5 Thus, as the leader of the newly founded "Social Democratic Workers' Party" (1869) he immediately charted a moderate course in opposition to the doctrinaire Liebknecht. Bebel advocated cooperation with other parties in the Reichstag where Liebknecht wanted only to create a disturbance. Bebel soberly assessed the capabilities of Bismarck to bring Germany under the leadership of Prussia, and worked with other members of Parliament in Committees to promote practical measures on behalf of the workers-while Liebknecht thundered against Prussia, against Germany and the exploitation of the working class by capitalist systems everywhere.

The war in 1914 split the German Social-Democratic Party between internationalism and pacifism, and a sense of duty toward the nation at war,—the same dilemma occurred in 1870. The Lassallean wing immediately and unreservedly supported the war, Liebknecht was ready to oppose if not sabotage it, since in his view both sides represented exploitative and despotic sys-

tems, while Bebel carried a majority with him in taking a rather non-committal and ambiguous stand. Thus from its very beginnings practical and national considerations went side by side with visionary and doctrinaire attitudes in the Social-Democratic Party of Germany.

After the defeat of Napoleon III at Sedan and his fall from power the German Social-Democratic Party voted unanimously against a continuation of the war and against the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. The Prussian government reacted by arresting the Prussian heads of the party while the Saxon government arrested Bebel and Liebknecht, these two being deputies to the Reichstag from this State. After that, Bebel became more radical, and both he and Liebknecht were hailed before the Supreme Court for high-treason. Their trial backfired when it provided new opportunity to the defendants of spreading their propaganda over the whole country. But Bebel and Liebknecht were imprisoned in a fortress for two years although a quite different place of confinement from the concentration camps of a later-Hitlerite as well as "Marxian"-variety. Bebel "returned spiritually and physically strengthened from this mild form of arrest" which afforded him, the son of a professional Army sergeant, who had never attended a high school, enough leisure to study Marx, Engels, Lassalle, Plato, Aristotle, Macchiavelli, and Darwin, and even to write some books of his own.6

During the month of May 1875 a compromise was worked out between the Marxian and Lassallean wings of the Party. It was embodied in the party program of Gotha of 1875. Being a compromise it did not signify a clear victory of the Marxian version of socialism, which was to come later in 1891 through the famous party program of Erfurt.

In the meantime, under the influence of

the magnetic personality and oratory of Bebel, the working masses had joined the socialist party in ever increasing numbers. And the jails, too, were crowded with them. In 1878 Bebel again was under arrest for another half year for insulting Bismarck and the army. Again, he used this "rest period" for writing two revolutionary treatises.

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Two attempted assassinations of Kaiser William I by anarchists were made the occasion by Bismarck in 1878 for pushing his well-known "socialist legislation" through the Reichstag. It prohibited all political activities of socialists, communists, and anarchists, indiscriminately lumped together regardless of the fact that significant differences and disagreements were being fought out among them. All but two socialist papers were prohibited, the workers' associations were dissolved, and numerous journalists, party functionaries and writers fled abroad. The only practical result was a still further shift of the German workers toward radicalism, in the direction of Marx and Engels.

One may have his own thoughts about socialism in general, Marxian socialism in particular. Yet, it was not difficult to see that Bismarck, for all the shrewdness and ingenuity which he applied to affairs of state, had no clear view of the results of his oppressive measures. The young Kaiser William II, himself strongly adverse to what he termed "men without a country" ("Vaterlandslose Gesellen") had no stomach for starting his reign with what threatened to turn into a civil war. The refusal of the Reichstag in 1890 to renew the "socialist legislation" gave the new Kaiser a welcome "liberal" pretense to dismiss a Chancellor who in any event he had wanted to get rid of.

About the turn of the century, the party underwent another change. The socialist refugees had returned from abroad. Under the influence of their foreign experiences they undertook to dampen the revolutionary temper of the German socialist party. They brought with them first hand observations on the practical value of cooperating with the powers that be, and they pressed toward a new policy. Thus, another internal struggle began between the orthodox Marxians and the revisionists, which came to a head during the party convention at Dresden in 1903. Bebel, who had stayed in the country and had become ever more radical and irreconcilable, thundered against "foreign ideas" and carried the day against the moderates. But the reformers, men such as Eduard Bernstein, Wolfgang Heine, Cuno Fischer, and others, continued their struggle. Then, as now, "bourgeois" intellectuals joined the party, rose to positions of leadership, toned down the revolutionary slogans, and "when August Bebel died in 1913, part of orthodox Marxism was buried with him."7

In 1912 the Socialist International of which the German Social-Democratic Party was a part, had passed a resolution to the effect that the outbreak of any war irrespective of its causes was immediately to be followed by an uprising of the proletariat. But when World War I broke out two years later, the parliamentary faction of the German Socialist Party, not unlike socialist parties elsewhere, voted for the war budget of their government. A reluctant minority surrendered to party discipline. In stating the reasons, it was argued that the country had to be defended against Tsarist despotism, which would be "an immeasurable threat to the culture and independence of Germany."

During the course of the war in 1917 the party split. Its left wing formed a new party under the name of "Independent Social-Democratic Party." The majority, however, continued its support of the war, even to the point where some of its

members finally joined a "reform cabinet" under the Kaiser during the fall of 1918. The outbreak of the revolution surprised the leaders of the Social-Democratic Party no less than those of the other parties, and the proclamation of the Republic by the socialist Scheidemann was a measure of desperation made under the pressure of the mounting tide of revolution in the streets, which threatened to wrest the initiative from the socialist leaders.

The "Independents" tried to foster the revolution, while Friedrich Ebert, the new socialist chief of government and revisionist, had assumed the reigns of government under the impression that the liberal Prince Max of Baden was to become a regent until such time as the eldest son of the German Crown Prince would come of age.

To the left of the "Independents" marched so-called Spartacist shock troops of soldiers and workers who used tactics on the model of the Russian Bolshevik revolution. In opposing them the "Majority Socialists" chose the way of democracy against revolution. Between the two factions stood the "Independents." Again, the conflicting tendencies in the German socialist movement were evident. In 1925 the Independents returned to the fold of the majority party after having lost more and more of their membership and votes to the Communist Party founded in 1919. The Communists who had emerged from the Spartacus movement regarded the socialists after the defeat of the revolution as "bloodhounds of the capitalist reaction," but in point of fact, the socialist majority had merely defended its country's freedom against violent revolution and a dictatorship from abroad, namely Moscow.

After the war and the immediate danger of a Communist revolution had passed, the party re-discovered its anti-militaristic sentiments. The Social-Democratic Party of Germany had shouldered its share of responsibility for state, government and nation. Thus it should have become aware of the obsolescent nature of some of the dogmas it had inherited. But it again became a party with a split personality; it represented responsible political power in the Republic of Weimar, yet it loathed the most important instrument of that power. The party never was able to develop a clearcut, unambiguous relation to the military establishment. Even during times when the Social-Democrats occupied leading positions in government, they remained aloof from. even hostile to the military. By default they contributed their share to the growing estrangement between the Republic and its army, the Reichswehr.

Nor is this all. Following its reunion with the more radical "Independents" the Social Democrats, anti-Communist at heart though they had proved to be, accepted at Heidelberg in 1925 a program which sounded Marxian to the core. The same party which had cooperated in the government with "bourgeois" middle class parties and which in actual practice had refused to attempt "socialist experiments," nevertheless sounded the call to "battle against the capitalist system" and demanded that "the capitalist exploitation" be ended by a wholesale transfer of soil, natural resources and natural power into common property, and the like.

One cannot but agree with Reinhold Niebuhr who stated that European socialism and communism are "half brothers, socialism having a democratic mother and a Marxist father. From its mother it has inherited its fierce devotion to liberty; but one must admit that its eyes, particularly the blindness of its eyes, are inherited from the father, for its vision is blinded by Marxist dogmatism."8

Throughout the Weimar period the Social Democratic Party vacillated between doctrinaire programs of action promoting

class conflict and practical compromises. Finally, it remained passive toward the increasing tides of radicalism to the left and to the right, even toward the rise of Hitler. It remained content with assuring its followers that the day of the worker would come; indeed, it was just around the corner. But instead, there followed twelve years of terror, violence, persecution and silence.

#### II

"Twice the German people had passed through the experiences of planned and restrictive economies in war and postwar times. When the free market economy began its triumphant course after the currency reform of 1948, the German people breathed a sigh of relief. They were rid of intolerable restrictions. Never again this controlled economy!" No party in the "new Germany" could ignore this state of mind, not even the revived Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD).

Under the chairmanship of the new SPD leader Kurt Schumacher a commission was formed to draft a program of action. Again, this program as adopted in Dortmund in September 1952, was a hybrid of contradictory Marxian and democratic formulas. It promised to "promote small and medium private enterprises" but reiterated previous demands for the wholesale "transfer of key mining and manufacturing industries to common property" and the "socialization of the raw material producing economy." Reinhold Niebuhr succinctly commented on the strange paradox that during the first and crucial post-war election in Berlin the Social Democrats branded the Communist party as the instrument of Russian imperialism, the "bourgeois" parties as tools of "Western imperialism" and told the workers that only the Social Democratic Party would bring them "eternal peace and a classless society." On the one hand, they resisted the evil effect of the Marxian dogma as embodied in Communist political practice and action, and on the other hand they continued to recite this same dogma. 10 Incidentally, Niebuhr correctly observed that German socialists were led astray by their Marxist dogmas less than most of the socialists of Western Europe, "They were in such close contact with the horrible realities of communism that, whatever their illusions, they could not deny the facts."11 Conversely, the French socialists required some years before they could be freed of the idea that in the interest of "working class solidarity" they could not enter a government without the communists, and the Italian socialists to this day are divided between a pro-communist and an anti-communist faction.

Under the circumstances, it required little wisdom to ascertain the reasons why the German Social Democrats, though holding controlling positions in some of the West German states, never obtained a chance to win a plurality, let alone a majority, in federal elections. Three times up to 1961 the SPD went into federal elections with high hopes, certain of its victory, and three times it was soundly beaten by the CDU of Dr. Adenauer.

First of all, some of the orthodox leaders of socialism who came to power in one of the states of the Federal Republic, in Hesse, actually tried radical socializing measures. These were fast abandoned after a few tentative experiments. Thus the SPD provided its adversaries with effective ammunition against itself. The radical experiments as such enabled its opponents to sound the alarm against "the red danger" embodied in an influential bloc of the leading socialist group. The failure and subsequent surrender of these same experiments provided arguments against the party for

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the irresponsibility and perilous dogmatism of some of its leading figures.

Thereafter, socialist ministers in the German states contented themselves with undertaking no action of fundamental political or economic significance other than what their predecessors or colleagues of the CDU might have done. With that inaction, they avoided an "aggressive propaganda" which had led to slogans such as: "All ways of socialism lead to Moscow." From the voters' viewpoint, there was little reason for shifting votes, and for substituting a socialist for Adenauer, as long as the latter was doing so well, and the economy was safe. A stable economy—it must be realized—has become a momentous political issue in Germany, more than anywhere else. The Germans see the disaster wrought by socialist meddling with the economy right on their doorstep in the Eastern part of their country, but they live also, after two lost wars and the misery of two unparalleled inflations which followed, still in terror of the possibility of another inflation. No government could survive in the democratic part of Germany which in the remotest way appeared to lend itself to inflationary measures. Short of this, today's opposition party has little chance of upsetting the existing balance in its favor.

There are some unconverted orthodox Marxians in the ranks of the SPD functionaries, a few among the intellectuals and possibly some among the workers. Professor Wolfgang Abendroth, a political scientist at the Hessian State University of Marburg, who is more noted for his zealous defense of the orthodox, radical Marxian creed than for detached scholarship, has suggested the futility of ever matching funds and chances with the CDU by having the SPD persist in making constant and indiscriminating appeals to a variety of voters. Instead, he has advised a return to the old-fashioned principles of the class

struggle, the inclusion of white collar employees and of federal, state and municipal officials in the orbit of the working class, finally a campaign for indoctrinating it and "manipulating" this largest social stratum of wage earners by "re-establishing its class consciousness." 12

This is hardly realistic advice in a more or less affluent society and the welfare economy which the Federal Republic of Germany represents today. But it may easily turn into a troublesome revolutionary program of action when, or if, the society should sag again economically. As matters stand, the party cannot escape its present dilemma. In 1955 and 1959 the Marxian concepts of the party were further whittled down, and in November 1960 at the party convention in Hannover, very little if anything resembling the original Marxian doctrines remained in the program. Significantly, the draft of the "program of principles" ("Grundsatzprogramm") as conceived on September 10, 1959, still contained a phrase to the effect that "the enormous development of productive capacities . . . has brought wealth and power to a few, but has brought nothing but hardship and misery to the working wage earners." This phrase, which was belied by the realities of the actual level of welfare and income achieved by the masses of German workers, could not be sustained, and it was quietly dropped from the final version adopted by the party convention at Godesberg a few months later.

In vain had the party fought for many years against the "social free market economy" of Professor Erhard, the Federal Minister of Economic Affairs. Gradually the economic program of the SPD, for all its theoretical opposition to it, came to approximate that of Erhard.

Years ago the labor unions had clamored for the right of co-determination ("Mitbestimmung") in industries. This was to be a sort of socialization by way of the back door, as some writers have called it. The party, largely dependent on the support of the unions and their leaders, backed the measure half-heartedly. Socialists and labor leaders in other countries strongly criticized it as risky and aiming beyond the objectives and capacities of labor union representatives. Though restricted in their functions through the law, as it finally passed the Federal Parliament in 1953, the "labor directors" never proved either efficient or popular. It was whispered among the rank and file that this was a trick to enable union bureaucrats to become members of the board of directors of large private enterprises, and workers had mixed feelings about the elevation of one of their representatives to the position of a "big shot" in a front office with the new habits and appearances of "the boss."

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In the field of social legislation, however, the SPD acted as a stimulating force. It may be taken for granted that some if not most of the social welfare acts of the federal government are owing to the pressure, possibly even the mere existence, of this opposition party.

In Germany, as in other countries, the Socialist Party agitated against the steadily rising price scale. Since the unions, most of them closely associated with the SPD, were busily engaged in attempting to raise wages, the German public on the whole had not been persuaded that the business community was exclusively to be blamed for the rising price spiral.

The shifting and opportunistic tactics adopted by the SPD with regard to questions of pacifism, rearmament and foreign policy have been unsuccessful. In order to find a formula in harmony with the dangerous and embattled position of post war Germany, standing as it does in the front line against the Soviet Union with the Communist puppets of the Soviet zone, vul-

nerable to the precarious situation of Berlin, the ancient arsenal of Marxist catch phrases simply had to be abandoned.

Yet, over and over again the reflex of anti-militarism so dear to the heart of any true Marxian and socialist was manifest. The party tried to forestall any step in the direction of rearming Germany, but when confronted with the question as to who was to defend the country in case of an emergency and in view of the closeness of the potential enemy, the party for years took refuge in a vain gesture of neutrality, in accusing the "militarism and imperialism" of the West as well as of the East, Nobody outside the party, not even the gradually emerging group of new intellectuals within the party, mistook this evasion for a solution. A more realistic policy pointed toward a minimum of military selfreliance had to be worked out. The party functionaries, most of them reared in Marxist catch words, fought hard against every attempt at readjusting the party to the necessities of becoming a responsible opposition in a sovereign state.

It required the last ounce of energy of the new group of intellectuals, of men such as Willy Brandt, Fritz Erler, Herbert Wehner—the latter a former Communist who had learned from experience—Professor Carlo Schmid, a splendid orator who however is capable of ambiguity, to win the final contest for power in Hannover in November 1960 against the functionaries prominently represented by the official party leader Erich Ollenhauer.

Radical intellectuals in the background such as Professors Abendroth and Weisser who are trying to juggle theories against reality, have neither the true intellectual weight nor the personalities to exert much influence. Pro-Communist elements of the intelligentsia who formerly tried to work within the SPD have long since found themselves outside the party. And they have

little following which would count in an election.

The coming elections in September of this year will provide the answer to whether the new program adopted by the party convention in Hannover and the radical de-Marxification of the SPD effected there will enable the party to change from its role of opposition to that of the responsible government party. If it does, the corollary that in this case it would not act very differently from the CDU is perhaps a little too glib, for the pull of the party functionaries on that government would persist, and very likely increase, since their minds will not change as rapidly as those of some of the less dogmatic among the party leaders. It must also not be forgotten that in order to win, the party will have to rely to some extent on the continued faithful adherence and work of the e functionaries.

If the SPD, however, should again fail to win in spite of the tampering with its traditions and ideological foundations, which has all but succeeded in obliterating the differences between the Social Democratic Party and the "bourgeois" parties, then one may certainly expect a great reaction within the ranks of the faithful. The fact cannot be ignored that as far as a great number of the leaders and followers are concerned, the sacrifice of principles was made not because of conviction but because of tactical considerations. Too many expect the sacrifice to be rewarded in terms of practical results,13 and if these fail to materialize, the future dynamics of the party's internal politics will be shaped by the fury of a great disappointment.

Walter Theimer, Von Bebel zu Ollenhauer. Munich, 1957. p. 5.

<sup>2</sup> James V. Schall, for example, draws too easy a line of demarcation between what he thinks is praiseworthy American political theory which should be "terrestrial and wholly pragmatic," and the "absolute system" of European political theory which Father Schall sees typically exemplified in the Russian doctrinaires at Yalta (J. V. Schall: "Theory in American Politics," Modern Age. Spring 1960, pp. 150 ff., esp. pp. 153 and 158). But F. D. Roosevelt would have been better advised had he taken pains to inform himself correctly about the world and theories outside the United States rather than relying on his hunch "that the Russians were men and politicians pretty much like American politicians back home" (ibid., p. 153). Father Schall deplores the fact that the Russians did not behave like pragmatic Americans. Does this suffice as a judgment of political theory and of the pragmatic improvisations of Roosevelt at Yalta? Is there not possibly a deeper lesson in that failure?

<sup>5</sup> This was a system of polling in three different classes. The class to which the individual belonged was determined by the taxes he paid. Accordingly a few persons in the highest class had the same polling strength as thousands or tens of thousands, respectively, in the two lower classes. In addition, the system of election was non-secret and indirect. The original constituency could vote only for electors. This method of voting lasted in Prussia till the end of the World War I.

- <sup>4</sup> Theimer, op. cit., p. 22 f.
- <sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 23.
- 6 Ibid., p. 27.
- <sup>7</sup> "Abschied vom Marxismus?" Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 28, 1959.
- <sup>8</sup> "The Anomaly of European Socialism," by Reinhold Niebuhr, *Christian Realism and Political Problems*, New York 1953, p. 43.
  - 9 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, op. cit.
  - 10 Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 44.
  - 11 Ibid., p. 45.
  - 12 Geist und Tat, November, 1957, pp. 366 ff.
- <sup>13</sup> See, for example, the discussion following a lecture on "Freedom in the Modern World," Junge Generation und Macht (Proceedings of the party convention of the SPD at Godesberg, October 1960), pp. 37 ff. and 61 ff.

# The Lost America—The Despair of Henry Adams and Mark Twain

TONY TANNER

HENRY ADAMS AND Samuel Clemens are often considered to represent the polar extremes of their age. Yet, however divergent their careers seem to be, it is absorbing to watch them approaching, each in his different way, a final mood of total despair that argues concurrence rather than coincidence. Personal tragedies might be adduced to explain this: the heart-breaking death of Susy Clemens and the long drawn out agony of Livy, the suicide of Adams's wife Clover, even the humiliation of bankruptcy, which both men experienced, these certainly are contributory causes. But as one examines the conspicuous modes of this despair-a compound of comminatory denunciation and brooding, intense pessimism-one is compelled to search further afield for the prime causes. Such an investigation reveals that this despair is in a slow process of incubation from their earliest work, and that it is finally hatched by the growing discords, conflicts, and problems of the age. It is not a despair of personal bereavement but of country-ultimately of man.

Much of Adams's despair, to say nothing of his wounded pride, is the negative residue of a constantly diminishing faith in American politics, which seemed progressively to abandon all the moral idealism that he felt that he and his family preeminently represented. His bitterness increases as it becomes increasingly apparent that such a person as himself has no part to play in the politics of his age: that such a stage of affairs should have come about clearly indicated an intolerable debasement of the whole political scene. His two early novels and the nine-volume history really have a common theme: they ask the question: What is the fate of idealism in American politics, is there any longer any meaning in the way things are going, is life moving towards any ideal end?

The Life of Albert Gallatin, as well as being a simple biography, is also an examination of political aspiration that results in failure, and it points out the fact that Republican idealism failed to establish its ideally conceived society. Democracy, written almost immediately after 1879, is an excoriating analysis of contemporary American democratic administration. The heroine, Mrs. Madeline Lee, sets out to understand Senator Radcliffe who is made

to represent the contemporary American politician in all his naked power. He proves to be selfish, hypocritical, and unscrupulous, "a naked will operating under convictions of moral lunacy." Mrs. Lee comes to consider him "diseased" and the disease is diagnosed as "atrophy of the moral sense." She had been searching for some meaning in life and had focussed on the senator as a possible provider of an ideal end for which she could work. His failure to furnish her with such an ideal induces in Mrs. Lee a mood of complete despair: for her, life is "emptier than ever now that this dream was over." She decides to "quit the masquerade" and sets out on a voyage to the Mediterranean and the Nile. The voyage, we feel, is but the first of many meaningless meanderings and it aptly prefigures Adam's own restless existence. These two novels about the futile search for some form of idealism were written while Adams was engaged in research for his great History. This work, published between 1889 and 1891, is a massive demonstration of the inevitable failure of idealism. The ideals governing Jeffersonian Republicanism are set out in the chapter called "American Ideals" and the rest of the work records the attempt to achieve these ideal goals. As George Hochfield observes in an unpublished dissertation on Adams: "The failure of that attempt-for failure it obviously was-is thus the conclusion to which the whole work tends." The attempt to establish an ideal society leads eventually to the horrors of war: this is the mute, sinister portent of the work. To phrase it thus is to slight its greatness but for our purpose it is interesting to note that Adams chose to study exactly that portion of history which would provide him with a pessimistic conclusion. Even here, long before The Education, there are hints of an incipient determinism, a determinism justified by this great failure of the past. As Hochfield writes: "the necessitarianism that tinctures the *History* is a response to the failure of idealism; it signifies Adams's conclusion that idealism must have been doomed from the start by the very nature of history." It is as though Adams unconsciously chose just that period in American history which would most warrant his inchoate pessimism. The odd thing is that Clemens chose to do exactly the same.

Clemens of course was not so articulate or painstaking in his political opinions. He was an admirer and later a friend of Grant, and Grant's régime did not fill him with the same deep disgust that afflicted the more perspicacious Adams. Nevertheless, he is far from being blithely unaware of an unpleasant drop in the tone of American politics after the Civil war. In The Curious Republic of Gondour, written in 1871, he satirizes an aspect of American politics that we might have expected to annoy Adams rather than Clemens, for the curious thing about Gondour is that "for the first time in the history of the republic, property, character, and intellect were able to wield a political influence." In this strange land an education entitles a man to more votes than the unlettered hodcarrier, and the ignorant are not allowed to swamp the intelligent with their greater numbers. The tone is more that of an alienated aristocrat than that of a supporter of the great American dream of government by the people. Three years later Clemens gave the definitive title to his times with The Gilded Age. The book is by no means the unrelieved attack on democracy that Adams's novel was to be, but the satirical intent is clear and Senator Dilworthy invites comparison with Senator Radcliffe. Clemens was no stranger to Washington, and his stay there during the winter of 1867 was sufficient to give him as low an opinion of American politics as Adams held. However, it is in that strangely confused book A Connecticut Yankee, published just before the History, that Clemens comes so close to echoing Adams's despairing conclusions. The book actually starts out from a point of view very distant from the omniscient retrospection of Adams the historian: the novel, as Professor Henry Nash Smith has shrewdly pointed out, is a "roman experimental" and the question at issue is whether republican idealism and nineteenth century technology can redeem society. This in turn poses the question of whether or not man can improve his lot if offered an ideal opportunity; whether, indeed, man is perfectible. Thus, it is asking the same question answered negatively by the History, for the ideals that are tested in that book are man's natural capacity to develop morally and intellectually, and the possibility of intelligent economic expansion. Frequently before the writing of this book Clemens exhibits a belief in natural goodness, the innately decent proclivities of the "heart" that has not been corrupted by inherited prejudice and the coercions of established institutions. Huck Finn is his supreme assertion of such a belief, and Hank Morgan is in some ways a grown-up Huck who instead of being in passive flight from society is in aggressive conflict with it. To the dark ages of sixthcentury England he brings these two great gifts-a theory of amelioration based on a belief in the goodness and perfectibility of man, and the economic principles and technological means to implement a beneficient alteration of the age. But all his efforts prove wasted: the initial philanthrope gradually becomes misanthropic; the idealistic democrat shades into a scornful tyrant; hoping to bring light he ends by concentrating on destruction: people are unapt for improvement-idealism is bound to fail. As the faith in man falls, so a savage authorial anger intrudes itself: the undertaken project

of reconstruction ends in a foul holocaust just as the *History* shows idealism leading inevitably to the "bloody arena" of war. Adams never had Clemens's belief in the perfectibility of man: he called it "this doubtful and even improbable principle" and proved the point by his *History*. Clemens's anger and dismay are the greater for his having once believed but the conclusions he reaches are identical. Yet we may note, as we noted of the History, that Clemens chose a situation in which idealism was bound to fail: established historical fact precludes all possibility of success and surely it is not excessive to see in this choice of situation a lurking, if unacknowledged, pessimistic determinism such as we discerned in Adams. (A similar unconscious fatalism clearly dictates his preoccupation with the Joan of Arc story; she is another idealistic person who comes to redeem a "sick age," and her ultimate rejection by society is even more inflexibly determined than Hank Morgan's.) It might here be argued that A Connecticut Yankee was an anti-English polemic stimulated by the patronizing contempt of America exhibited by Matthew Arnold, but the satiric barb of the book is aimed at contemporary America-the "dark ages" become the corrupt post civil-war years in which the great American dream was so glaringly betrayed. The Round Table, for instance, comes to have an uncanny resemblance to the stock exchange and the final civil-war is precipitated by a shady deal reminiscent of the railroad frauds of the seventies: the slavedriver in the illustrations, which were executed by the radical Dan Beard with Clemens's approval, is clearly meant to be Jay Gould; in a word, the degradation and misery of the sixth century is America's own. The years from 1873 to 1879 were years of great economic distress; the small farmers were badly off and in the cities there was widespread unemployment, while

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in 1877 the first nation-wide strike led to a sinister outburst of labor rioting. In 1879 Henry George published his Progress and Poverty. The book opens with a statement of the expectations and opportunities of the early nineteenth century: its theme is "disappointment has followed disappointment," a theme re-echoed in Adams's historical work and Clemens's novels. If the ideals on which America was founded were being rapidly stained by political practice, so also was the paradisaical surface of the continent suffering a comparable degradation from the rapid urbanization and industrialization of the period. One would not have expected a nostalgia for the unspoiled wildness of an earlier America to have had much effect on the urbane temperament of Adams, yet it clearly does. Several amazingly passionate passages in the Education reveal that for Adams "the vast maternity of nature" always "showed charms more voluptuous than the vast paternity of the United States senate." And this is not to be discounted as the urban man's genteel indulgence in the country from a safe distance—this is not an age of pastoral poetry. It is definitely the profligate waywardness of an untamed nature that arouses his sympathies. When he first sees the South he is most distressed by the fact that it is "unkempt, poverty-stricken, ignorant, vicious" and yet certain aspects of it draw him as though he were hypnotized by them against his better, civilized, judgment. "The want of barriers, of pavements, of forms; the looseness, the laziness; the indolent southern drawl; the pigs in the streets, the negro babies and their mothers with bandanas; the freedom, openness, swagger of nature and man soothed his Johnson blood" -a passage that Clemens would have applauded. What disappoints Adams in his later travels is that "the sense of wildness had vanished" and Huckleberry Finn embodies a similar lament, lyrically developed,

for some lost "wildness" that is Huck's natural element. We should remember that Adams, when talking of the visible nature of trees and mountains, never calls it a chaos: the wildness of this nature gratified some deep instinct in him and he was saddened to see it vanishing from the continent. The nature he came to consider as pure chaos was an intellectual system. To maintain the comparison with Clemens we may recall the passage in which he speaks of changes on the Mississippi. "Ten years had passed since he last crossed the Mississippi, and he found everything new. In this great region from Pittsburgh through Ohio and Indiana, agriculture had made way for steam; tall chimneys reeked smoke on every horizon, and dirty suburbs filled with scrap iron, scrap paper and cinders, formed the setting of every town." In Life on the Mississippi Clemens records his feelings as he witnesses the changes along the river he knew so well as a youth, and the great quality of the work is a controlled nostalgia for a lost era. And yet here we must point to a difference. Just as Clemens had believed in the perfectibility of man while Adams doubted, so he was initially optimistic about the beneficence of industrialization, an optimism never shared by Adams. When Clemens sees some of those tall chimneys on the horizon he expresses great delight at the "changes uniformly evidencing progress, energy, prosperity": it was only later that, sickened by the corruptive powers of materialism, he gravitated to a mood of cynical despair.

More specifically let us cite the machine and the mob as two phenomena that served to alienate these men from their age. There is a significant moment when Adams visits the great Chicago Exposition in 1893. The extended exposure to mechanical novelties of which he has no understanding completely immobilizes him. Before the array of steam engines, electric batteries, telephones, etc., he "had no choice but to sit down on the steps and brood as (he) had never brooded on the benches of Harvard College. . . . The historical mind can only think in historical processes, and probably this was the first time since historians existed, that any of them had sat down helpless before a mechanical sequence." The word "mechanical," so neutral to us, should be noted, for it gradually acquires an ominous weight of meaning as Adams discovers that the world is being increasingly administered by mechanical forces of one kind or another. (His attitude is comparable to that of the writer of the Erewhonian "Book of the Machines"; "Is it not plain that the machines are gaining ground upon us, when we reflect on the increasing number of those who are bound down to them as slaves, and of those who devote their whole souls to the advancement of the mechanical kingdom?") There is an irony in this since the eighteenth century rationalism that was so dear to Adams was based on the Newtonian conception of Nature as a divinely ordered machine. But the Great Watchmaker had decreed a mechanistic universe which was rational and explicable. As the scrap heaps and the cinders came increasingly into view mechanism gradually ceased to exemplify a rational principle and seemed to become a hideous principle of blind force. Mechanism had turned on the class and way of life that initially upheld it. Adams talks of "the whole mechanical consolidation of force, which ruthlessly stamped out the life of the class into which Adams was born." Again in the Exposition: "As he grew accustomed to the great gallery of machines he began to feel the forty-foot dynamo as a moral force, much as the early Christian felt the cross." But at least there had been a Christ on the cross: the dynamo is completely impersonal in its divine power. It is non-human and therefore inhuman, non-moral and therefore immoral, or rather amoral. And it is that dynamo which really unfixes Adams's mind. Clemens's career affords us a comparable symbol although his antipathy to the machine is the result of a long process of disillusionment rather than the sudden bewilderment felt by Adams. His relationship with the Paige typesetter symbolically foreshortens this disillusionment. An initial enthusiasm gradually gives way to a profound despair as the machine heartlessly robs him of a fortune and mockingly refuses to arrive at the hoped-for perfection.

A concomitant of Adams's reaction to the dynamo is a feeling that just as the world is coming to be dominated by impersonal forces so also are the inhabitants of this world becoming as impersonal, mechanical and inhuman as the forces that guide them. The mob was making its appearance in America and although in many ways these people were the victims of the machines that Adams deprecated, their impersonal violence disturbed him as much as did the dynamo. In his youth, he recalls, he was once involved in a snow-ball fight: the sides were the Latin school versus the rest of the local boys. The account of the fight reads like a parable. At first the Latin school dominate the others, but then as night comes on the tide turns. "A dark mass of figures could be seen below, making ready for the last rush, and rumor said that a swarm of blackguards from the slums . . . was going to put an end to the Beacon Street cowards forever. Henry wanted to run away with the others, but his brother was too big to run away, so they stood still and waited immolation. The dark mass set up a shout, and rushed forward." It ends as all children's games should, but throughout the extended description one feels the terrible threat of the dark forces who come swarming up against the Latin school (which very easily

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can be made to represent the aristocratic element in society) threatening total annihilation. In its way it is like a small Dunciad and the idea that "universal darkness" will eventually "cover all" is a theme which grows throughout the book until that last apocalyptic description of New York in 1905 which ends: "A traveler in the highways of history looked out of the club window on the turmoil of Fifth Avenue, and felt himself in Rome, under Diocletian, witnessing the anarchy, conscious of the compulsion, eager for the solution, but unable to conceive whence the next impulse was to come or how it was to act. The two-thousand-years failure of Christianity roared upward from Broadway, and no Constantine the Great was in sight." Although Clemens had a ready sympathy for the strikers so brutally suppressed under Cleveland, he also came to hate "the mob." Colonel Sherburn's scornful arraignment of the brutality, pusillanimity, and cowardice of the lynching crowd is an overt piece of authorial intrusion: Hank Morgan who came to save the people finds himself admiring their king and despising them as "muck," and it is the ungrateful mob that allows Joan to be burned after she had devoted herself to their liberation. Adams's patrician heritage helped to enforce his antipathies on him and although Clemens certainly enjoyed no comparably cultured environment as a child yet he also recalls that "the aristocratic taint was in the air." His Virginian father, John Marshall Clemens, was a type of aristocrat in his insistence on the proud, austere, dignified bearing proper to "a man"; an Andrew Jackson, perhaps, rather than a John Quincy Adams. If Adams inherited an aristocracy of class, then Clemens certainly inherited an aristocracy of character, and this must not be ignored in any attempt to account for their disaffiliation from the age of the common man. Mobocracy, like "dollarocracy" and "machineocracy" (if we may coin a word) aroused bitterness, contempt and despair in both men. It remains to examine this despair.

The Education is an account of a life dissolving into chaos. Adams construes his life as a series of false starts-a continual failure to learn anything. Everywhere he looks he can only see a world "both unwise and ignorant" and full of contradictions among intelligent people: "from such contradictions . . . what was a young man to learn." Continually he says "the horizon widened out in endless waves of confusion," and we should note that sea image: it is one that will recur. On the moral level he never finds anything he can trust. In London diplomatic circles he loses all confidence and when Russell, Gladstone, and Palmerston seem to be double-dealing he makes it a crucial test: "could one afford to trust human nature in politics . . . for education the point was vital. If one could not trust a dozen of the most respected private characters in the world . . . one could trust no mortal man." When they fall short of his idealistic standards he just gives up, blaming it all on "the sheer chaos of human nature." Such moments recur: as he makes his way through political life he seeks out something he can hold fast to, some one facet of human nature that will never let him down. He is almost adolescent, almost child-like in his search for goodness in the world. One can see him as conducting on an international urban level the search that Huck carried out down the Mississippi, and in the course of this search he confesses "he had wholly lost his way." He is always making another "leap into the unknown" and after working near the Grant administration for a while he emerges with the comment by now only to be expected from him. He "had made another total misconception of life-another inconceivable false start." Like Huck he is lost and always passive. He "drifted into the mental indolence of history" and wherever he goes he says that knowledge absorbs him-"he was passive." Like Huck he often appears as "a helpless victim" with no defense or means of attack and he feels "at the mercy of fools and cowards": even when he takes a job as a teacher his morbid comment is: "he went on, submissive." Again like Huck he is continually on the move. Feeling unfitted for Boston "he had to go": shocked by McKinley's ways he says "once more, one must go!" He is well aware of this nomadic aspect of his life since he adds: "Nothing was easier! On and off, one had done the same thing since the year 1858, at frequent intervals." Very early on in the book he recalls: "Always he felt himself somewhere else . . . and he watched with vague unrest from the Quincy hills the smoke of the Cunard steamers stretching in a long line to the horizon . . . as though the steamers were offering to take him away, which was precisely what they were doing." It is important to note how purposeless Adams makes all his voyaging seem-both the actual travel and the larger voyage towards knowledge. He is always "drifting" with some unspecified current. The sea imagery is prolific throughout the book. It starts when he is writing of the civil war: "On April 13 the storm burst and rolled several hundred thousand young men like Henry Adams into the surf of a wild ocean, all helpless like himself, to be beaten about for four years by the waves of war." But there was no ebb of the tide for Henry Adams. As the end of his first year in England approaches he writes: "His old education was finished; his new one was not begun; he still loitered a year, feeling himself near the end of a very long, anxious tempestuous successful voyage, with another to follow, and a summer sea between." Success would seem to consist merely in keeping afloat-a success

not always permitted him since he elsewhere talks of "sinking under the surface." In 1871, he writes, "his course had led him through oceans of ignorance" and the ocean seems limitless. In the chapter entitled "The Abyss of Ignorance" the final stage of passivity is reached. "After so many years of effort to find one's drift, the drift found the seeker and slowly swept him forward and back, with a steady progress oceanwards." He doesn't let go of the image even when talking of smaller matters, of his attempt to study "race and sex" he writes: "Even within these narrow seas the navigator lost his bearings and followed the winds as they blew." That he sometimes wishes this sea of ignorance to turn into something more soporific, something to rock him back to unconsciousness again, is shown by one remarkable passage. "Adams would rather, as choice, have gone back to the east, if it were only to sleep forever in the trade-winds under the southern stars, wandering over the dark purple ocean, with its purple sense of solitude and void." Images of the sea as a fearful void are supported by images of darkness. He refers to himself as being "lost in the darkness of his own gropings" and after King's death "Adams could only blunder back alone, helplessly, wearily, his eyes rather dim with tears, to his vague trail across the darkening prairie of education, without a motive, big or small except curiosity to reach, before he too should drop, some point that would give him a far look ahead." This "darkening prairie" later becomes "mountains of ignorance" where the "weary pilgrim . . . could no longer see any path whatever and could not even understand a signpost." One tends to forget the almost phantasmagoric nature of his accounts because of the tempered, elegant detached tone, but the accounting voice is a neutral, almost blank, one and its purpose is to direct attention to the pitiful figure strug-

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gling down on earth. "Never had the proportions of his ignorance looked so appalling. He semed to know nothing-to be groping in darkness-to be falling forever in space." The images of sea, space and darkness blend for one moment when he tells of the significance for him of Karl Pearson's writing: "At last their universe had been wrecked by rays, and Karl Pearson undertook to cut the wreck loose with an axe, leaving science adrift on a sensual raft in the midst of a supersensual chaos" and now Adams finds himself "on the raft." He might have found two companions on the raft-Huck Finn, and that hapless narrator of The Mysterious Stranger, Theodore Fischer. In one sense the voyages of these two boys complement each other. Huck is afloat in America in search of a destination. He is an Odysseus without an Ithaca. Like Odysseus he is "never at a loss" and knows how to disguise himself or manufacture a tale in order to get himself out of trouble and continue on his way; but that way is no longer clear. The frontier to which he finally heads is too vague to be a definite destination—it is the geographical location of the great unknown. But still, there is a feeling that out there all things are possible. Huck, we feel, stands a chance. But not Theodore. The ending of The Mysterious Stranger reads like a more hysterical and total version of Adams's own despair. Here is a part of Satan's last speech. "In a little while you will be alone in shoreless space, to wander its limitless solitudes without friend or comrade forever. . . . It is true, that which I have revealed to you; there is no God, no universe, no human race, no earthly life, no heaven, no hell. It is all a dream-a grotesque and foolish dream. Nothing exists but you. And you are but a thought-a vagrant thought, a useless thought, a homeless thought, wandering forlorn among the empty eternities!"

One can add comparable evidence from Clemens's last period that he became increasingly preoccupied with images of chaos, darkness, purposelessness, the passivity of man before the dark forces of the world and the complete lostness of man. In some of his late, unfinished scraps of fiction there is a measure of unwarranted horror which one might expect from a writer more devoted to symbolism than Clemens at any time showed himself to be: there is a feeling of living in a symbolic universe to which man has lost the interpretative key, thus leaving the writer with an accumulating emotion that finds no satisfactory deciphering expression. Just to mention the three sea stories among these late papers will reveal something of this process, and the preoccupation with purposeless voyages which end in horror is one which seems to mirror something that was going on in Adams's mind. (It is interesting to recall that Emerson employed images of voyaging and water to enforce his optimistic view of man's effortless relationship with a benign nature. "Place yourself in the middle of the stream of power and wisdom which animates all whom it floats, and you are without effort impelled to truth, to right and a perfect contentment." And again: man "is like a ship in a river . . . he sweeps serenely over a deepening channel into an infinite sea.")

For Twain and Adams that "infinite sea" turned into pure nightmare. The Enchanted Sea Wilderness is the story of a ship which wanders into a great area of the ocean where the compass suddenly goes berserk and loses all value as a means of steering and plotting direction. First it runs into a terrible nine-day storm which the sailors nickname "the devil's race track" and then it emerges into a deadly calm or "the everlasting Sunday." Here they slowly drift until they see what they take to be a fleet on the horizon: full of hope they

row towards it but it turns out to be a dead fleet which rotted away years ago leaving only the deceptive shells on the surface to mock all who find them with an image of their irrevocable fate. In all this "universal paralysis of life and energy" the only active thing is the compass which is whirling around "in a frenzy of fear." Out of this morbid but pregnant predicament Clemens makes nothing and we are left to wonder how the narrator lived to tell the tale.

A more suggestive story is An Adventure in Remote Seas, where once again a ship gets lost but this time arrives at a strange island. Half the crew go ashore to catch penguins and find, implausibly enough, a vast hoard of gold: this turns the captain's mind and the men are employed in weighing and counting it. Strikes and labor disputes arise and there are some satirical references to the question of adopting the silver standard, on which William Jennings Bryan was campaigning at the time. All thought of the original purpose of the voyage is given up, and those on shore start to forget the ship and cease to worry about their location. Suddenly they realize the ship has gone-and here the story breaks off. This has all the inchoate lineaments of an allegory. The unknown island which they discover could be America and the penguins (who are so docile and friendly while the sailors cut their throats) might well be the original inhabitants, the Indians. The frenzy aroused by the money is Clemens's comment on what the Industrial Revolution was doing to men and the final situation seems to symbolize contemporary America: busy scrambling for money while the one chance of salvation, the ship, is finally lost, leaving the men abandoned in a nameless ocean with only a meaningless wealth for consolation. Again this is not brought to anything; it remains formless and crude, merely indicating a desire to express a bitter comment on the crisis of mankind.

The long story to which De Voto applied Clemens's phrase "The Great Dark" is a more prolonged, though scarcely more successful, attempt to find a fitting parable to carry his feelings. A man named Henry Edwards dreams that he embarks on a long trip across the drop of water that he had been studying under the microscope shortly before falling asleep. The "blind voyage" across this unknown ocean moves from dream to nightmare. At first it is constantly dark: no one knows where they are but try and conceal the fact from others; the charts and compass prove to be utterly useless since none of the expected landmarks seem to exist; fantastic animals flounder in the sea, occasionally attacking them giving the impression of a Bosch-like apocalyptic chaos. Hideous surreal incidents multiply and the story spirals to a pitch of phantasmagoric insanity: the sea dries up, fighting and brawling (again over a useless treasure) gradually account for all the characters except Edwards who, like Theodore Fischer, is left alone in an arid eternity. The terrible dream turns out to be the true reality—a favorite theme of the aging Clemens.

This unrelenting vision of life as chaos is, in essence and conclusion, not very different from that of Henry Adams. Whence this similarity of vision? Both of them had ceased to believe in God but both retained something of that Calvinistic intensity of vision common to believers of previous ages. It is their inability to disburden themselves of the mental framework which accompanied belief that makes both determinists of one kind or another. God had either fled or been diminished to a thinga deus absconditum, but the feeling of predestination lingered on just beneath the surface of the conscious mind. To this we can trace the persistent image of the voyage in so much nineteenth century American literature, but now what was the destiny to which man had been predestined? The compasses were not functioning, the chart of infallible absolutes was completely useless on these novel seas of dissolving belief. It seems that without the one allsolving deity the world collapsed into an amorphous, inexplicable mess before which the only reaction was one of sterile horror. Not that either man wanted the old God back, but they were equally dismayed at America's failure to provide any substitute ideal purpose or explanation: (they are both, at one time or another, extremely sardonic about evolutionary optimism).

At first both Clemens and Adams had credited man with some degree of free will: in the History there is such a thing as moral responsibility and decision, while Huck is a superb example of man's ability to argue with, challenge, and finally rebuff the circumpressure of environment and heredity. By the end of their lives they were both convinced that free will was completely illusory. In the Education Adams decides that people involved in politics are simply "forces as dumb as their dynamos" and this interpretation gradually extends over all mankind. One sentence intimates the large shift in conviction. "Adams never knew why, knowing nothing of Faraday, he began to mimic Faraday's trick of seeing lines of force all about him, where he had always seen lines of will." Very quickly man becomes "a feeble atom."

1898 was a bad year for Clemens, a year in which he sought some relief from Susy's death and his bankruptcy, in a prolonged spell of uninterrupted work. He not only wrote *The Mysterious Stranger* but he also completed a work which he had been toying with for eighteen years—What Is Man? It is entirely apt that the very first sub-title should read: "a. Man the Machine." This book has been almost entirely ignored by

subsequent generations and for good reason: yet Clemens was so apprehensive about the scandal he thought it would cause that he would only print it anonymously and privately for a few friends in 1906. It is a jumble of half-pursued thoughts and improperly defined terms the whole upshot of which is that man is "an impersonal machine . . . he is moved, directed, com-MANDED by exterior influences—solely. He originates nothing, not even a thought." And then there follows that notorious simile -Shakespeare is merely a "Gobelin loom" compared with the sewing machine which is the average man. Of course it wasn't subsequent generations who were shockedit was Clemens himself. He was terrified by his own conclusion (and note how his "exterior influences" have taken over the imperious authoritarianism of the Calvinist God). There is something unnerved and frenzied about his insistence that man is a completely irresponsible object at the mercy of forces that he cannot understand and he is almost vengeful in his efforts to humiliate and degrade mankind.

It is interesting that he seeks out the most ignoble animals with which to compare man (in personal dignity, for instance, man is on the same level as a rat) for Adams continually chooses to compare himself to animals: and such animals—the small, the helpless, the ones that crawl. For example he likens himself at various times to a mosquito, a maggot, a worm, a firefly, and a horseshoe crab. More interesting is his simile for Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe. In a letter to Tilden in 1883 he wrote: "they appear like mere grasshoppers kicking and gesticulating on the middle of the Mississippi River . . : they were carried along on a stream which floated them, after a fashion, without much regard to themselves." One can see here an unconscious preparation for his later attitude toward the predicament of man: this image conjoins just those two themes which later he consciously exploited. Man is as helpless as a trivial animal: his life is a brief floating on the endless waters of chaos.

As a boy Adams was impregnated with truths that were rigid, absolute, and transcendent: it is only natural that when he embarks on his search for some new truth he should search for some inflexible, theoretic and timelessly true principle. His search for unity is actually a yearning for some inviolable, transcendent principle of unification such as Aquinas had postulated. But along with everything else the philosophic climate was changing. Absolute systems of philosophy tended to be reactionary, to justify the old status quo that brought them into being; they inhibited reform, they imposed a mental vice on a world which was breaking its boundaries in every direction. A new philosophy was needed to control and discipline the new directions man was taking without closing off any avenues to him-the philosophy was pragmatism. Pragmatism kept truth open and searched for useful instruments rather than final answers; it turned away from "a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes": it turned towards facts and was not dismayed by their improvident multiplicity.

William James, attacking a conservative professor, writes in a way that seems almost like a direct answer to the morbid despair of Adams and Clemens with all their images of oceans of chaos and fruitless voyages. He writes: "These critics appear to suppose that, if left to itself, the rudderless craft of our experience must be ready to drift anywhere or nowhere. Even tho there were compasses on board, they seem to say, there would be no pole for them to point to. There must be absolute sailing directions, they insist, decreed from outside, and an independent chart of the voyage added to the 'mere' voyage itself, if we are ever to

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As the recurrent imagery of their late work reveals, both Adams and Clemens felt profoundly uneasy without a set of "absolute sailing directions."

It is strange that Adams and Clemens never seem to have met. They had many mutual friends-Clarence King, John Hay, and most notably William Dean Howells, and they both spent many years in New England, yet we have no record of a meeting. There is a strange moment in What Is Man? when Clemens suddenly cites one "Henry Adams" as a (presumably fictional) example of the unhappiest man he knows: he must certainly have known too much about Adams to have used the name quite innocently and perhaps this is a covert way of intimating that he considers himself at an extreme temperamental remove from such a man. Had they met they would probably have found themselves at odds, yet they are two of the most notable alienated figures of their age. They never felt quite at home anywhere, never quite settled down, never really found themselves. At one point Adams imagines describing himself to his father and finds that all he could say of himself would be: "Sir, I am a tourist!," and when he later calls himself "a historical tramp" we are reminded of that habitual tourist who punningly names himself in A Tramp Abroad. Both these international hobos spent many years of their lives wandering around the world and beneath the successful exterior

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make a port. But is it not obvious that even the there be such absolute sailing-directions in the shape of pre-human standards of truth that we ought to follow, the only guarantee that we shall in fact follow them must lie in our human equipment. . . . The only real guarantee we have against licentious thinking is the circumpressure of experience itself, which gets us sick of concrete errors, whether there be a trans-empirical reality or not."

As the recurrent imagery of their late work reveals, both Adams and Clemens felt profoundly uneasy without a set of "absolute sailing directions."

It is strange that Adams and Clemens never seem to have met. They had many mutual friends-Clarence King, John Hay, and most notably William Dean Howells, and they both spent many years in New England, yet we have no record of a meeting. There is a strange moment in What Is Man? when Clemens suddenly cites one "Henry Adams" as a (presumably fictional) example of the unhappiest man he knows: he must certainly have known too much about Adams to have used the name quite innocently and perhaps this is a covert way of intimating that he considers himself at an extreme temperamental remove from such a man. Had they met they would probably have found themselves at odds, yet they are two of the most notable alienated figures of their age. They never felt quite at home anywhere, never quite settled down, never really found themselves. At one point Adams imagines describing himself to his father and finds that all he could say of himself would be: "Sir, I am a tourist!," and when he later calls himself "a historical tramp" we are reminded of that habitual tourist who punningly names himself in A Tramp Abroad. Both these international hobos spent many years of their lives wandering around the world and beneath the successful exterior of the one and the cultured veneer of the other one can indeed discern the lineaments of that recurrent American image—the tramp. Devious and unpremeditated as their wanderings may seem they were both on the same road, not to anywhere but away from a society with which they could no longer identify themselves and which seemed to offer no answering image to their own deepest hopes and ideals.

If these two were alone in their disillusion and despair one might be inclined to put it down to a personal perversity of vision. But the evidence is all the other way. One can trace a spectrum of complaint throughout the age. Whitman, although he had faith in democracy-"the unyielding principle of the average"-conceded "the appalling dangers of universal suffrage in the United States." Committed to loving all men he was yet sufficiently offended by the progress of post-civil war America to write that "society," despite or because of "unprecedented materialistic advancement . . . is canker'd, crude, superstitious and rotten." A man less like Adams than Whitman never lived and yet the former would have supported Whitman's complaint that "the element of the moral conscience, the most important, the vertebrae to State or man, seems to me either entirely lacking, or seriously enfeebled or ungrown."

Brooks Adams, in his significantly titled The Law of Civilization and Decay, developed an adventurous cyclical interpretation of history and the lesson he reads in the past is the inevitable disintegration of a society in which the economic type had gained total supremacy. As determinist as his brother Henry he maintained that Nature operates on the human mind "according to immutable laws"—a theory which endorses pessimism but slights man's ability to learn from the past. Consequently he

saw in the exaltation of the new materialistic middle class a portent of inevitable doom. Henry James fled to England to avert his eyes from the new generation of Americans dedicated to the "great black ebony God of business": in the last scene of *The Bostonians* Basil Ransom dismisses the middle class mob at the lecture hall as "senseless brutes" and it is difficult not to feel that he speaks with the author's approval.

Near the turn of the century Henry Adams, perspicacious enough to see that the future of society might lie in the directions of state-socialism, pronounced it a "future with which I sincerely wish I may have nothing to do." Clemens, more angry because more humane, composed this "salutation speech from the 19th century to the 20th" (subsequently withdrawn) in which he bitterly arraigns the imperialistic greed of the West.

"I bring you the stately matron named Christendom, returning bedraggled, besmirched and dishonoured from pirateraids in Kiao-Chow, Manchuria, South Africa and the Philippines, with her soul full of boodle, and her mouth full of pious hypocrisies. Give her soap and a towel, but hide the looking glass."

But middle-class America was to receive a more disturbing turn-of-the-century salutation. In 1899 Thorstein Veblen published The Theory of the Leisure Classes in which the pecuniary fanaticism of the nouveau riche received its most mordant, sardonic analysis. His evidence must be taken as conclusive. It remained for later scholars such as Vernon Parrington to clarify the phenomenon which had so distressed men like Clemens and Adams; namely, "the emergence of a new middle class" which in the second half of the nineteenth century subdued American "to middle class ends."

# The Essays of Agnes Repplier

An invitation to reading

#### DORA HORCHLER

Some eighty years ago the old Father Hecker, founder of the Paulist order in America, turned to the young lady whom he had just taken around the Paulist church in New York. He asked her bluntly: "Why do you write fiction? You are not equipped for it." At her bewildered: "But what am I to write?" he said: "Essays."

The young lady who then started to write essays and continued to do so for some sixty years was Agnes Repplier; she turned out to be one of the finest, and perhaps the finest, of American classical essayists

"Classical," according to the dictionary, refers to work of the highest class; according to definitions of literature it refers to lucid writing concerned with deeper and general human truths. Both definitions apply to Agnes Repplier. But there is a third, a popular definition: a classic writer is one whose works are always praised but

seldom, if ever, read. This does not apply to Agnes Repplier. Her works are seldom read *and* seldom praised nowadays.

When they are praised, they are praised enthusiastically by a few who stumble upon them even now. It may be, of course, that Miss Repplier wanted to be read only by the very few. In her memoir Mrs. Lightner-Witmer mentions her aunt's wish "to join that little band of authors who, unknown to the wide, careless world, remain from generation to generation the friends of a few fortunate readers." But will these coming generations have the opportunity to know her work? Few young people know her name now, not quite a decade after the death of this author who had, after all, received honorary degrees from Pennsylvania, Yale, Columbia, and Princeton for her literary achievements. Her books are at present "shrinking bashfully into their appointed nooks and powdering their little gray heads

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with the dust of the undisturbed" in our libraries, as their author once feared they would do in the bookstores. More often than not English professors and librarians do not know what they contain. It is a pity. In her intelligent, amusing, stimulating essays the wit and humor are as fresh and effervescent as if they were written today and her conclusions are ever timely, indicating that their wisdom is genuine and that it will endure.

Miss Repplier was called a social critic, a reviver of the Addisonian type of social criticism "that has nothing directly to do with economics, sociology, politics, or religion, but a great deal to do with good sense, consideration for others and personal dignity," as Joseph J. Reilly put it already in 1943. Today, when "social criticism has become a leaden-footed vagrant whose proper domain has been usurped by economics, sociology, science, and a type of ethics so highly personal that sanctions and standards know it no longer" these Addisonian qualities set Miss Repplier apart. Nor does she fit into any other category. "Good sense and human dignity" not only characterized her writing but were a part of her nature and preserved her from the dangers of conformism, characteristic of modern American life.

She was a staunch American with literary sympathies leaning of course towards Europe, particularly towards England and France. These inclinations, together with her criticism of America and Americanism, were often resented by her countrymen.

She was a devout Roman Catholic. Yet her French ancestry, as well as her education at Eden Hall, a Sacred Heart school with French traditions, set her somehow apart among her co-parishioners. She was a child of the "eldest Daughter of the Church" and her Catholicism—as Father Francis Sweeney, S.J., wrote after her death—"stood clear of its contemporary Ameri-

can adjuncts: a kind of Ghetto complex and the worst artistic taste since the Prussian Barok."

She was a conservative, she said so herself at a time when "conservatism" had already begun to be a Bad Term. She was however a "temperamental conservative," believing that "if we are too stiff to adjust ourselves to changed conditions, we are bound to play a losing game."

She was born in Philadelphia, spent the nine decades of her long life in the heart of this town, wrote perhaps the best history of her native city in *Philadelphia*, the Place and the People. Still the City of Brotherly Love was too embarrassed by the spectacle of a lady writing for her livelihood—and smoking besides! She did not find a publisher in Philadelphia, but had to send her manuscripts to Boston.

She was a woman, but she refused to become a feminist. "For half a century"— her niece wrote—"Miss Repplier stood on the sidelines gazing with sanity, sympathy and common sense at the American scene and declining to be swept into the stream of contemporary follies and false hopes."

"She stood on the sidelines." Her great knowledge of history placed her on heights from which she could trace the developments of her times to their historical sources. She could even project-and more accurately than most of the "experts"their future results. In her essay "Living in History," she wrote: "I used to think that ignorance of history meant lack of cultivation and loss of pleasure. Now I am sure that such ignorance impairs our judgment by impairing our understanding, by depriving us of standards, of the power to contrast and the right to estimate." This "power to contrast and right to estimate" she possessed to a high degree, having mastered "the book of the World" which is "full of knowledge we need to acquire, of lessons we need to learn, of wisdom we need to assimilate."

History runs through all her essays whatever their theme and their mood. In "A Conservative's Consolation" Miss Repplier wrote: "If belief in the perfectibility of man-and not of man only, but of governments-is the inspiration of liberalism, of radicalism, of the spirit that calls clamorously for change, and that requisitioned the words reform and progression, sympathy with man and his work, with the beautiful and imperfect things he has made of the chequered centuries, is the keynote of conservatism." In many of her essays, "The Headsman," "The Pilgrim's Staff," "The Beggar's Pouch," she reaches back into these chequered centuries and invites us to enjoy the beauties and to ponder the imperfections of the past. In others, such as "A Certain Complacency in Americans," "The Divineness of Discontent," "What Is Moral Support?" "Americanism," she places her own times and contemporaries under the searchlight of history. In all we can detect something of their author's belief that "stupidity is not the prerogative of any class or creed. It is Heaven's gift to men of all kinds, and conditions, and civilizations." And all bear the mark of this certain "temperamental conservatism" which Miss Repplier defined as being "the dower (not to be coveted) of men in whom delight and doubt-I had almost said delight and despair-contend for mastery; whose enjoyment of colour, light, atmosphere, tradition, language and literature is balanced by chilling apprehensiveness; whose easily won pardon for the shameless revelations of an historic past brings with it no healing belief in the triumphant virtues of the future." With these qualities she was a keen and spirited critic.

She had to take her share of being criticized. This came mostly from her countrymen, literary critics, some of whom re-

proached her for not citing American authors. Henry Cuyler Bunner wrote ("in a vicious mood"-says Miss Repplier in Eight Decades): "Miss Repplier seems to be forever echoing the words of Sidney Smith: 'Who reads an American book?'" She risked being called un-American, she wrote, "a bearable misfortune because the phrase still awaits analysis," since she believed that "to dare to be unpopular in the best and noblest sense of a good and noble word is to hold fast to the principles which speeded the Mayflower to Plymouth Rock and Penn to the shores of the Delaware." Almost always time has proved the soundness of her criticism. It is we who should be reproached for neglecting her today.

She always had a word to say-and what a precise, well-placed word-about many tendencies that were only flimsy indications then, but have become grave problems since. About education: "Desultory information cannot be trusted to develop habits of work. Our efforts to protect the child from doing what he does not want to do, because he does not want to do it, are kind, but unintelligent. Every normal child prefers play to work and the precise value of work lies in its call for renunciation. The theory that schoolwork must appeal to a child's fluctuating tastes, must attract a child's involuntary attention does grievous wrong to the rising generation." About the modern "humanitarian" sentiment concerning criminals: "The excess of sentiment which is misleading in philanthropy and economics grows acutely dangerous when it interferes with legislation or with the ordinary ruling of morality. It is ill so to soften our hearts with psychological interest in the lawbreaker that no criminal is safe from popularity." She had not yet seen much of our juvenile delinquents when she sensed the dangers of a "loss of nerve." "It is with the best intentions in the world that we Americans are now engaged in letting down the walls

of human resistance, in lessening personal obligation. The assumption that children should never be burdened with responsibilities and never-under any stress of circumstances-be deprived of the pleasures which are no more a privilege, but their sacred and inalienable right, makes failure of nerve." The word "momism" was not coined yet, but enthusiastic feminists already dreamed of a "Mother State" and professed that "all life, physical and spiritual, personal and social, needs to be mothered." To which Miss Repplier retorted in "Woman Enthroned": "The Mother State of which we dream offers no attraction to many plain and practical workers and is a veritable nightmare to others -Needs to be Mothered! When men proffer this welter of sentiment in the name of women, how is it possible to say convincingly that the girl student standing at the gates of knowledge is as humble-hearted as the boy; that she does not mean to mother medicine, or architecture, or biology any more than the girl in the banker's office means to mother finance?" In her opinion "the superlative complacency of American women is due largely to the oratorical adulation of American men-an adulation that has no more substance than has the foam on beer." She understood well that communism is built upon the "perilous race inertia of Russia" discovered long ago by Henry Adams, who asked: "Could inertia on such a scale be broken, or take new scale?" To which Miss Repplier answered: "And we read the answer today: a minority ruling with iron hand; a majority accepting what comes to them as they accept day and night and the seasons." Another passage of this same essay, "The Divineness of Discontent," is as true today as it was thirty years ago: "Back of our lives is the sombre setting of a world ill at ease and beset by perils. Darkening all our days is the gathering cloud of ill will, the ugly hatred of man for man which is the perpetual threat to progress." Her comment on Carthage was an historical warning to our materialistic world: "A selfsatisfied, self-confident, money-getting, money-loving people, honouring success and hugging their fancied security, while in faroff Rome Cato pronounced their doom." Ancient European races were not enslaved yet in "People's Democracies" when she wrote in a "Conservative's Consolation": "Democracy may be divorced from freedom, and freedom is the breath of man's nostrils, the strength of his sinews, the sanction of his soul. It is as painful to be tyrannized over by a proletariat as by the tsar or by a corporation, and it is in a measure more disconcerting, because of the greater incohesion of the process."

Miss Repplier reminds our insecure, modern reformers that "the law of Christ is as pure and lofty as any code our human intelligence can grasp. We do not live by it, because it makes no concession to the sickly qualities which cement our earthly natures; but we hold fast to it as an incomparable ideal. It is not law or light we need. It is the power of effort and resistance. What the world asks now are state reforms and social reforms-in other words. the reformation of our neighbours. What the Gospel asks, and has always asked, is the reformation of ourselves-a harrassing and importunate demand. Mr. Chesterton spoke but the truth when he said that Christianity has not been tried and found wanting. It has been found difficult and not tried."

One could go on quoting, since Agnes Repplier seldom wrote a meaningless phrase and never a commonplace. She possessed—again in the words of Mrs. Lightner-Witmer, who at times is as quotable as her aunt from whom she inherited so much—"captivating humor, wisdom without conceit and wit without malice." Ellery Sedg-

wick, the editor of the Atlantic Monthly and Miss Repplier's friend of many years, called her a "sort of contemporary ancestor, a summation of the best that has gone before." In these days of "digests" we could call her essays a digest of European civilization, of this "endangered civilization" which is the common good and should be the common concern of Americans and Europeans.

Thanks to her vast reading and remarkable memory (which made Mary Ellen Chase exclaim: "Has she read all her life and forgotten nothing?") Agnes Repplier draws from the wealth of centuries for our amusement and intellectual pleasure. Thanks to her French esprit and English humor, heritages which blend in her writings in the best American tradition, her erudition is never pedantic. She wiped the schoolroom's dust off Horace and brought him back to us in one of her finest essays. In the Happy Halfcentury she presented us with a very humorous comedy dug up from a corner of history usually associated with heroic and sombre tragedies. The end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century "was not a time distinguishedin England at least-for wit or wisdom, for public virtues or for private charm; but it was a time when literary reputations were so cheaply gained that nobody needed to despair of one." It was the time of Hannah More, "a brilliant and bewildering example of sustained success"; of Mrs. Montagu "the real and very solid foundation of whose reputation was the admirable manner in which she fed her lions"; of Mrs. Barbaulds, eulogized even by her own brother, though "there are few things more difficult to conceive than an enthusiastic brother tunefully entreating his sister to go on enrapturing the world with her pen." We have not the time nor perhaps the urge to read Froissart, but it is an intellectual feast to have him presented to us by Miss Repplier. Byron sheds his scandalous reputation to appear as a thoughtful father in Miss Repplier's "Allegra" and a sensible businessman and generous friend in her "When Lalla Rookh Was Young."

Sometimes Miss Repplier sprinkled the glitter of history over our everyday life. In "A Question of Politeness" she reminds us that "the nature of youth and the nature of crowds have not changed since the Civil War, nor since the Punic War," that we are not the first to complain about jostling crowds in the rush hours. Theocritus, in the third century B.C. in Syracuse said about his fellow-citizens that "they rushed like a herd of swine."

Our modest cup of tea becomes a symbol of tradition and culture in Agnes Repplier's *Thinking of Tea*. The "Grocer's Cat" is of course the pet of saints and of Renaissance Duchesses.

Her essays about World War I reflect her sensitive and patriotic sentiments, her anti-Germanism at the time of the invasion of Belgium and the sinking of the Lusitania, her dislike of pacifists, since she believed that the "civilization of the world is the business of all who live in the world."

In Eight Decades she gave us an enlightning nutshell history of the downfall of the Spanish monarchy in a few vivacious sentences, interpolated in the narrative of her seventh decade, "a gray age weighted with uncompromising biblical allusions." But not for Miss Repplier, ahead of whom a "glint of dazzling sunshine" was "dancing merrily." There was an international Spanish-Iberian exposition at Seville, to which the United States had been invited and she was one of the appointed United States commissioners. "The king arrived twentyfour hours before the opening and worked like a beaver." The following day he opened the exposition. "The Spanish crowd looked, as a Spanish crowd always looks, in perfect harmony with the setting. The flowing mantillas of white and black lace composed themselves into the landscape. There was but one discordant note: the queen and the royal princesses had refused the smallest concession to Spain. Their dresses and hats were as English as London could make them. I heard bitter remarks about this later. It was hard to think that so insignificant a bêtise could have affronted so many people." Then the American Commissioner-General met Primo de Rivera and conceived an ardent admiration for him.

A very intelligent man—he kept on repeating through the evening—a vastly intelligent man.—The king was intelligent about the plumbing, I hinted.—I dare say—said the chief dryly—plumbing has not chanced to come my way. But for grasp on affairs, for complete knowledge of the political situation! I don't see how Spain could ever get along without Primo!—And it hasn't.—concluded Miss Repplier.

Ellery Sedgwick said of her that "in the withholding of praise and in its just bestowal she had no match." Towards herself she was severely demanding. She and she alone noticed when the ravages of old age had caught up with her and, unlike Le Sage's Archbishop of Granada who would not heed Gil Blas' advice, she retired at once. At a time when editors were still soliciting her manuscripts, she put down her pen. So she did not leave us any work that is failing, everything she wrote bears the mark of a sharp wit and crystal-clear mind.

Mrs. Lightner-Witmer's book has given us a worthy but half biographical tribute to Agnes Repplier; Sheed and Ward have published one of her historical biographies, Mère Marie of the Ursulines, but her essays, these exquisite pieces of literary art should be rediscovered in their turn. They should be made accessible to college students in inexpensive editions. Joseph R. Reilly thinks that "a Cabinet Minister with authority over higher education might well require those three essays-'Living in History,' 'The Virtuous Victorian,' and 'Horace'to be mastered as a prerequisite for a degree, for then at least he might be sure that the departing neophytes from our temples of learning had grasped certain fundamentals of social widsom."

Beside social wisdom they would get a better understanding of our civilization and culture. They would be proud of their Agnes Repplier, as French students are proud of their Alain. As for those who love and appreciate literature and who agree with Gide that "today, when there is no unique source and the waters surging everywhere without any élan stay stagnant on the soil, the literary soil can be compared to a swamp," they will find refreshment in Agnes Repplier's works. Her writings flow through the swamp of modern literature with the impetus and the limpidity of a mountain stream springing from the two great sources of our civilization: Antiquity and Christianity.

# Eighty Days around the Communist World

### ANDREW GYORGY

Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, by David J. Dallin. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1961.

THE PROFESSIONAL READER and the interested observer should both be indebted to Mr. Dallin, who in his latest work has offered us a brilliant panoramic view and perspective of Soviet foreign policy since 1953. Indeed, with its swiftly paced narrative, abundance of detail and rapidly changing mosaic-type vignettes this work reminds the reviewer of Jules Verne's exciting novel of the record-breaking trip around the world. Completely successful in his undertaking, despite its breathlessly broad and ambitious scope, Dallin has added yet another dimension to his professional stature. This "solid and knowledgeable guide" to post-Stalinist Soviet developments, to cite the words of one reviewer, is a worthy and colorful sequel to the author's The Big Three, Soviet Espionage, and more recently, The Changing World of Soviet Russia.

Probably the single most impressive accomplishment of this work is the artistic matching of an almost global geopolitical coverage with a sound and meticulous historical blueprint. The geographic scope includes a review of European, Middle and Far Eastern, Southeast Asian and Latin American developments nicely balancing one area against the other, and thus avoiding the customary professional pitfall of over-concentration or over-preoccupation with one single continent, region or country. Even within a single geopolitical area, like Europe, Dallin skilfully matches by parallel treatment or by dramatic juxtaposition the major diplomatic characteristics of one against the other. For the European area, as an example, Britain, France, Finland and Austria are as exhaustively treated as the satellites of Eastern Europe, the Berlin problem or the non-Iron Curtain type Balkan countries of Greece and Turkey. And throughout the book Communist Chinese foreign policy is receiving a great deal of dramatically well-merited attention, in itself a most useful feat for a professional literature which—generally speaking—is either exclusively Europe-oriented or totally immersed in Far Eastern speculations.

Historically Dallin's blueprint calls for a careful slicing of the 1953-1960 period into five major portions. Part One freezes the international position of the Soviet Union as it appeared on the day Stalin finally died. Not only are the major conflict areas thoughtfully outlined, but the immediate impact of Stalin's death is clearly anticipated and his controversial legacy is outlined both in a sheer power-political context as well as in more elusive ideological terms. The author's leitmotiv for this much-debated and most tortuous period is a well selected "Conflicts Everywhere!" battle cry foreshadowing in turn the obvious relaxation which had to follow the hated leader's demise both in domestic and foreign political developments. Part Two then focusses on the transitional Malenkov-Molotov era (1953-1955) in which the temporary and artificially contrived "collective leadership" principle inevitably had to yield to a return of the familiar "cult of personality" pattern, this time denoting Khrushchev's ascendancy to full and unqualified power. This subtle, but highly competitive, process of gradual leadership-erosion is exceedingly well portrayed here. The author's interaction concept, domestic events ineluctably setting off foreign waves and/or crises which then give their own peculiar twists and turns to the politics of the home front, dramatically conveys the full meaning of these exciting interim years which by themselves form one period of transition leading to another transition period.

Part Three deals with the first Khruschev era (July 1955 through the Polish and Hungarian uprisings of October-November 1956) which reached an early, and in the long run most disappointing, climax with the Geneva summit conference. The mutually high expectations and the inevitably rude return to historic (or in Marxist terms) "objective" reality is given a detailed and intellectually sophisticated cover-

age. Dallin, at least in this reviewer's opinion, is at his best when describing concrete and actual diplomatic events, incidents, conferences or trips. Thus one of the book's major highlights appears in the amazingly vivid and clever portrayals of Khrushchev's and Bulganin's travels to three South Asian countries: India, Burma and Afghanistan in November-December 1955. "The Indian press estimated the total number of people who turned out for the Russian leaders at over 10 million. The government encouraged the population to accord the Soviet leaders an enthusiastic welcome, and the press went along. Schools were closed, and school children were marched to the meetings; thousands of paper flags . . . were distributed; the visitors were pelted with flowers . . . ; gifts were presented; Khrushchev rode an elephant and wore an embroidered Indian cap; he waved jeweled scimitars, beat drums, embraced dancers, and had kumkum smeared on his forehead by young Hindu women." (Pp. 307-308)

On the other hand, lengthy philosophical dissertations are distinctly not the forte of Mr. Dallin. The review of the foreign political impact of the Twentieth Party Congress is far too sketchy and uninspired to do even partial justice to the crucial "Wars Are Not Inevitable" doctrine which after all forms one of the most centrally contentious issues of conflict in the prolonged and severe dialogue between Communist China and Soviet Russia. One could only wish that the author elaborate on his all-too-brief (12 pages!) coverage of this Congress which was indeed the terminal point of the Stalin era and the beginning of a new (and still current) chapter in the evolution of Soviet domestic and foreign policies.

The last two parts of the book split the years 1957-1960 into two, almost mathematically even, time-periods. While Khrushchev is very much in command and absorbed with the launching of new cold-war

policies in the Middle East, Asia and Africa, China's "growing aspirations" are sensitively analyzed. As we approach the timelier crises and the tensions of today, Dallin again performs admirably. This reviewer was particularly impressed with the excellent short profile of the March 1958 Prague conference of selected Communist parties which led almost immediately to the birth of the new "theoretical monthly" magazine of international Communism, the World Marxist Review. (Pp. 458-459). The final summary and restatement of the Berlin issue is also a most useful mosaic, both as a revealing tactic of the "Khrushchev era of Soviet history" as well as a permanent conflict-pattern of the cold war concealing dreadful possibilities of heating up the now traditional East-West controversy.

Just a word about Mr. Dallin's use of source materials. To the American reader a peculiarly interesting value of the book is its emphasis on seldom used and often underrated sources ranging from the skilfull exploitation of such Communist propaganda sources as New Times to such authoritative West German publications as Osteuropa or Ost-Probleme. While the diversity of such colorful documentation is welcome, the relatively unimaginative "professional" academician could possibly pick a quarrel with the author over the all-too-frequent use of the mysterious "D papers" whose authority and authenticity-although arrestingly explained in the Preface-are somewhat over-exploited by the author. One might also criticize the frequently careless spelling of names with disturbing typographical errors varying from Rákosi through Voznesensky to Laqueur. The next edition of this important work should conscientiously correct these minor, but often disturbing, mistakes.

Above all, from the long-range perspective of history, we must endorse with enthusiasm the author's continuing emphasis on the multiple dangers of Communism as an ideological force and as a threat to our way of life. Moving from one historic vignette to the next, from one lively ad hominem discussion to the other, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin rings the alarm bell trying to arouse a half-asleep free world to the menace of Soviet (and Chinese) forms of Communism. To perform this task effectively, and yet without hysteria, is no mean achievement. As Eugene Davidson rightly observed: "Too many intellectuals have consciously or unconsciously placed their hopes for the good society in a totalitarian system . . . "\* A careful study of Dallin's latest book is bound to dispel such optical illusions or the semiphony ideological mirages pursued by certain sectors of the Anglo-American public.

\*See "Mr. Dallin among the Scholars," Modern Age. Winter 1960-1961, p. 4.

## Another Noble Experiment

A German Community under American Occupation, by John Gimbel. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961.

NEXT TO PROHIBITION, the American Occupation of Germany deserves to be listed among this country's Noble Experiments. Both were "a great social and economic experiment, noble in motive and far-reaching in purpose," as Herbert Hoover in a letter to Senator William E. Borah described the attempt to create at home a nation of teetotallers. Occupation attempted to create abroad a nation of democratic citizens in the American image.

In fact, the experiment of Occupationa term summing up the often contradictory policies and administrative acts by which the United States endeavored to change and renew conquered Germanywas unique in American history, and a break with the American tradition. As an occupation power, Americans departed from the principle-held since the days of the Founding Fathers, and guiding them ever since, though in continually weakening ways-that the American form of government, and "way of life" as well, cannot be imposed by force on foreign peoples. In the traditional American view, the world abroad would advance toward freedom as Americans themselves had done, by the spontaneous and autarchic consent of the citizenry to "republicanism." The American wish to see the whole world adapt their example, and emerge in their image, could be realized only if Americans did not try to impose it from outside. But in the case of occupied Germany, this was exactly what Americans set out to do, while they wanted to enforce an American order.

Surely this undertaking was "noble in motive"—rather than merely to see to their own military interests as occupants, Americans wanted to turn Germany—ravaged by Nazi rule, war, and defeat—into a peaceful, prosperous, progressive, nation, or, in American usage, into a democracy. And this they expected to achieve by forcing the Germans to embrace the American ways from kindergartens to women's clubs, from grass-roots democracy in town-hall meetings to grass-roots capitalism without cartels or big corporations. No doubt this experiment was "far-reaching in purpose."

But soon it became rather evident that this experiment would lose much of its nobility once it began being translated into real life, and that it failed to achieve its own purpose. While the experiment was conducted, American critics of Occupation outweighed the defenders by far. It was defended in the main by those who bore an active share in it as planners or administrators, but less engaged observers were primarily impressed by its apparent shortcomings, and sometimes follies. When its last remnants had disappeared, and detached American chroniclers presented a balance-sheet of the seven Occupation years, the critics appeared considerably closer to the truth than the defenders.

In A German Community under American Occupation, 1945-1952, John Gimbel, an Assistant Professor of History at Humboldt State College, California, has concentrated on the investigation of Occupation policies in one German town. While he correctly admits that this town is by no means "typical" (but, then, does any truly typical town exist except in the minds of sociologists on Manhattan's Columbia Heights?) his microscopic case report seems well suited to arrive at valid conclusions.

With admirably painstaking research, Mr. Gimbel has examined, in detail, the activities of American Occupation officials at the lowest administrative level, within the narrow limits of the Marburg Township district; he has attempted to present the social backgrounds and the political thinking of American occupation personnel, and he has also shown the impact on, the response of, the temper created among the German community under the occupation regime. By basing his research on official files, as well as private notes and diaries of Americans and Germans, some of whom he also personally interviewed, he presents an objective picture in great depth and detail.

As Mr. Gimbel concludes, "most of what Americans tried to promote as positive programs in Marburg produced negative effects that far outweighed their positive results." Among the positive results he found the lasting favorable impression of American national characteristics left by American occupation officials with their example of idealistic zeal, efficiency and practical knowhow, their lessons of equality and individualism ("both in acts of kindness and in crime and corruption," as he wisely adds). The negative impact consisted mainly in the failure of De-nazification, De-industrialization, the reform programs of Civil service and school systems. To some degree, as Mr. Gimbel demonstrates, this was the fault of occupation officers whose majority were illprepared by training and outlook to do their job, while in addition the army gave them scant opportunity to train on the job; once an official had begun to get acquainted with his assignment ("to case the joint," as it was called in Occupationese), he was transferred. But to a much higher, if not decisive degree, the failure of the mission was built-in into this very assignment. For a great many reasons, many of which might have been foreseeable, it was just not possible to reform Germany—nor, probably, any other country, for that matter-in the American image, particularly not through the agency of a Military Government whose power rested on war and victory. And almost by necessity, many Germans were bound to resent, sometimes subtly to resist the American Occupation which personally as well as culturally insulted their dignity, much though they may have agreed with its loftier aspirations. Quite a few of the American officials who wanted to reform "Germany" according to blueprints and orders, carefully avoided "the Germans" themselves. As Mr. Gimbel reports, communications from German civilians were filed away by the Marburg Occupation authorities under the heading of "crank letters." Only at a late stage was this title changed-into "public opinion." Working "on Germany" rather than with Germans, Occupation recalled the reformers who love mankind and hate their fellow-man; and not unlike these reformers, they assumed that freedom could be brought about by bureaucracy and brute force, and the prejudiced pet ideas of Military Government "experts."

While Mr. Gimbel contributes valuable case material and sound analyses, some shortcoming mar his findings. In the first place, the study was apparently undertaken in the years 1953-54, that is, immediately after the end of Occupation when Germans for the first time felt free again; in an understandable reaction, they then tended to show a measure of resentment, and even bitterness, against Occupation, and through this, against America, which soon thereafter disappeared, as this reviewer observed. Only in those years, for instance, did anti-Occupation, anti-American themes play a significant role in German fiction; in the subsequent years, Occupation in German eyes appeared rather as an anticlimactic post-script of the war, without much emotional or factual impact. Had Mr. Gimbel undertaken his study in the years after 1956, he would hardly have concluded, as he did in 1954, that Occupation left a reservoir of anti-Americanism among Germans.

A second shortcoming is unhappily connected with the case study method: likely to over-emphasize local events, it runs the risk of disregarding or distorting the wider national picture. This seems to occur, for instance, when Mr. Gimbel arrives at a negative evaluation of the democratic forces in the Christian Democratic Union, partly on the strength of a speech given in 1946 before a Marburg CDU youth rally by one Maria Sevenich. A study of the history of Germany and the CDU would have revealed that this speaker-an ex-Communist who somehow joined the CDU in the first postwar years-was generally regarded an irresponsible and hysterical rabblerouser. She

disappeared from the public view as soon as political life in general, and the CDU in particular, were stabilized, and did not reflect the temper of her people or party at large.

But limitations of this kind are merely unavoidable side-products of the isolated-case reporting method which Mr. Gimbel has used, and which on the whole validly presents the course as well as the causes of the failure of a Noble Experiment. Happily, its failure seems to have left no bad scars on the German body politic. Under more auspicious conditions, German leadership and American policies as they evolved after the end of Occupation have combined over the past few years to bring about Occupation's primary objectives—a peaceful, prosperous, lawful Germany closely tied to its American ally.

Reviewed by NORBERT MUHLEN

U.S.A. Revisited

Midcentury, by John Dos Passos. Boston Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961.

In *Midcentury*, his new novel dealing with labor union racketeering and chicanery in business and industry, Dos Passos has utilized the general form employed in his *U.S.A.* 

The form here includes a poetic prelude and epode and poetic interludes within the work. The poetry is "modern," availing

itself of typographical arrangement to establish its identity, yet including passages of genuine poetic feeling. The resources of page make-up are also utilized throughout for special emphasis. And, while noting such details, it may be appropriate to observe that Dos Passos believes in "togetherness" in words. He omits the hyphens in words ordinarily hyphenated though he is not averse to hyphenated creations of his own. What is ordinarily a truncated phrase appears as "infradig" without having passed through any intermediate hyphenated stage, suggesting some exotic linguistic origin instead of the classical flavor of old collegiate slang. Occasionally the reader may be uncertain whether he is dealing with "private" vocabulary or misprints.

In lieu of plot, *Midcentury* contains biographical data concerning several individuals and their women folk. Their experiences provide the vehicle for Dos Passos' protest against the evils that plague the labor union and industry. The experiences of Terry and Blackie deal with labor problems, those of Jap with those of industry. (Personal problems such as love life and even a dash of marginal marital infidelity are noted, but even these are subordinated to the main issues of the workaday problems of racketeering and similar struggles.)

In comparison with the great fictional creations of earlier novelists, the characters of Dos Passos' book seem mere puppets. Yet it may be that he is really an accurate observer who is describing a society whose members are actually shallow and lack the depth of personalities of the past. Like that of the ant and the bee, our complex society has more character in the aggregate than in its individuals whom the pressures toward conformity are reducing to stereotypes.

The stories of Terry and Jap converge at a single point. Terry is killed in a taxi war while in Jap's employ. The concurrent struggles of these two are dramatically presented. Blackie tells his own story in a series of monologues as he lies dying of tuberculosis. He reviews the history of the labor movement from the days when, with its Knights of Labor, its cause might have been regarded as a Crusade, through the days of I.W.W., down to the present.

Scattered among the fictional passages are sketches of figures in the public eye. These portraits of Harry Bridges, Sam Goldwyn, Eleanor Roosevelt, and the rest make very lively reading. The language in which they are couched and their juxtaposition to the fictional material impart to the latter the suggestion of historicity.

Two other types of interspersions, that of the seven sections labeled Investigator's Notes scattered throughout the work and that of the Documentaries, also contribute to creating the appearance of historicity for Dos Passos' fiction. The former are for the most part accounts of efforts to clean up labor union racketeering by legal process. The mortality among potential witnesses is frightening indeed. The Documentaries are of the nature of headlines. They reflect social problems, record the scientific progress which promises to reshape our lives. They include advertising blurbs making all kinds of claims. All these interspersions accent the ferment and confusion of the world in which we live.

Midcentury, with its multiplicity of what passes for plot and its variety of detail, is a powerful work that brings into sharp focus some of the evils of our national life at the moment when optimists are reveling in the thought of our contemporary progress. To this reviewer's mind, Dos Passos has scored a success.

Reviewed by CHARLES J. ADAMEC

## The Scientistic Fallacy

Scientism and Values, edited by Helmut Schoeck and James W. Wiggins. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1960.

THE EXCESSES AND pretensions of modern social science have gone almost unchallenged by dissenting professionals. Oddly enough, up to now the most determined if not the most noteworthy attacks have been made by three literary men, all Columbia University professors—Barzun, Krutch, and Trilling. But except for Krutch, they have limited themselves to handling mischievously the Parsonian ponderosity of terminology, something which officially designated sociologists, and even historians and economists, have from time to time themselves poked fun at.

The twelve contributors to this volume are drawn from several fields, but most of them are social scientists employing an effective, and long overdue, tactic of boring from within. As in all compilations of this kind, the contributions are uneven in quality, but all are worth reading and most of them are significant and important.

And unlike most other books by many authors, this one was not put together after several searches for a subject had gone off in a dozen different directions. The philosophical foundation of modern social science, and of sociology in particular, is consistently examined and questioned. The basic thesis is that the social scientist cannot remove himself from the value-meshed social world he examines. That "he knows how to counteract or get rid of bias in his work" is an "illusion." It is also evident that not one of these contributors would

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question Pareto's dictum that, since there can be no scientific data on the subject, science cannot determine what ends society should pursue. One contributor, in fact, improves upon Pareto's phrasing: "The key to decision-making is not the knowledge provided by the sciences; it is the value commitments of a civilized humanity. These commitments, and not the sciences, determine ultimately what our ends and goals should be."

The common focus is scientism, an "undue application of the terminology and of the methods of science to the study of man," a "boundary transgression or a misuse of otherwise legitimate procedures and attitudes of science." Scientism denies "the existence of individual consciousness and will"; instead of the once fashionable "profession of ethical beliefs," scientism is the new "pretension" that "screens the power urge."

Science cannot, then, "save us," and the social and political consequences of the belief that it can do so are explored. Scientism has had an historical affinity for utopian schemes of perfectionism, and thus directly or indirectly with dangerously innocent schemes for determining what other peoples' best interests are; that is to say, with authoritarianism. The dangerous innocence of "scientists" in sociology is shown by the persistent identification of "controlling variables" in physical experiments with "controlling variables" (i.e., people who persist in doing what they themselves choose to do) in so-called social planning.

This is a good book, an important book. It will not be a popular book, for the simple reason that it was put together by rational empiricists who have discarded the dominant myths and pieties. I have only one quarrel with it. The pervasiveness and folly and danger of scientistic thought are fully and persuasively—at least to a mind that remains uncaptured by scientism—ex-

plored, but I question the extent to which modern practitioners of social science are personally responsible for the present state of affairs. Most of the contributors assign them a power to move events which I feel is in these pages somewhat exaggerated. There remains a question of who controls scientism and who is controlled by it.

Reviewed by ARNOLD W. GREEN

# The City of the Trans-Cultural God

Philosophical Anthropology and Practical Politics, by F. S. C. Northrop. New York: MacMillan Company, 1960.

ONE OF THE GRATIFYING REWARDS of opening any of the works of F. S. C. Northrop is the anticipation of being exposed to far-ranging erudition and a provocative mind at play. Philosophical Anthropology and Practical Politics does not disrupt this sequence. Certainly Professor Northrop's primary charm, for me, is the scope of his interests, which sacrifices little if any depth in this pleasing diversity. To find an avowed political theorist exhibiting competence in speculative philosophy, logic, science, anthropology, art and literature does a good deal to buoy up one's faith that humane learning is not yet defunct among us and that certain urbane accoutrements are not yet wholly unfashionable. Professor Northrop may well be the Aldous Huxley of our sturdy fraternity, albeit a less leisurely and more hyper-organized version.

Philosophical Anthropology (may I "shorthand" the rather formidable title?) will not disappoint those who anticipate a

solid Northrop performance. I am not so sure that it will delight all serious-minded observors of international politics, be they of the Realpolitik persuasion that Northrop so vociferously castigates or of the more moralistically inclined. In any event, it would be a difficult book to appraise in a single pithy sentence, not alone for the obvious complexities of his subject, but also for the reason that he has, it seems to me, produced two books under one title. One deals with the philosophic problem of examining the base upon which cultures and national behavior rest and the other substantially consists of policy criticism and prescriptions for world tranquility. Indeed, Northrop himself invites those readers caring little for the rigours of methodology or digging about in epistemological investigations to skip Part I and wade without delay into Parts II and III. I think it is fair to say that somehow these two problem areas never really become reconciled. Part of this disjuncture springs, as might be expected, from the fact that several of Northrop's "examples" used for illustration are articles and papers published elsewhere and included within the framework of the book. The result of this bi-level structuring makes it possible, as in my case, to be sympathetic to the position Professor Northrop assumes in relation to the question of the genesis and substance of culture, while retaining considerable reservation regarding his recommendations for the curing of the world's political maladies.

In Part One of his book, Northrop succinctly states his basic premise:

The political problems of today's world, both domestic and international, center in the mentalities and customs of people and only secondarily and afterwards in their tools—whether these tools be economic, military, technological or eschatological in the sense of the Reverend Reinhold Niebuhr.

This permits him to argue:

The problem of designing a foreign policy to achieve peace becomes that of describing the specific anthropological philosophical properties of each of the world's nations, including one's own, and then putting together these nations with their diverse philosophical properties as they are today (not as one might like to have them be) in such a way that political nitroglycerin is not exploded.

How is this done? Professor Northrop proposes that "philosophical anthropology" can be relied upon, defining that term as an evaluation of the "living law" of nations. He draws the distinction between a "living law" as a sort of cultural-moral consensus underlying a given society and "positive law" as the formal ordering of political societies. In this connection, Northrop launches a vigorous attack upon legal positivism and with equal enthusiasm offers a defense of "sociological jurisprudence." The method of philosophical anthropology, he contends, has both a descriptive and an evaluative phase. He writes:

... any practical politician who would possess objective knowledge of the positive or living law of any nation must use the descriptive method not merely of anthropology but of philosophical anthropology.

An important feature of his validation of this descriptive method rests on epistemological ground. In this regard, he offers an altogether cogent and effective defense of logical realism, buttressed by most intriguing inferences drawn from the McCulloch-Pitt neurological experiments concerned with "trapped universals." The heart of Northrop's argument for ubiquity of cultural determinants in politics is his explanation of the existence of "epistemically correlated trapped impulses" and the necessity

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for the recognition of the significance of "indirectly confirmed, logically realistic facts." Description, then, must contain a "nonnormatively worded theory of first-order factual man and nature" and "its one-one epistemic correlate which is the inner hierarchically trapped target of one's public teleologically mechanical nervous system and its motor behavior as mechanically inhibited or reinforced prescriptively by this target."

Evaluation, correspondingly, "consists in finding the non-normatively worded first-order factual assumptions of any personal or national philosophy, apart from which its normative words are devoid of content, and then examining these assumptions with respect both to (a) their logical consistency and (b) empirical data inspectable by anyone anywhere, to test their truth or falsity."

The problems arise, I believe, when this conception of philosophical anthropology is applied to the realm of the nation-state. Certain disturbing questions arise regarding Northrop's fundamental assumptions. While one would unhesitatingly agree that philosophically-grounded anthropology should receive greater attention from the "practical politicians" which Professor Northrop holds in low esteem, his reduction of national behavior in terms of foreign policy to cultural and ideological factors provokes some rather unoriginal queries which he leaves unanswered. Could it not be argued with some justification, for example, that the characteristics of state policy while affected by the "living law" are more the products of the unique relationship of any nation-state to the international complex of nation-states? It could certainly be asserted that the policy of nations proceeds from general postulates not determined by the peculiar cultural make-up of the nation, but by the factors of international political relatedness.

Further, it could be pointed out that the

behavior of states may be more the result of the initiative of policy-makers and if this is so, to what extent is the cultural frame of these policy-makers identical or even similar to the national patterns? One might argue that there is a significant cosmopolitan occupational behavioral pattern of statesmen more pervasive in their thought processes than their national inculturation.2 Northrop's assault upon the "power" school of international politics-Kennan, Morgenthau, et al-as alleged victims of "Hobbesian error" is so strenuous as to suggest that only two choices exist, Northrop's and "power politics." I for one reject this as an over-simplification.

Then there is the much-ploughed issue of cultural relativism. Assuming a "living law" of the nations, is this international rapprochment to be based upon conviction that each culture must be judged only upon its own criteria? Northrop rejects this view and suggests that non-western societies can and must learn "that they can perfectly realize their non-codifiable jen, Nirvana or Brahman goal values only if they combine its intuitive indeterminate and uncodifiable experience of the morally good, the politically just and religiously Divine with the more formal, imageless type of goal value which free democratic law-of-contract philosophy defines. . . ." This would seem to require a bit of doing. How far can "understanding" be stretched (assuming for the moment that the origin of international animosity is lack of "understanding") without provoking clashes of value which are not merely redefinitions, but substantive issues?

I take it that Professor Northrop assumes a common factor in divergent cultures. It is upon this universal element that he would found international jurisprudence, but I confess to some confusion as to how he proposes to accomplish this. At one point he states:

The living law of the rest of the world is not identical with that of Western Continental Europe. Hence, if world-wide similarly effective international law or free domestic national law is to be achieved, it must be tailor-made and fitted to the specific objectively determinable complex living law of each particular nation and cultural tradition.

Elsewhere, he adds:

Then by bringing together objective knowledge of these national living law factors, it should be possible to write a positive legal constitution for the world that will specify and command the living law support that is necessary to make itself effective, thereby giving additional content to the basic international legal principle upon which any modern nation depends.

Yet again, he writes:

When the domestic law of any contracturally legal nation is thus understood, it may be instrumentally valuable, but there is no necessity that there be an international court of justice to decide international legal and political disputes. Appeal of a foreign nation which believes it has been treated unjustly by some other nation can be made to any nation's federal (sic) court, including even the federal court of the nation against whom the charge of warful aggression or "peaceful" unilaterally power-political foreign policy decision making is being lodged.

One suspects that in the final analysis Professor Northrop's essential common cultural factor is the acceptance of the liberal democracy of the West, for good or ill. He advocates this with missionary zeal.<sup>3</sup> But however laudatory the objectives or benevolent the means, Northrop's whole case rests upon a not-too-deceptive cultural imperialism. And I am not too convinced that those Western "goal values" he espouses are those most fundamental or the most civiliz-

ing in our tradition. I feel that often Professor Northrop is a captive of his own evident fondness for ideological "cataloging"—a fascinating pastime, but one with an insidious lure for over-simplification.

I cannot share Professor Northrop's reification of "free democratic law-of-contract philosophy" either in the melioristic interpretation he places on it or as an axiological principle which stems from his Whiteheadian religious metaphysic. He writes of this philosophy that it was something "of which the prophets and saints of three Semitic religions of the Middle East and the West had a premonition in their concept of God as an imageless determinate logos who transcends and transforms differentiated intuitive immediacy." Never has the "free democratic political philosophy of Locke and Jefferson" received so frightening a eulogy.

Reviewed by DONALD A. ZOLL

<sup>1</sup>Northrop's recommendations are interesting to contrast with those of William McGovern in his recent book, Strategic Intelligence and the Shape of Tomorrow. Both gentlemen seem in essential agreement regarding the need for analysis in greater depth of cultural factors relating to national behavior, but as to the ultimate purposes of such investigations they radically part company.

"I am tempted to make reference to the other extreme in attempting to fathom the cerebral intricacies of statemen. This is the popular "interstate simulation" game, where at some large universities undergraduate students assume the decision-making roles of world statesmen. The result of this sort of thing, it strikes me, is that one might well become better informed on the mental peculiarities of undergraduates, but validity of the inference that they approximate vari-cultured policy planners, world-round, seems dubious, to say the least.

<sup>3</sup>In this connection, he advises: "Instead, freedom's philosophy must proceed by persuasion with respect to what is true in a sense that can be confirmed by anyone anywhere. It must use freedom's methods. It cannot resort to shortsighted short cuts by forcing its way with warful aggression, dictatorial and inquisitorial methods or by recourse to the Index; for this is to hope to achieve freedom by destroying it." p. 338.

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## Confessions of a Legal Light

Felix Frankfurter Reminisces, recorded in talks with Dr. Harlan B. Phillips, New York: Reynal & Company, 1960.

"I'M A SPONTANEOUS CREATURE, and I like people and it's a pleasure. I'm not a reflective person. . . . I'm not a fellow who projects himself into the future. . . . Live-in-the-moment disposition. . . . Have a general direction and then somehow or other chance takes care of you. . . ." Professor Copeland told him, "You go off like an alarm clock. Don't talk so fast."

These qualities produce a very revealing book, free, extemporaneous, flowing. And as is the case with many older successful people who have lived so long with their faults and characteristics that they are oblivious to the good or bad in them, Frankfurter spreads his inmost nature for us to see.

Frankfurter has an extremely active, sharp mind, and his gifts of memory are prodigious. He was the top student in all his three years at the Harvard Law School. To be the "big man on campus" has its great and evident merit, but it may, afterwards, also tend to limit, particularly when it is not preceded by a great undergraduate school with its broader outlook.

Frankfurter has a great interest in people and a sharpness in exposing them if they are opposed to him. His judgments gain increased value, because he knows what is incontrovertible evidence—namely, a man's own words:

Wilson: "We are conducting the war on the assumption that there is a distinction between the German government and the German people."

After the tentative treaty was made public, there was great consternation as to the harshness of the terms.

Wilson: "We mean them to be harsh because we want to etch forever on the minds of the German people that the people are responsible for the conduct of its rulers," which, of course, was the very opposite of what he'd been saying throughout the war.

And there are many such judgments in the book.

But his friends, he sees with different eyes and with a different mind. He says this of Joseph P. Cotton (Cotton was a member of McAdoo, Cotton & Franklin):

I think McAdoo had been counsel for Sinclair, the oil man. McAdoo went in for money-making, and he was not reputed to be the most fastidious operator. This came after Teapot Dome and all that business.

He [Cotton] was very critical of the work he was doing and, on the whole, despised his rich clients. He squared his conscience by charging them very heavily....

It is as if a bank robber or assistant to a bank robber squared his conscience by making the other members of the gang give him twice his share. Frankfurter has brains enough and to spare to realize the immorality and nonsense of this, but Cotton was a friend of his and in judging his friends, Frankfurter puts on prisms which transpose everything.

Along with energy and mental capacity, Frankfurter has a strong motivating force to show his superiority to other people. This carries him so far that he cannot forego relating the Wigmore incident. He must show that he came out ahead of Dean Wigmore even though he realizes the damaging nature to himself of the evidence he must bring in.

Wigmore had questioned the accuracy of facts stated by Frankfurter in an article on Sacco-Vanzetti. Mr. Frankfurter has the following to say:

Mr. Lowell [President of Harvard] said to Norman Hapgood, who promptly came over to tell it to me, "Wigmore is a fool! Wigmore is a fool! He should have known that Frankfurter would be shrewd enough to be accurate."

"Shrewd enough to be accurate." Lowell does not say, "Of such great integrity that he would be accurate," nor that Frankfurter would be "wise enough" or "knowing enough"—words of great depth. No, Lowell says, "shrewd enough," one of those perfect evaluations.

To get ahead of the other fellow was with him a dominating trait. He relates the following about one of the professors in his Law School days:

Beale, one day, got off a most preposterous theory. Grenny Clark [one of the students] said, "But Mr. Beale, the rule that you've formulated is very difficult to apply."

Beale almost jumped across the table and beat him with one of his outrageous bits of casuistic repartee, "Mr. Clark, I haven't advertised this as a cinch course."

This is a perfect illustration of the chief necessity of repartee, which is to cover the hole of the moment and then move on before you get out of the hole and see that nothing's happened.

Even at the mature age when Frankfurter dictated these reminiscences, he shows no

awareness that Beale should have been interested more in the truth and less in beating down the student.

How far back does the strong animus that Frankfurter has against business go? To the Harvard Law School? He mentions with approval Dean Ame's

delight in finding again and again and again the law had much higher standards than the businessmen who prate about it.

But actually it probably went back much further.

Although Frankfurter speaks of the high standards of the law, this does not interfere with his using other means to win his case. In a case in which he was interested, he got a private appointment with Chief Justice White;

... a massive man, a charming gentleman, and a devout Catholic. White came from Louisiana and he was essentially an orator, eloquent and illuminating. As Holmes says somewhere. "His big frame was meant for politics rather than the law."

[on meeting Justice White] . . . the happy thought struck me to say, "Mr. Chief Justice, I am not at all sure I have a right to be here. I am not at all clear that I should put to you the matter I'm about to put to you, but I come to you as though in the confessional."

Well, that was a master stroke. I felt at once as though the whole church was enfolding me. He came nearer, more intimately, he said, "Tell me. Just speak freely."

Frankfurter earlier had lauded the Harvard Law School because of its professional quality. Nothing counted but the law. If it is the greatest quality for a law school to have no other god but the law, it is even more the greatest quality of a court. And yet here is Frankfurter establishing a rapport between himself and the Chief Jus-

tice on the basis of religion. Frankfurter is indeed a "shrewd" man.

This is a very important book for its revealing picture of a human being and for its clear picture of the mentality and motivations of a man whose protégés will have a very central place in our government, and doubly valuable because, as with quotations from Woodrow Wilson, Frankfurter's own words furnish incontrovertible evidence.

Reviewed by FRANK F. KOLBE

## A Moral in a Word

Studies in Words, by C. S. Lewis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960.

Anyone reading the literature of modern semantics with a reflective mind must conclude that many of those who pontificate about the relation between words and their referents actually have the smallest insight into the matter. But at the opposite pole stands a student like C. S. Lewis, who traces what words of multiple signification have meant at various times and do mean in various contexts, and illustrates what he says out of a vast erudition. His Studies in Words is a series of disquisitions upon nature, sad, wit, free, sense, simple, conscious, and conscience.

There does exist in language the fact of semantic shift, a process by which words over a period of time widen, contract, or otherwise change their roles. Of course not all words are affected or are affected equally. But since the present meaning of a word is often vaguely swayed by past meanings which have dropped into the subconscious, a knowledge of particular semantic histories can increase our facility and sometimes save us from inadvertent error.

It is revealing, for example, to know that frank at one time meant the same thing as free. Hence the present use of the term as a social-ethical upgrader. "The frank person is unencumbered by fear, calculation, an eye to the main chance; he also shows the straightforwardness and boldness of a noble nature." In a comparable sense Aristotle could speak of free studies (for him the word was eleutheria). Here is the root idea of our "liberal" education. "The free study seeks nothing beyond itself and desires the activity of knowing for that activity's own sake. That is what the man of radically servile character-give him what leisure and what fortune you please-will never understand. He will ask, 'But what is the use of it?' And finding that it cannot be eaten or drunk, nor used as an aphrodisiac, nor made the instrument of increasing his income or his power, he will pronounce it-he has pronounced it to be-'bunk.'"

Conscious and conscience were once so near in meaning as almost to excuse the college freshman's habitual mistaking of the one for the other. To have conscience meant originally to be conscious of what you know—to pull yourself together in an act of recollection. The meaning is present in the Latin conscire: "to know together." Only later did the noun come to mean something like "the lawgiver" or "the fear of hell." ("Thus conscience does make cowards of us all.")

For readers of this journal the author's most valuable revelation may well be the

following. Commenting on the changes which overcame the meaning of wit in the eighteenth century discussions of literature, he has this to remark: "However little the new poetry resembled the old, those who claimed excellence for it claimed that it showed wit. As new shopkeepers who have 'bought the goodwill' of their predecessor's business keep his name for a while over their door, so the literary innovators want[ed] to retain the prestige, almost the 'selling power,' of the consecrated word."

And precisely so in the field of politics. Here, I suggest, is the principle that we need to explain what has happened to the term *liberalism*. How is it possible that nineteenth century and twentieth century *liberalism* can mean virtually opposite things? Under statism and collectivism the shopkeeper and the wares have changed, but the name is still being used over the door as a bait, because the old liberalism, with its frank acceptance of liberty, created a great reservoir of good will.

Reviewed by RICHARD M. WEAVER

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# Communist Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics

FRANK S. MEYER

ALTHOUGH MR. ANDREW GYORGY in his article, "Relations within the Soviet Bloc: A Note on 1960 Developments," in the Spring, 1961 issue of Modern Ace, provides many perceptive and stimulating insights, I would suggest that there is a most important dimension missing from his analysis. The theoretical continuity and worldwide universality of the Communist movement and of the ideology, theoretical and operational, which is integral to its every act and motion, must be constantly held in mind if the play of events within the Communist world—the shifts of positions and personalities-is to be understood in its true significance.

In my opinion, the various tonal developments which have occurred in the Communist world since Stalin's death are fundamentally without significance. It is as tonal developments, and only as such, that I would judge the various changes of leadership and "conflicts" of emphasis, which have occurred, which continue to occur, and to which, for the year 1960, Mr. Gyorgy devotes his attention. The great event, from the Communist point of view, of 1960 was the meeting of the 81 Communist Parties

in Moscow in November. The Statement of that Conference and Khrushchev's Report on it, delivered in Moscow on January 6 of this year, constitute together proof that the Communist world still moves, as it always has moved, on the basis of a fundamental monolithic outlook and that the differences which exist within that world continue to be resolved, as they always have been resolved, on a principled basis derived from the ultimate Communist goal of world conquest under unitary leadership—in this case, the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev.

Every indication is that the November meeting was in effect the second Congress of the new form the Communist International has assumed (the first was held in 1957); that the Statement of the eighty-one Parties is equivalent to the Resolutions adopted by the seven Congresses of the Communist International; and that Khrushchev's Report is equivalent in political weight and authoritativeness to the major Reports of these Congresses. Therefore, this Report must be taken in the context of the major Communist documents of the last ten years: the main Reports to the

20th and 21st Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the material of the meeting of the international Communist Parties in Moscow in 1957.

Communist documents cannot be considered as ad hoc reactions to current situations, but only as the continuing development of a major medium-term line-established for "the period"-in the light of the particular developments of events. Interpretations of the recent Statement and Report which regard them as primarily reactions to possible Sino-Soviet strains, or to changes in the immediate technologicalmilitary situation, or to inner conflicts in the Kremlin, inevitably miss the point as that point is understood by the Communists for whose guidance the documents are issued and as they are understood as guides to action by the ruling circles of the Communist world.

## Communist Strategy

From 1917 until approximately the end of World War II, the continuing Communist strategical position was founded upon a strategic estimate of the situation summed up in the phrase "capitalist encirclement of the socialist world." They considered themselves the smaller segment of the world, the less powerful segment of the world, totally surrounded by those whom they wished to conquer. On the basis of that estimate, the determining strategy was a defensive strategy: to consolidate forces and strengthen the position of Communism, and to work by every means of subversion, conspiracy and diplomacy to secure the material base (the Soviet Union ... the doctrine of "socialism in one country") from which to move forward.

The years since World War II have constituted, from the Communist point of view, a new strategical period, a period of offensive strategy. It is not possible to date the

origin of this new strategy too closely. Essentially it begins with the moment that the victory of World War II was assured. The major outlines of the new strategical estimate and the offensive strategy based upon it were contained in Stalin's last major work, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, written shortly before his death. With the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, what had been developing in Communist consciousness was crystallized—sharply and clearly stated—as the guiding analysis for the period ahead:

The second phase has begun, the phase of socialist encirclement, the period in which the power of Communism is moving forward ever faster, in which those who resist are in retreat and on the defensive. This is the phase of strategic attack, of the strategic offensive.

The Communists have, in their view, entered the final phase of the struggle for world denomination.

#### Communist Tactics

WHILE COMMUNIST TACTICS and methods of action vary from day to day and hour to hour, depending upon the immediate situation, the fundamental direction of their tactics is always derived from their strategy.

During the first strategical phase, the phase of "capitalist encirclement" and of the strategic defensive, Communists relied primarily on offensive tactics—like a boxer who senses that his opponent is stronger and attempts to hold him off with jabs and footwork, to keep him off balance as much as possible. During this period the tone, the attitude, the public directives, the very mode of existence of Communism was primarily offensive. Their stance bristled with constant emphasis upon the irreconcilability of Communism with Western society.

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As they have moved over to the strategic offensive, however, the tactical emphasis has reversed. In this period the strategic offensive demands defensive tactics, and for a very good reason. There is only one development that in the Communist view can interfere with the continuing forward march of Communism: the consolidation in the West (which means primarily in the United States) of an understanding of the totality of the Communist threat; the consolidation in the West of a force dedicated to the destruction of Communism; the emergence in the West of a will which places the defeat of Communism as decisive. The mode of their advance in this period of their strategic offensive demands that we sleep.

Therefore, the defensive tactics (pointed up from time to time with threats and blackmail and démarches which they feel will not be seriously resisted) are dictated as modes of immobilizing and disarming us. The fundamental concept of these tactics is the concept of coexistence, a concept which is central to all operations of the Communist movement today, to be achieved by every possible method-by propaganda, by diplomacy, by cultural exchange, by infiltration, and above all by influencing opinion in the West so that our clarity of vision and our will to resist will be paralyzed. The tactic of coexistence is an absolutely necessary corollary of the strategy of "socialist encirclement."

It is in the light of this strategical and tactical general line that the statement of the eighty-one Parties and Khrushchev's Report can be understood for what it is. This was not an emergency meeting called because of some intensification of the struggle between Russian and Chinese Communists. It was the second full Congress of the New Communist International, and it reaffirmed and carried forward the general line of

world Communism as developed over the past decade.

It is true that certain differences of emphasis undoubtedly existed between Khrushchev's position and the "left" tendencies represented not only by the Chinese Party but by elements throughout the Communist Parties, including the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It is equally true, although less attention has been paid to it, that differences existed between Khrushchev's position and "revisionist" positions, for which Tito was made the whipping boy, but which would not have received the attention they did were they not reflected in more "legitimate" circles. But those disagreements were resolved and absorbed into the main line of the Statement, Khrushchev's line, on the basis of reaffirmation of the policy of strategic offensive, tactical defensive.

The first, the doctrine of the strategic offensive, is contained in the analysis of "the balance of forces" in the world and the continued vaunting of Communist superiority; in the sharply stated aggressive position on Berlin and Germany; in the aggressive statement of policy for Cuba and Latin America; and in the assertion of a profound contrast between "local wars" and "wars of national liberation."

The second, the doctrine of defensive tactics, is contained in the placing of coexistence, the prevention of general war, and disarmament as the major line of the Communist movement.

It is made perfectly clear that the errors of the "revisionist Right" consist in the transformation of tactical doctrine into strategical doctrine, namely dependence on "coexistence" and "peaceful transformation" to bring about automatically victory for Communism; it is made equally clear that the errors of the "left" consist in the failure to understand that the tactic of coexistence is vital to success in a strategic-

ally offensive phase, and therefore to put dangerously aggressive tactics, which run the risk of awakening the West, in the place of the necessary masking tactics of coexistence and disarmament.

The concrete program which embodied the resolution of the different emphases (not a "compromise" of them, as it has been called) is expressed in four major points: (a) to further the widest possible movement throughout the world for "coexistence" and Western disarmament; (b) to threaten to transform any local war carried out by the west in its own defense into a general war (a new tactic-Communist "deterrence"); (c) to proclaim all-out support for all "wars of national liberation," that is, for aggressive local wars against the West; (d) to consolidate the balance of power in the Eurasian continent and decisively disrupt the Western alliance by carrying out under the umbrella of coexistence a determined campaign for the capture of Berlin and the neutralization of West Germany.

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On the basis of the theoretical analysis of the strategical and tactical situation and by the promulgation of a practical program based on that analysis, a unified policy for the international Communist movement, was hewn out; the ideological authority of Nikita Khrushchev as the leader of international Communism in all respects was confirmed; and a clearly directed if flexible program for the immediate future was laid down. That program, which is being carried out before our eyes, can be translated succinctly into: press the Communist advance in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America through "national revolutionary" movements and drive towards the neutralization first of Germany, then of Europe, while diverting the attention of the West-above all, of the United Statesby a world-wide campaign for "coexistence" and disarmament.

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